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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Aaron A. Rodriguez 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: The Echo of God’s Laughter: Aesthetic Experience and the Virtue of Openness 
within a Pragmatist Ethics 
 
 
 Immanuel Kant’s claim that morality is a matter of rational judgment is perhaps the 
apotheosis of a tradition within ethical philosophy that sought certainty with regards to how 
one ought to live or what one should to do in any given situation.  Although this strand still 
lingers in various guises in contemporary moral philosophy, pragmatism has set itself up as 
a response to this quest for ethical certainty.  Yet, with its anti-absolutist commitments, 
pragmatist approaches to ethics struggle with the articulation of a prescriptive moral 
philosophy.  Virtue ethics, however, with its focus on the general dispositions of agents, 
suggests itself as a viable model for a normative pragmatist moral theory.  Moreover, in 
moving away from the view that moral progress is a form of knowledge-acquisition, 
pragmatist ethics opens the door for a host of possible influences for our ethical 
development. In this dissertation, I argue that aesthetic experience, as elicited by the work 
of art, can significantly inform our ethical lives by cultivating in us what I consider to be 
the cardinal pragmatist virtue, openness.  For, not only does this disposition, which John 
Dewey describes as a “hospitality towards the new” and a “willingness to be affected by 
experience,” prove salutary in regards to the pursuits of individual flourishing and social 
melioration, but one can also construct a system of norms and values upon it while not 
 v 
 
contradicting pragmatism’s anti-absolutist commitments.  Engagements with art can help 
foster this virtue, I argue, because the work of art helps unsettle the conceptual systems of 
interpretation we often over-rely on in moral inquiry and thus expands our horizons of 
possibility for human meaning and action.   
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CHAPTER I 
UNCERTAIN MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO A  
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO ETHICS 
[H]e looked out to where the grass was running in the wind  
under the cold starlight as if it were the earth itself hurtling headlong  
and he said softly before he slept again that the one thing he knew 
 of all things claimed to be known was that there was no certainty to any of it. 
     - Cormac McCarthy, The Crossing 
Introduction 
 In The Art of the Novel, Milan Kundera articulates his philosophy of writing, 
which is framed in large part by a rebuke of dogmatism and self-certainty in literature, 
criticism, and life itself.  In the midst of this critique, Kundera notes, “[t]he agélastes, the 
non-thought of received ideas, and kitsch are one and the same, the three-headed enemy 
of the art born as the echo of God’s laughter, the art that created the fascinating 
imaginative realm where no one owns the truth and everyone has the right to be 
understood” (Kundera 1986, 164).1  In mentioning the agélastes, Kundera is paying 
homage to François Rabelais, who used the term to refer to those who do not laugh.  The 
rhetoric of Kundera’s criticism is also inspired by a Jewish proverb: “Man thinks, God 
laughs.”  Kundera interprets this proverb as God laughing in the face of the hubris we 
exhibit with respect to our intellect, our thinking.  Those who do not laugh, then, have 
themselves never heard God’s laughter, and think that human thought somehow gets in 
touch with absolute truth.  It is easy to see how such a mindset would lend itself to the 
non-thought of received ideas, and the kitsch, by which Kundera means an aesthetic 
                                                 
1
 All of the citations in this dissertation are made in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style, except 
for citations of Dewey, which are made according to The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953. 
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which denies the uncertain and misanthropic realities of existence.  As I hope to show, 
this three-headed enemy is also the antithesis of an approach to ethics fashioned within 
the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, an approach which also contains many artistic 
tropes.  Genuine art, according to Kundera, is born from the recognition of human 
limitations and vulnerability; though this realization does not disquiet.  Indeed, for both 
Kundera and pragmatists, embracing the uncertainty of experience opens us up to the 
wealth of possibilities for living a human life.  
 This dissertation will focus on two seemingly distinct concerns: (1) taking into 
consideration its anti-absolutist assumptions, how can a pragmatist approach to ethics put 
forth anything resembling a prescriptive ethical philosophy?; and (2) what significance, if 
any, can an encounter with a work of art have for our ethical lives?  However separate 
these concerns may seem on the surface, it is my contention that the two are actually 
closely related.  Indeed, as will be shown, a pragmatic conception of ethics, one that 
draws heavily on classical American pragmatists such as William James and John 
Dewey, contemporary neopragmatist Richard Rorty, as well as the “continental 
pragmatist” Friedrich Nietzsche, leads one away from searching for ethical guidance in 
absolute principles, universal systems, or dogmatic rules, and towards our lived 
experience itself.  In particular, within such a pragmatist framework, the moral import of 
art, and specifically visual art, itself gains a renewed respect.
2
 
 In attempting to erect a bridge between his Second (1788) and Third (1790) 
Critiques, Immanuel Kant might have been the first to suggest in some detail the moral 
implications of aesthetic experience in his proclamation that beauty is the symbol of 
                                                 
2
 Although certain strands of moral philosophy employ a distinction between “ethics” and “morality,” I will 
be using the terms interchangeably to connote the basic normative questions of how one ought to live and 
what one should do in a particular situation.   
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morality.
3
  Roughly a century later, Leo Tolstoy, in his “What is Art” (1896) argued that 
the primary criterion for judging a work of art ought to be how infectious the moral 
feelings it evoked are (not to mention that those moral feelings should line up with 
Tolstoy’s own Christian commitments).  And, in his own writings on art in the early to 
mid-20
th
 century, Heidegger himself averred that a work of art informs and reflects a 
historical community’s sense of what is and what matters.  Heidegger also, however, 
recognized, echoing G. W. F. Hegel, that art’s station within society is in decline, and 
that instead of giving “to things their look” and giving “to humanity their outlook on 
themselves” (Heidegger 2002, 21), art is being reduced to mere entertaining distraction, 
frivolous ornamentation, or status symbols for the upper class.   
 Peruse any art gallery, museum, or art show and Hegel and Heidegger’s dour 
verdict on art may very well be thought vindicated.  Moreover, with many school district 
and city budgets feeling the pinch of the global economic crisis, the dramatic decrease in 
public funding for arts programs and public arts projects illustrates the devaluation of art 
within present-day American society.  Difficult and uncertain times such as we are now 
in typically bring to light the unsaid priorities of a given society and, as such, the 
depreciation of art has come into relief. 
 It is hard to deny that we are indeed in a time of drastic transition on a world-
historical level.  The global economic crisis, the unrelenting and exponential growth of 
                                                 
3
 For the purposes of this dissertation, an aesthetic experience refers to the human encounter with a work of 
art.  Much of what will be said regarding art’s significance for ethics may very well apply to the 
appreciation of nature as well, yet the difference between the two seems substantial enough to warrant a 
much more detailed treatment of nature’s aesthetic value – a treatment I unfortunately do not have the 
space for here.  Additionally, in subsequent chapters it will become clear that I am electing to focus on the 
visual arts in particular.  The aesthetic theory with which I will be working, I believe, accommodates all 
forms of art.  One reason for this choice, then, is simply to avoid having to engage the subtleties of each art 
form.  Also, much has already been written on the ethically-transformative potential of music, tragedy, and 
literature. Visual arts, on the other hand, especially when not thought of as carrying with it a “moral” or as 
propaganda, has not really been considered as being morally-salutary.    
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technology, concerns about human overpopulation, intense geopolitical changes, and 
other such instabilities have bred an air of uncertainty.  Within our own society, this 
uncertainty has seemingly led to a retreat to convention, as we lack the conceptual 
resources necessary to think through the novel problems we are now facing.  Experience 
has no doubt become rather complicated, yet we are all too ready to simplify this 
complexity by appealing to outworn systems of thought comprised of traditional ideas 
about such concepts as freedom, personhood, good/bad and right/wrong.  Instead of 
searching for ways to remap and transform human experience, we are shoddily 
attempting to patch the crust of convention so that we have something supposedly stable 
on which to meander into the future.   
 Within ethical and moral philosophy, this retreat to the traditional and 
conventional is likewise apparent.  Although normative ethics are reappearing in certain 
guises, the basic Socratic question of how one ought to live has been relegated beneath 
metaethical projects, applied ethics’ pursuit of incorrigible guides to action, and the 
descriptive analysis of moral concepts.  Offering up novel suggestions for how we might 
navigate the ambiguity and complexity of our situation, in a way that does not retreat to 
the comfortable confines of tradition, does not seem to be of prime concern for many 
contemporary philosophers. 
 During a similar period of uncertainty, one manifested in the philosophical world 
by the growing skepticism concerning the notion of “Truth,” G. E. Moore and other 
analytic philosophers elected to focus on the conceptual analysis of ethical terms.  
Dewey, however, despite writing during a time of radical economic, political, 
demographic, and technological transformation within the United States and living 
 5 
 
through such destabilizing events as the American Civil War and both World Wars, held 
firm in his belief that the abandonment of an Archimedean point in ethics did not 
necessarily lead to the abandonment of normative and practically-applicable ethical 
theory.  Rather, Dewey’s thought, which resonates in many ways with Nietzsche’s, and 
which was significantly influential for Rorty, can be best understood as a philosophy 
dedicated to helping us craft flexible guides for living and action; ones which do not 
disregard the fundamental precariousness of our world.  In fact, looking at Dewey’s 
ethical project in general, we can see how the two distinct concerns mentioned at the 
outset are perhaps not as separate as first thought.  That is, holding together Dewey’s 
normative ethics and his aesthetic theory, a theory which gives pride of place to art within 
our human experience, specific ways in which an encounter with a work of art can inform 
our moral development emerge.
4
  Indeed, in this dissertation, I will argue that a 
pragmatist approach to ethics provides a viable prescriptive moral philosophy that not 
only embraces the uncertainty of our ethical lives, but also reminds us that art can be a 
powerful, ethically-transformative force by fostering a certain orientation towards 
experience – an orientation crowned by the virtue of openness.   
 
Pragmatism’s supposed immaturity 
 Despite its recent resurgence through philosophers such as Rorty, Hillary Putnam, 
Joseph Margolis, and Richard Bernstein, pragmatism still remains on the fringes of 
mainstream American and European academic philosophy.  In its various attempts to 
                                                 
4
 While Dewey certainly plays the lead role in this inquiry into the ethical significance of artistic 
appreciation, Nietzsche and Rorty are worth singling out as the other key inspirations for this project.  
Throughout the course of this dissertation, I hope to show how, instead of fussing over their various 
disagreements and divergences, holding them together in conversation supplements each thinker’s views in 
a way that particularly illuminates the value that art can have for our ethical lives. 
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undermine the conventional notions of truth, objectivity, and representationalist models 
of experience which have dominated much of the western philosophical tradition, 
pragmatism clearly cuts against the grain.  This supposed heresy committed by the 
pragmatists against the golden idols of Plato, Descartes, and Kant, coupled with a 
superficial understanding of just what pragmatism is all about, has led to the almost out-
of-hand dismissal of most its proposals.  Nowhere is this chilly reception on the part of 
mainstream philosophy more apparent than in pragmatist approaches to ethics; for, in 
echoing Nietzsche and denying a God’s-eye-view perspective of reality, and hence the 
possibility of absolute foundations for knowledge and morality, pragmatists often get 
branded with the scarlet letter R.
5
  This disdain for moral relativism lies in what Rorty 
thinks is those critics’ belief that “unless there is something absolute, something which 
shares God’s implacable refusal to yield to human weakness, we have no reason to go on 
resisting evil” (Rorty 1999, xxix).   
 One of my former professors, who is rather representative of the more mainstream 
analytic moral philosophy currently dominant in the Anglophone world, first brought to 
my attention this disdain for the philosophical worldview arising out of the basic 
commitments shared by the likes of Nietzsche, James, Dewey, and Rorty.  In hearing this 
professor blithely belittle what he considered to be an extremely watered-down ethics 
coming out of pragmatist thought, one could easily get the impression that pragmatism is 
simply an immature philosophy, appealing to the postmodern, ironic relativism rampant 
amongst the current generation of American undergraduates.  On this same point, Rorty 
notes: “Pragmatism is often said to be a distinctively American philosophy.  Sometimes 
this is said in tones of contempt, as it was by Bertrand Russell.  Russell meant that 
                                                 
5
 That is, for relativist. 
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pragmatism is a shallow philosophy, suitable for an immature country” (Rorty 1999, 23).  
In other words, at a certain point in life, one should realize that the embracing of 
contingency and the worldview that follows from that acceptance can no longer be taken 
seriously.  With maturation comes a fixity of belief, and, according to this way of 
thinking, that is what growing up is all about.  Moreover, without something utterly 
foundational and immune to revision, this professor would always rhetorically ask, 
“What will the ironists be willing to die for?” 
 Despite the fundamentalist undertones of such a query, there is something telling 
about this interpretation of pragmatism, and it illustrates why pragmatist approaches to 
ethics, in particular, are not seen as credible alternatives to current traditional, 
mainstream moral philosophy.  That is, despite its explicit attempts to unsettle the 
conventional concepts and distinctions which have been passed down from philosophical 
generation to philosophical generation, pragmatism still finds itself caught in the logic of 
those traditional conceptual frameworks, whereby the absence of unshakeable 
foundations is thought to necessarily entail some form of capricious subjective or cultural 
relativism. 
 
The quest for ethical certainty 
 This entrapment is most apparent when contextualized within a pernicious either-
or that, by my lights, continues to dog not only more everyday ethical inquiry, but also 
much of the landscape of moral philosophy.  This either-or consists in the belief that 
either ethical prescriptions must be justified by some ahistorical, absolute foundation, 
such as an essential human nature, Divine Law, or transcendental Reason; or we are 
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doomed to some form of moral skepticism, nihilistic relativism, or at the very least, the 
impossibility of a prescriptive ethics  As Rorty disparagingly sees it, within this context, 
then, the aim of ethical theory should be to gradually unravel the veil of appearances 
occluding our moral vision in order to see moral Truth in all its magnificent and 
uncomplicated splendor. 
 The story Rorty spins of this mindset’s origin is worth retelling, as it lines up 
nicely with Nietzsche’s own history of otherworldly metaphysics, as well as Dewey’s 
critique of the quest for certainty that has plagued the philosophical tradition of the 
West.
6
  One of the widely accepted interpretations of the birth of philosophy in ancient 
Greece nearly 2500 years ago describes how philosophers, as opposed to the poets such 
as Hesiod and the rhetorically-gifted sophists, attempted to ground their descriptions 
about what is, as well as their prescriptions about how things ought to be, in rational 
justifications.  In other words, what Plato sought was an indubitable justification for 
Socrates’ argument against Thrasymachus that justice is not merely the will to power of 
the strong over and against the weak.  What was wanted was something certain, a 
justification underlying belief that was as incorrigible as the geometer’s proof that the 
sum of the angles of any triangle is equal to 180 degrees.  Regarding Socrates’ seemingly 
simple question of how one ought to live, however, such verification proves much harder 
to provide.   
                                                 
6
 In what follows, I will be discussing the relatively standard and mainstream interpretations of the 
Platonic-Christian-Kantian tradition.  I do acknowledge that Plato does not have to be read as a Platonist, 
that there are forms of Christian morality that are not absolutist, and that some do not see Kant as the 
metaphysician par excellence.  My reason for using the Nietzschean narrative about this tradition is that it 
is the reading of that tradition to which pragmatism is directly responding.  Furthermore, as noted, 
especially with regards to Christian morality, these are the mainstream interpretations of these approaches, 
and, as such, they are the ones that have had the most profound effect on our common sense views of 
morality. 
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 There does, though, seem to be a nagging desire among humans for an 
unwavering beacon to guide us through the inescapable complexities and ambiguity of 
our situation.  We want to know that we are doing the right thing, that we are living the 
right way.  We want to somehow discover the one correct answer to the Socratic question 
mentioned above.  As Nietzsche and Dewey both observe, we yearn for something stable, 
universal, and absolute to redeem the impermanence, contingency, and perspectivism 
inherent in human existence.  Thus arose the various conceptions of the “True World,” 
which Nietzsche sketched out in a polemical dig at otherworldly metaphysics, that were 
supposed to be the home of our ethical guiding light – a home beyond the vagaries of our 
world of mere shadows and appearances that could allow for the certainty we so desired 
(Nietzsche 1976b, 485).   
 According to Nietzsche, however, this appeal to a redemptive “True World” 
which transcends our earthly abode did not die out with the replacement of Platonism by 
Christianity within the movement of western thought, but rather transformed itself from 
the Platonic realm of the Forms into God’s Kingdom of Heaven.  As the Divine Law has 
been appealed to by numerous moralists as the very source of the deepest intuitions of 
our conscience,
7
 the influence that Christian morality had, and continues to have, on 
ethical philosophy cannot be understated.  And, needless to say, such an omnipotent 
source of moral direction placates that longing for certitude mentioned above. 
 But, as the story goes, with Newton’s science spurring on the Enlightenment, 
reason replaced God as the guarantor of moral judgment.  Yet, this shift only bolstered 
the ambitious pursuit of unshakable foundations for ethics; the acme of which is found in 
                                                 
7
 C. S. Lewis’ Mere Christianity (1952) is but one example of such an appeal.  Moreover, the traction his 
ideas gained evince the allure of this approach to explaining conscience. 
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the work of Kant.  With his categorical imperative, Kant proposed to explain, as he did 
concerning scientific judgments about nature, how it is possible to have certainty 
regarding how we ought to live.  It was pure practical reason that Kant leaned on for this 
demonstration of objective moral judgment, and through explaining its workings, he 
attempted to show how absolute moral principles could be generated a priori.  So, while 
this approach to morality may have replaced God with the supreme faculty of Reason as 
the source of our conscience, it nonetheless removed empirical considerations from the 
realm of the ethical. 
 The tie that binds these standard interpretations of the prescriptive ethics of Plato, 
Christianity, and Kant, then, could thus easily be described as the attempt to drastically 
simplify the complexity of experience and provide people with the reassurance that they 
are living the one right way or doing the right thing in any situation.  Such a guarantee 
was said to come from the fact that the good person was indeed actualizing her essential 
human potential by getting into contact with some ideal, non-human reality, whether it be 
the Form of the Good, the Kingdom of Heaven, or the supersensible, noumenal realm of 
Morality.  And, again, only with such absolute, ahistorical underpinnings could humanity 
be sure that they were headed in the right direction and avoiding evil.  Yet, according to 
Dewey, subscribers to this black-and-white view of morality are driven by an urge for 
“certainty,” an urge that is “born of timidity and nourished by love of  authoritative 
prestige,” and which “has led to the idea that absence of immutably fixed and universally 
applicable ready-made principles is equivalent to moral chaos” (MW 14:165). 
 Admittedly, much of the story I have been telling is also gleaned from Rorty’s 
reading of the western tradition’s view of moral progress; that is, as something akin to the 
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acquisition of knowledge through reason’s gradual dismantling of appearances.  As 
noted, within such an understanding, there is not a lot of grey area in the realm of ethics 
and morality.  Right is right, wrong is wrong, good and evil are absolute and certain.  
Hence we are faced with the dilemma mentioned above: either morality is articulated and 
justified in terms that are universal, eternal, and necessary, or it is merely as relative and 
subjective as, to use Kant’s parlance, a judgment of the agreeable.8 
 A pragmatist ethics, then, is best understood as a response to this tradition; a 
tradition which has undoubtedly found footing within our everyday view of morality.  
One of the most distinguishing features of pragmatism is that it embraces the changing 
and contingent nature of our experience.  This leads pragmatists to stress the contextual 
aspects of our moral lives, thereby rejecting the black-and-white view just described.  
Yet, despite the common misunderstanding, pragmatists are not anti-theory, and do want 
to say something positive about how we might live our lives in a way that promotes 
human flourishing.  A positive pragmatist ethical philosophy, then, will not seek to 
propound any fixed principles, empty formalist moral theories, or absolute conceptions of 
the summum bonnum.  Instead, ethical prescriptions become, within this pragmatist 
framework, matters of comportment.  That is, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty, for instance, 
put forth normative ethics that come in the form of a sketch of an ideal orientation 
towards experience.  In lieu of providing incorrigible action-guidance, pragmatists tend to 
focus on the sorts of character traits a person should have so as to equip them to deal with 
                                                 
8
 Now, to be fair, there certainly have been exceptions to this view of ethics that have appeared throughout 
the history of philosophy.  David Hume, for instance, actually took a much more naturalistic approach to 
morality in proclaiming it to be rooted in the emotions and, therefore, he argued that moral progress was a 
matter of cultivating certain sentiments.  Within the traditional framework just discussed, however, 
emotions and our passional nature are the very things that must be overcome in ethical conduct, as they 
arise from the animalistic side of us, “rational animals,” and only obscure the truth from our moral vision. 
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the particular contexts of a situation in an ethically-responsible fashion.
9
  As will be seen, 
pragmatism redescribes ethical deliberation as a form of problem solving.  There are 
problems that arise with respect to how we care for ourselves and our individual pursuits 
of flourishing, and there are problems that arise because of the ineluctable interpersonal 
dimension of experience.  The basic Socratic question of how one ought to live, thus 
conceived, could potentially be thought of as the question of how we can become better 
problem-solvers.  
 
Nietzschean, Deweyan, and Rortian pragmatism 
 Before ariculating some of the central commitments underlying the basic 
understanding of human experience shared by Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty, it seems 
appropriate to at least mention the metaphilosophical approach I am taking in holding 
these three together in dialogue under the umbrella of “pragmatism.”  There is a tendency 
among the relatively small cohort of scholars working within American pragmatist 
philosophy to focus intensely on picking apart the various differences between the 
classical pragmatists such as James and Dewey, neopragmatists such as Rorty and Robert 
Brandom, and those European authors sometimes associated with pragmatist thought 
such as Nietzsche and Heidegger.  There are also those, such as Rorty himself, who 
recognize the fruitfulness of synthesizing the various ideas held together by the cluster 
concept “pragmatism.”  For instance, Rorty thinks it is helpful to understand Nietzsche 
                                                 
9
 I will be using the admittedly vague descriptor of “ethically-responsible” as a term of praise and the 
hoped-for goal of the view of moral development I will be articulating.  What exactly it entails should 
become apparent over the course of my dissertation, but for now, I will say that it has to do with being 
response-able; that is, responsive to the various complexities and concerns involved in our moral decision-
making.  It is a comportment that is characterized by thoughtfulness, reflection, and consideration of one’s 
conduct and how any significant choice will affect the well-being of oneself and others. 
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“as the figure who did the most to convince European intellectuals of the doctrines which 
were purveyed to Americans by James and Dewey” (Rorty 1991, 2).  And, he further 
suggests that “Nietzsche was as good an anti-Cartesian, antirepresentationalist, and 
antiessentialist as Dewey,” along with being “as devoted to the question ‘what difference 
will this belief make to our conduct?’ as Peirce or James” (Rorty 1991, 2).  This is not to 
ignore the obvious differences between these thinkers.  I have simply chosen to follow 
the spirit of Rorty’s syncretism and play each thinker off of one another, using them as 
supplements and correctives to one another, which seems to provide a more 
comprehensive perspective of just what a pragmatist ethics entails, and, moreover, how 
art can be of service for our moral lives.
10
 
 One obvious similarity between Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty that has already 
been implied is that the ideal ethical comportment is one which not only respects but 
embraces the uncertainty inherent in our situation.  As will be discussed later, promoting 
the ability to deal with the flux inherent in our human reality is one of the clear 
advantages a pragmatist ethics has to offer.  As Colin Koopman argues, pragmatism 
might be best thought of “as a philosophical mode that takes as its central concern the 
process of transitioning.”  “Transitions are,” continues Koopman, “those temporal 
structures and historical shapes in virtue of which we get from here to there,” and 
“[a]ccording to this transitionalist interpretation, pragmatism’s most important 
philosophical contribution is that of redescribing the philosophical practices of thought, 
critique, and inquiry such that these practices take place in time and through history” 
                                                 
10
 Much has been made of the split between the classical pragmatists’ emphasis on experience and the 
neopragmatists’ turn to language.  I happen to follow those contemporary pragmatists, such as Colin 
Koopman, who are advancing a “third-wave” pragmatism which seeks to overcome this rather unpragmatic 
schism and show how exclusively taking experience or language as the fundamental field of inquiry is a 
reductive step in the wrong direction. 
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(Koopman 2011, 2).  Situating its methodology within the temporal flow that both 
conspicuously and inconspicuously shapes human existence is crucial for a pragmatist 
ethics. That, as mentioned, we seem to be in a time of rather drastic social and world-
historical transition only offers itself as further support for what pragmatism might be 
able to bring to ethical philosophy.  Thus, one way of thinking about the advantages of a 
pragmatist ethics is that it attempts to articulate certain traits of character that, as 
mentioned, will help individuals cope with the transitory and contingent character of our 
existence in an ethically-responsible manner.   
 Despite the glaring differences in the political views of Nietzsche, on one side, 
and James, Dewey and Rorty, on the other, the fact remains that for all these thinkers 
ethical development is not about learning a creed or even employing our rational faculty 
to guide us to the certain “Good” or “Right.”  So instead of moral progress being defined 
by a convergence model similar to that of how science was once believed to advance, 
pragmatists conceive of moral progress more as a matter of imagining ever new 
possibilities for human life so as to promote individual and communal flourishing.  The 
critical implication of this shift is that ethical development is not a matter of acquiring 
theoretical knowledge, but is a matter of imagining what our experience could be like.
11
  
In reference to Dewey’s ethics, Gregory Pappas writes, “The most important learning a 
person accomplishes in a situation is not amassing information, but the cultivation of 
habits which are going to affect the quality of future situations” (Pappas 2008, 189).  This 
                                                 
11
 Another way of thinking about a pragmatist approach to ethics is that it, like naturalized approaches, 
rejects “top-down” theories of morality, where ethical prescriptions are thought of as descending from 
some ideal realm.  Within such a theory, the objective of moral inquiry is to simply acquire knowledge of 
said principles.  In emphasizing the emergence out of the primary level of our engaged existence of our 
conceptual tools, our three protagonists could actually be seen as presenting “bottom-up” approaches to our 
ethical considerations.   
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sums up the understanding of how one acquires their ethical comportment shared by 
Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty, and it is a notion that underlies my entire dissertation.  
That is, once ethical development is seen in a pragmatist light, a host of influences 
become validated as sources of moral guidance and inspiration.  Again, my thesis is that 
aesthetic experience, as elicited by a work of art, can greatly inform our ethical lives by 
helping cultivate a certain orientation towards experience – one which involves what 
Nietzsche calls, “an artistic conception of the world” (Nietzsche 1995, 21).  
 
Why a Pragmatist Ethics 
 Simply stating that a pragmatist approach to ethics grants art a significant ethical 
function is clearly not an argument for the advantages of adopting such an approach.  As 
mentioned, despite its recent resurgence over the last quarter of a century, pragmatism is 
still not seen as a viable alternative to other more mainstream discourses within ethical 
theory.  Much of this reluctance to grant pragmatism validity has to do with it not playing 
by the rules of these more accepted approaches.  Simply put, pragmatism is seen as 
“thin,” in the same way virtue ethics is within much of contemporary ethical philosophy, 
by not being able to provide antecedent action-guidance or strict codifiability of actions 
already performed.  Moreover, absent a set of fundamental assumptions shared with more 
traditional strands of thought, pragmatist arguments tend to not carry much weight.  
Consequently, instead of specifically arguing against some of these traditional 
contemporary moral theories, I will follow Rorty’s tack and simply attempt to make a 
pragmatist approach to ethics sound as appealing as possible.  Therefore I will now lay 
out some of pragmatism’s most basic commitments and highlight the merits of their 
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ethical implications.  In responding to the moral tradition which pined for certainty, 
pragmatism presents a view of human reality and practice that is (1) anti-representational, 
anti-foundational, and anti-essentialist, as well as (2) oriented towards the future, (3) has 
a respect for the contingent and naturalistic constraints on inquiry, and (4) is deeply 
committed to our pluralistic society. 
 
Pragmatism’s “anti-‘s” 
 In his book, Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political 
Tradition (2011), which discusses Barack Obama’s political ascendency, James 
Kloppenberg presents the 44
th
 president as a pragmatist of sorts, and focuses primarily on 
his avoidance of rigid ideology and absolutist thinking.  Typically this eschewal of 
absolute truth is one of the first things that comes to mind when thinking about 
pragmatism.  While this take is not mistaken, in explicating pragmatism’s anti-absolutist 
stance, it is helpful to separate three distinct, yet thoroughly interrelated, commitments 
underlying it: (1) its anti-foundationalism (with regards to knowledge and truth), (2) its 
anti-essentialism (with regards to nature and the self), and (3) its anti-representationalism 
(with regards to experience).  In elucidating these commitments it is important to start by 
looking at the last of these “anti-‘s,” insofar as the view of experience put forth by the 
classical American pragmatists, and echoed by Rorty in his Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (1979), gives rise to the other two major negative commitments of pragmatism.
12
  
In both James’s radical empiricism and Dewey’s antidualism, the idea that reality 
                                                 
12
 This is not to say that there are not important differences between Dewey’s and Rorty’s views on 
experience, or, more specifically, what can be said of experience.  Although both reject the 
representationalist model of experience, Dewey believes that “generic traits” of our primary interaction 
with our environment can be mapped out.  Such an attempt is seen by Rorty, however, as a regrettable lapse 
into materialist metaphysics.   
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consists in the experience of an autonomous, isolated subject standing against an 
independent world of objects with which the subject will interact, and hopefully, get to 
know through accurate representation, is rejected.  In this traditional conception, 
experience serves as a “screen” of sorts between the individual subject and the world.  
Depending on the particular philosophical school of thought, the “Real” (as unchanging 
and absolute) is either conceived to exist in the mind of the subject, or in the external 
world against which that subject stands.  For pragmatists, however, experience is 
construed as a much more dynamic and transactional process of an individual organism 
coping with her environment.  Experience is reality.  There is thus a privileging of a more 
intimate, qualitative, level of engaged existence out of which representational and 
conceptual thought emerges.  One can thus already begin to see why aesthetics (in the 
general sense of the felt, sensual aspect of our experience) might be pivotal within a 
pragmatist ethics.  
 Because it stems from this anti-Cartesian understanding of experience, let us now 
take a cursory look at pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism and its attendant ethical 
significance.  Although known primarily as an epistemological view, foundationalism 
also has bearing on moral theory as well.  Very generically, foundationalists hold that 
what justifies a belief is its relation to a basic, unshakable source, or foundation.  These 
sources of justification range from the Divine word of God to clear and distinct ideas to 
brute sense data, and to others, but most importantly these foundations are thought to be 
completely independent of human interpretation.  Once a belief is vouchsafed by linking 
itself to one of these foundations, it is granted the status of “truth.”  The validity of a 
moral belief about how to live or what to do, within this framework, then, is gauged by 
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the strength of the connection between it and some absolute guarantor from which it is 
thought to be derived.   
Pragmatists renounce the classical correspondence model of truth, where the 
degree to which a belief or proposition is true, or justified, is measured by how closely it 
corresponds to reality independent of human interpretation, or The Way Things Really 
Are.  This renunciation is illustrated in Rorty’s constant recitation of the Nietzschean 
claim that truth is simply a mobile army of metaphors, as well as his adherence to 
James’s tenet that the true is what is good in the way of belief.  Dewey himself often 
skirted the question of truth completely and opted for the more vague and banal concept 
of “warranted assertability.”  This attempt to destabilize an eternal conception of truth is, 
according to Joseph Margolis, one of pragmatism’s foremost advantages.  For, as he 
notes, “[b]oth analytic and continental philosophy are obviously tempted by one or 
another form of Eleatic invariance: the analytic, by the excessive economies of scientism 
and reductions; the continental, by the extravagances of extranaturalism. (Margolis 2010, 
136).  Thus, Margolis believes that pragmatism lines itself up with “the dawning sense 
that the a posteriori forms of the a priori will never capture, and have never captured, 
Kantian necessities or universalities (Margolis 2010, 137).   
 Every pragmatist has a different argument for why absolute truth is chimerical, 
but, in short, it rests in the notion that human interpretation, specifically as it is colored 
with desires, practices, needs, etc., can never be stripped away from our descriptions or 
understandings of the world, so the idea of capturing Reality as it is in-itself is simply 
non-sensical.  Regarding morality, then, the idea that there is the right way to live or the 
right thing to do (rightness that is always already embedded in the nature of reality and 
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that it is simply our duty to recognize) cannot be sustained.  Ethical certainty is simply 
not attainable as long as experience is forever subject to change.  Therefore, justification, 
within a pragmatist framework, has nothing to do with getting in touch with a non-human 
reality, but actually has to do with coherence of belief and intersubjective agreement.  
Pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism really amounts to the charge that there be no final 
words in any inquiry, no Aristotelian axioms from which an order of reasons can be 
derived, and so one must give pride of place to the particularity and context of a given 
situation over an a priori ideology.   
 So, one of the major ethical implications of pragmatism’s anti-foundationalism is 
a staunch rejection of fundamentalist or dogmatic thinking.  While the dangers posed by 
religious fundamentalism are quite clear, any form of dogmatic thinking is viewed by 
pragmatists as morally detrimental.  In drastically reducing one’s horizons of meaning 
and possibility, dogmatism impedes inquiry.  Although more explicit in Dewey, 
Nietzsche and Rorty also place a strong emphasis on experimentation within one’s 
attempt to cope with experience.  Experimentation, though, requires an ability to discard 
previous descriptions of the world in order to accommodate redescriptions more apt to 
one’s current situation.  Therefore, one must at least be willing to question preconceived 
beliefs in the name of individual and societal growth and progress.  Yet, this is not to say 
that pragmatists ignore the fact that we draw on habits and prior experiences in regards to 
present and future conduct, but simply that whatever we might formulate as a priori 
guides to action must remain faithful to the a posteriori of experience.     
As its rejection of foundationalism rests significantly on foundationalist 
thinking’s hindrance to inquiry, and thus hindrance to the ability to flexibly adapt to the 
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ever-changing dynamics of experience, pragmatism’s stance against essentialism also has 
to do with the rigid fixity so often bound up with essentialist thought.  Pragmatism’s anti-
essentialism is rooted in the idea that seeking something like Nature as it is in-itself, or 
the essential character of an individual, is a non-starter.  Because our inquiries always 
already take place amidst a host of cultural practices, and proceed through the medium of 
language, there simply is no way of separating our interpretations of an object of inquiry 
from that object as it is “in-itself” so as to determine if we stand in an adequate enough 
relation to it to know its essence.  Rorty also denounces the idea that we could have 
anything like what Bertrand Russell called “knowledge by acquaintance,” proclaiming 
that “[a]ll our knowledge is of the sort which Russell called ‘knowledge by description’” 
and, furthermore, this knowledge “is under descriptions suited to our current social 
purposes” (Rorty 1999, 48).13  All we have are our descriptions of the object, descriptions 
that relate the object to other descriptions of objects, beliefs, or states of affairs.  
Nietzsche’s claim that a thing is merely the sum of its effects (Nietzsche 2007, 252), 
along with Dewey’s redescription of essences as “gists” (Dewey, 1934: 305), clearly 
inform Rorty’s own anti-essentialism, and, as such, all three stress the mutability of 
experience and our understandings of the world and ourselves.   
Perhaps this anti-essentialism’s most crucial ethical implication regards how we 
understand the human self.  As Rorty notes regarding essentialist versions of selfhood 
espoused in various forms throughout the western metaphysical tradition: 
They (the metaphysicians) were going to explain to us the ultimate locus of 
 power, the nature of reality, the conditions of the possibility of experience.  They 
 would thereby inform us what we really are … They would exhibit the stamp 
 which had been impressed on all of us.  It would not be a matter of chance, a mere 
                                                 
13
 Put very simply, for Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is foundational knowledge that exists when 
there a direct cognitive relation to that object, without any filter of linguistic description. 
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 contingency.  It would be necessary, essential, telic, constitutive of what it is to be 
 human.  It would give us a goal, the only possible goal, namely, the full 
 recognition of that very necessity, the self-consciousness of our essence (Rorty 
 1989, 26).   
 
Essentialism, then, comes in two forms – one involving the structure of nature and the 
“objective” world, and one positing that each individual has a true self rooted in a 
universal human essence which it is their ethical obligation to try and realize.  As a child 
of God, one must heed His law.  As an intelligible self, one must heed the call of Reason.  
Pragmatism’s main concern with this view is that it is rigidly and narrowly telic; meaning 
there is only one possible destination to end up if the Good is what you seek, not to 
mention only one possible path.  Counter to this view, the pragmatist replies that the self 
is in-process, that who we are is something that we become through the situations and 
experiences we encounter.  There is, then, no preset path for us to walk if we are to be 
“ethical,” but rather many possibilities for what might be “right.”  This shift causes us to 
think about self-correction (a primary concern for the western ethical tradition since its 
inception) as creative rather than a process of discovering something that antecedently 
determines one’s existence.  This alteration has a deep ethical significance which will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, as the acceptance of this anti-essentialist view of the 
self raises a host of questions concerning authenticity, autonomy, and care of the self. 
Much of what has just been said is a recapitulation of the pragmatist’s 
abandonment of the quest for certainty.  So what exactly are the ethical implications of 
such abandonment?  In giving up any assurances that how one is living or what one is 
going to do is right, a pragmatist ethics is clearly fallibalistic.  What this entails, as a 
virtue, is a form of critique that is always ready to ask whether or not a certain way of 
doing things is the only or the best way.  In renouncing the idea of a convergence theory 
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of moral progress, whereby progress is based on supposedly coming closer and closer to 
the truth, pragmatists substitute hope for knowledge.  This hope is based in the belief that, 
because of the flux of history, things can always be different, and, as such, we as humans 
can always strive for better.  Things can only be different and possibly better, however, if 
we are willing to give up the ideals of the tradition which takes Eleatic truth as its 
ultimate goal – where the “Right” thing to do is foundational, essential, and changeless.   
 
Orientation towards the future 
 In his penetrating book, Pragmatism’s Advantage: American and European 
Philosophy at the End of the 20
th
 Century (2010), Joseph Margolis contends that one 
particular area where pragmatism diverges in a positive way from contemporary analytic 
and continental philosophy is in its wholehearted acceptance of the flux of reality.  
Margolis cannot help but see vestiges in these two traditions of the strain running from 
Parmenides to Kant which takes only the changeless and a priori as real.  In certain 
analytic strands of thought, this assumption is manifested in the form of scientific or 
logical reductionism, and in certain continental thinkers, it is carried out in the form of 
some appeal to the extranatural.  Pragmatism’s naturalism, coupled with its commitment 
to historicity and the fluidity of culture (which will be discussed shortly), however, 
necessitates this abdication of such a pursuit for the eternal.  
 Taking this flux seriously, pragmatists orient themselves towards the future in a 
way different from other traditions.  For, in giving up the idea that we could uncover the 
conditions for the possibility of experience, and thereby construct an absolute moral 
system built on a priori principles of action, pragmatists jettison the search for fixed 
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antecedent criteria for attaining the “Good,” whether on the individual or societal level.  
As James notes, the pragmatist orientation is the “attitude of looking away from first 
things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, 
fruits, consequences, facts” (James 1981, 29).  
 This is not to say, however, that we should not draw upon prior experience to 
inform our present projects and moral decision-making.  Instead, what pragmatism 
advocates is the mindful avoidance of what Dewey refers to as “the philosophical 
fallacy,” or “the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may 
forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions,” and where it “is 
forgotten that success is success of a specific effort” (MW 14:124).  
 It is for this reason I asserted that pragmatism substitutes hope for knowledge 
when it comes to moral progress.  Because the conceptual resources comprising our 
cultural lives are ever-changing and shifting, the way we, as humanity, inhabit the world 
can always be different, and again, if it can be different, it can be better.  This is why the 
regulative ideal for a pragmatist ethics becomes rather vague – as in Nietzsche’s notion of 
“self-overcoming” and Dewey’s concept of “growth.”  Such notions are used on both the 
individual and societal level by pragmatists in articulating their normative ethics.  
Regarding individual well-being, the ideals put forth by Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty all 
have to do with continually adapting to the contingent and fluid nature of our 
environment.  And, on the societal level, pragmatist political philosophy often takes the 
form of a utopian exercise of imagining a more inclusive community among the plurality 
of individual perspectives. 
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 The pragmatist emphasis on hope is sometimes discussed in terms of James’s 
doctrine of meliorism.  Attempting to find a middle-way between two competing 
doctrines of common sense, James introduces what he dubs meliorism as an orientation 
towards the future that mediates between the tough-minded pessimism of a scientific 
reductionist sort and the tender-minded optimism of idealist philosophies, including 
many religious understandings of reality.  Plainly put, meliorism holds that salvation, 
more fruitfully conceived of as the betterment of humanity’s lot, is not a utopian 
phantasm, nor is it something guaranteed in advance by some extranatural ideal realm.  
Instead, pragmatism holds that things might not be guaranteed to get better, either 
through the telic movement of Absolute Spirit or the second coming of Christ, but they 
can get better through human effort and imaginative innovation.    
 Within metaethical discourse, pragmatism is often counted as contextualist or 
particularist on account of its emphasis on the shifting dynamics of human existence.  
Despite not being a radical particularism, in that a pragmatist ethics does have some use 
(which will be discussed shortly) for principles, a sensitivity to the particularities or 
context of a situation is undoubtedly a central virtue.  Thus pragmatism stands opposed to 
moral universalism which latches onto principles or courses of action which proved 
worthy in some specific moral inquiry, yet forgets that those were tools that were 
successful only within the context of that particular inquiry or situation. 
 The ethical contextualism of pragmatism is meant to loosen the crust of 
convention that so often hinders progress through experimental inquiry.  There are fairly 
significant ethical implications bound up in an individual or society being overly or 
blindly wedded to tradition.  As John Corvino points out in the context of the debate over 
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what rights and recognition gay individuals and couples ought to receive, when all 
arguments seem to run counter to someone’s viewpoint on a particular issue, it is often 
the case that tradition will be invoked as the ultimate conversation stopper.
14
  The “this is 
just the way we’ve always done things” argument can be heard in America on such 
morally-charged issues as the debate over gay rights or over whether or not we should 
continue to use capital punishment today in the 21
st
 century, even after discovering the 
numerous innocent people who have been put to death.  Pragmatists will certainly not 
stand for this argument, and, in many ways, an appropriately critical orientation towards 
convention and the doxa of one’s time is an indispensible disposition for a normative 
pragmatist ethics. 
 Similar to Socrates’ famous pronouncement that the unexamined life is not worth 
living, a pragmatist approach to ethics promotes a healthy thoughtfulness and skepticism 
concerning the way things are being done at any given time.  The question of whether we, 
as individuals and as a society, might do better is one that can and should always be 
asked.  Retreating to tradition in the face of the uncertainty brought by the undammed 
flow of history is something Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty all denounce.  In so doing, all 
three instead sing the praises of a courageous experimentalism that utilizes the fluid 
nature of human meaning and values in the name of growth and progress. 
 Clearly within this frame, the imagination is granted a hearty respect.  In not 
treating reason as some transcendental faculty that can get us in touch with the “Truth,” 
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 In concluding his chapter “Why Shouldn’t Tommy and Jim Have Sex?: A Defense of Homosexuality,” 
Corvino argues that one of the most leaned upon and favorite arguments of those opposed to homosexuality 
is: “‘It’s wrong because we’ve always been taught that it’s wrong.’”  Corvino then goes on to comment that 
“[t]his argument – call it the argument from tradition – has an obvious appeal: people reasonably favor 
tried-and-true ideas over unfamiliar ones, and they recognize the foolishness of trying to invent morality 
from scratch.  But the argument from tradition is also a dangerous argument, as any honest look at history 
will reveal” (Corvino 1997, 15). 
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be it scientific or moral, pragmatists, and in particular Dewey, stress the role that 
imagination plays in our attempts to cope with experience.  It is the imagination that 
reaches forward into the future in order to deal with and enrich our present situation.  
More will have to be said about what imaginative work exactly does for the human of 
pragmatist wisdom; but, it is important to keep in mind that the imagination is not to be 
thought of as some whimsical faculty of fancy, but rather as pushing against the 
constraints of one’s situation in the hope of opening up novel possibilities for meaning 
and action.   
 
Respect for contingency 
 The respect for the constraints of one’s concrete situation is yet another of the 
distinguishing features of a pragmatist approach to ethics and is manifest in its historicity, 
its naturalism, and its conception of selfhood.  Hegel’s critique of the Kantian 
transcendental project, specifically the former’s emphasis on the historical forces shaping 
our basic sense of what is and what matters, was influential for both Dewey and Rorty, 
and this historical sense clearly aligns with Nietzsche’s own genealogical method of 
deconstructing moral concepts and systems. 
 With the central commitments of pragmatism all interrelated, the ethical 
implications of pragmatism’s historical awareness have already been touched on.  In 
admitting that our basic sense of what is and what matters can change over time, 
pragmatists cannot appeal to any foundational axioms or eternal principles for 
normativity.  The social construction theories popular in much of post-Nietzschean 
continental philosophy are in no way foreign to pragmatist thought.  “To say that 
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everything is a social construction,” writes Rorty, “is to say that our linguistic practices 
are so bound up with our other social practices that our descriptions of nature, as well as 
of ourselves, will always be a function of our social needs” (Rorty 1999, 48).  Thus, any 
ethical theory emerging out of pragmatism remains self-aware of its situatedness within a 
historical and cultural context.  As organisms practically engaged with an environment, 
an environment that is just as much social as it is physical, any prescriptive ethics is 
going to be greatly informed by the situation out of which it arises.  It is simply bad faith, 
according to pragmatists, to aver, as the Vatican did in its “Declaration on Certain 
Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics,” (1975) that moral principles “in no way owe their 
origin to a certain type of culture, but rather to knowledge of the Divine Law and of 
human nature” and that, therefore, “(they) cannot be considered as having become out of 
date or doubtful under the pretext that a new cultural situation has arisen” (The Vatican 
1998, 108). 
 In its refusal to let transcendental principles and concepts impinge on ethical 
considerations, pragmatism also resonates with contemporary naturalized approaches to 
ethical theory.  Not only do pragmatists like Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty take seriously 
the constraints one’s situation places on her ethical deliberations, but they also champion 
the Darwinian narrative describing the evolutionary development of Homo sapiens.  
Margolis indeed argues that pragmatism’s brand of naturalism is one of its defining 
characteristics (Margolis 2010, 31). 
 Despite his sometimes disparaging tone regarding Darwin, Nietzsche too held a 
biologically-emergent picture of the human being.
15
  It is an understatement to say that 
                                                 
15
 Nietzsche’s reading of Darwin seems to me to be slightly misinformed, in that he often reads him as 
teleological in spirit.  Nietzsche appeared to not be able to quell the fear that Darwinian evolution, and the 
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Nietzsche was highly skeptical of extranatural accounts of humanity, and deeply despised 
moralities which sought to tamp down or even extirpate our physiological, or “animal-
like,” nature.  In fact, in his revaluation of values Nietzsche calls for physiology to be the 
starting point of our understandings of ourselves and our inquiry into how we ought to 
live.  Evincing his author’s “inverted Platonism,” Zarathustra proclaims, “ [T]he 
awakened and the knowing say: body am I entirely, and nothing else; and soul is only a 
word for something about the body.  The body is a great reason … [a]n instrument of 
your body is also your little reason, my brother, which you call ‘spirit’ – a little 
instrument and toy of your great reason” (Nietzsche 1976, 146). This privileging of the 
body is not only significant as an example of Nietzsche’s naturalism, but the idea that 
“the great reason known by the body is simply more primordial epistemologically (than 
what he might consider conscious, discursive reason)” (Benson 2003, 30) will prove to 
have important implications for the relationship between aesthetic experience and ethical 
transformation. 
 Dewey, likewise, opens his ethical treatise Human Nature and Conduct (1922) by 
lamenting the way that our embodied human nature has traditionally been viewed vis-à-
vis morality throughout most of history.  “Man’s nature,” writes Dewey, “has been 
regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks … [i]t has appeared to be so evilly 
disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it” (MW 14:5).  In fact, 
similar to Nietzsche, Dewey’s positive ethics actually advocates for what might be called 
the “sensual,” in making aesthetic and emotional sensitivity crucial areas of focus for 
ethical education.  In an early essay titled “The Aesthetic Element in Education,” Dewey 
                                                                                                                                                 
notion of the good for the species, was a narrative leading inevitably to a herd mentality, the acme of which 
is embodied in the “last men” upon whom he heaps his scorn (Nietzsche 1976, 129-30).   
 29 
 
argues that, “Responsiveness, an emotional reaction to ideas and facts, is a necessary 
factor in moral character,” and so “[w]e need to return more to the Greek conception, 
which defined education as the attaching of pleasure and pain to the right objects and 
ideals in the right way” (EW 5:203-4).16  
 While much is often made of Rorty’s seemingly disembodied poeticism, one need 
only unpack his thoughts on language a bit to witness hints of his own naturalistic 
commitments.  Introducing some of the basic thoughts and background ideas underlying 
pragmatism, specifically its anti-representationalist view of experience, Rorty poses the 
following rhetorical query: “At what point in biological evolution did organisms stop just 
coping with reailty and start representing it?  To pose the riddle is to suggest the answer,” 
which Rorty himself supposes is “[m]aybe they never did start representing it” (Rorty 
1999, 269).  Echoing Nietzsche and Dewey, Rorty thinks it will be a benefit to ethical 
discourse to think of humans not as rational animals, where reason is thought of 
transcendentally, but as animals with incredibly complex behavior that allows for 
meaningful planning and the coordination of actions.  Rorty astutely points out, though, 
that making this argument is an uphill battle, as much of the western philosophical 
tradition has relied on a special rational ingredient possessed solely by humanity in trying 
to spell out how we should live or why our fellow humans are deserving of dignity.  
Turning this belief on its head, however, Rorty also observes how this special ingredient 
has been used throughout history to justify discriminatory treatment against marginalized 
                                                 
16
 Here is an appropriate place to say something about Dewey’s naturalized metaphysics, or the part of him 
that Rorty could do without.  I happen to share Rorty’s taste for Dewey as historically-aware, cultural critic, 
but the pragmatic work the latter’s naturalism (which gives rise to his pursuit of generic traits of experience 
and his psychologically-centered approach to ethics) does, cannot be understated.  Moreover, the debate 
this divergence between Rorty and Dewey sparks seems to me to be one of the petty squabbles in 
philosophical scholarship the former so admonishes. 
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groups who were thought to possess little, if any, of that essential element.  It is Rorty’s 
assumption that such moves reflect a domineering will to power and this fear of 
totalitarianism spurs his attempt to bring reason, along with language, back down to earth 
by redescribing them as simply examples of the complex behaviors humans have 
developed to help them cope with experience and coordinate their projects.     
 Here it is important to highlight another one of pragmatism’s advantages vis-à-vis 
certain contemporary analytic and continental strands of philosophic thought.  As 
mentioned earlier, Margolis sees pragmatism’s commitment to the Darwinian narrative of 
human evolution, and the naturalism that comes with it, as crucial in steering it away 
from the extranaturalism he finds in many contemporary continental thinkers.  In the 
spirit of mediation that is so distinctive of pragmatism, Margolis sees pragmatism’s 
naturalism as “moderate” in form (Margolis 2010, 136).  It is its sincere regard for culture 
and historicity that Margolis believes insulates pragmatism from the reductionist 
scientism found in many Anglo-American analysts, a reductionism stemming from a pre-
Kuhnian view of science as the paragon of academic rigor and the only discipline that 
will lead to absolute knowledge.  That is, according to Margolis, pragmatism embodies 
the most significant insights of both Darwin and Hegel.  For, he claims that pragmatism 
“Darwinizes” Hegel by removing the extranatural teleology contained in his system while 
also “Hegelianizing” Darwin’s evolutionary theory by emphasizing that scientific 
concepts and methods are themselves products of our linguistic and cultural practices.   
 Painting something once seen as natural as itself subject to the ever-shifting 
dynamics of human history is something the protagonists of this dissertation all did.  
Picking up from Hegel’s historicizing of Kant’s categories of the understanding, 
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Nietzsche’s genealogies of some of our most important metaphysical and ethical concepts 
bring into relief the ways in which historical contingencies have shaped our basic 
descriptions of the world and prescriptions for how humans ought to behave.  Likewise, 
Dewey’s Hegelian roots betray this commitment to maintaining an historical perspective 
when engaging in cultural criticism and attempting to construct a conceptual framework 
with which to promote growth through collective inquiry.  And, as noted earlier, Rorty 
himself is fond of phrasing this thread within pragmatism in terms of social construction.  
In Chapter III I will go into more detail regarding Margolis’s conception of the self, as it 
is with this idea that he sees pragmatism’s moderate naturalism do its most work. 
 And, as regards the self, before explaining specifically how this respect for 
factical constraints plays itself out in a pragmatist ethics, it is useful to briefly discuss 
Rorty’s pragmatic appropriation of Freud in his discussion of selfhood.  In his chapter 
“The Contingency of Selfhood” (1989), Rorty writes that “[w]e can begin to understand 
Freud’s role in our culture by seeing him as the moralist who helped de-divinize the self 
by tracking conscience home to its origin in the contingencies of our upbringing” (Rorty 
1989, 30).  The Freudian view of moral conscience works against moral intuitionists 
(e.g., C. S. Lewis and W. D. Ross) who argue that the voice inside our heads guiding our 
behavior towards the “Good” is something implanted in us from God our Father, or is 
perhaps an innate transcendental aptitude.  Rorty’s pragmatic appropriation of Freud 
presents conscience as something shaped by our own idiosyncratic experiences, under the 
influence of our familial and cultural circumstances.  In so challenging the idea that our 
moral conscience is something akin to the mark of our maker, Rorty contends that Freud 
brings into relief the various contingent factors informing our basic ethical orientation 
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towards experience.  Moreover, Rorty also writes that “Freud thus helps us take seriously 
the possibility that there is no central faculty, no central self, called ‘reason’ – and thus to 
take Nietzschean pragmatism and perspectivalism seriously” (Rorty 1989, 33).   
 But what exactly does it mean that Freud “de-divinized” our understanding of the 
self?  Affirming pragmatism’s moderate naturalism and “doctrine of the flux”17 leads, 
Rorty contends, to “the point where we no longer worship anything, where we treat 
nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything … as a product of time and 
chance” (Rorty 1989, 22).  Put another way, a pragmatist approach to ethics must 
abandon a notion of the “holy” as a potential source of ethical guidance.  
 Discarding a concept of the “holy,” though, is one of the things that make many 
skeptical about the efficacy of a pragmatist normative ethics.  For, there clearly is no 
better guarantor of certainty about what we should do or how we ought to live than that 
which is held sacred.  Here, the words of my former professor mentioned earlier come to 
mind – “Absent something ‘Holy’, what is the ironist going to die for?”  Having gone 
through some of the most characteristic traits of pragmatism, though, I can now say a bit 
more about a pragmatist’s potential response to this accusatory query.   
 The ideal mode of experience for most pragmatists is expressed in Dewey’s  
 
reflection on James’s notion of “flights and perchings:” 
 
 William James aptly compared the course of a conscious experience to the 
 alternate flights and perchings of a bird. The flights and perching are
 
intimately 
 connected with one another; they are not so many
 
unrelated lightings succeeded 
                                                 
17
  “After Kant,” writes Margolis, “with the rapid rise to prominence of the concept of historicity and its 
remarkable penetration of all the seeming invariances of the accepted canon, what may fairly be termed the 
‘doctrine of the flux’ has gained a measure of parity so compelling that the ancient canon has had to look to 
its own defenses in an entirely new way.  Philosophy has been bifurcated ever since in a way that was never 
possible before.  Furthermore, if we divide the post-Kantian tradition along ‘pragmatist,’ ‘analytic,’ and 
‘continental’ lines … then pragmatism, nearly alone among the principal movements of our time, has 
embraced the flux four square, without clinging to subversive loyalties of any kind harking back to would-
be older invariances” (Margolis 2010, 131). 
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 by a number of equally unrelated
 
hoppings.  Each resting place in experience is an 
 undergoing in which is absorbed and taken home the consequences of prior doing, 
 and, unless the doing is that of utter caprice or sheer routine, each doing carries in 
 itself meaning that has been extracted and conserved. As with the advance of an 
 army, all gains from what has been already effected are periodically consolidated, 
 and
 
always with a view to what is to be done next. If we move too
 
rapidly, we get 
 away from the base of supplies—of accrued meanings—and the experience is 
 flustered, thin, and confused. If we dawdle too long after having extracted a net 
 value, experience perishes of inanition. (LW 10:63) 
 
Striking this balance between projecting precariously into the future through our 
everyday engagement with the world, and stably reflecting on what meanings might have 
been gathered through that flight embodies the underlying rhythm of experience.  Maybe 
counter-intuitively, based on what has been said regarding pragmatism’s anti-absolutist 
commitments, it is important to keep in mind that a pragmatist ethics is not (pace Rorty) 
an ethics without principles.
18
  A pragmatist’s “principles” are best understood in the 
sense that Arthur Murphy gives when he states that “[t]he ultimate or final things will be 
those which maintain themselves as genuine and reliable in the light of the most 
penetrating and comprehensive scrutiny” and that to think oneself as having found 
anything more secure “in a process in which all claims to finality are and must be partial 
and in which all partiality is subject to correction as we live and learn would be to reach a 
state of mind in which both living and learning had ceased to function as sources of 
wisdom” (Murphy 1994, 59).  In other words, the moral principles which guide our 
action and way of life are simply those which hold up to reflective scrutiny and prove 
resourceful in everyday doings and sufferings. 
                                                 
18
 Despite the title of Rorty’s essay “Ethics without Principles” (1999), he no doubt understood their 
unavoidable use as guides for action. His main point in that essay, though, has more to do with critiquing a 
certain approach to moral principles – that is, moral principles as absolute and derived from extranatural or 
invariant sources.   
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 Yet, I would assume that nearly all of us have at one time or another felt that 
principles gathered from previous experience, which had proven their worth, appear ill-
suited when confronted with the particularities of a novel situation.  They may conflict 
with other principles, or a sense of obligation, or a state of affairs we hope to realize, but 
in any case, holding on to the principle X for the sole reason that it is a principle is 
counter-productive to the pragmatist pursuit of progress.  Granted, some principles may 
stand the test of time and flux, such as a basic principle against harming others.  
However, the overarching point regarding this balance between the stable and the 
precarious is that pragmatists replace the notion that morality is about discovering 
antecedently existing principles with the more humble notion that it is simply about 
coping with experience in an ethically-responsible fashion.  So, a principle’s worth is not 
derived from being written in the stars, so to speak, but from its applicability and utility 
to a particular situation.  A pragmatist approach to ethics is not without anything to guide 
one’s ethical life, then, but simply acknowledges the fragility and contingency of these 
guiding lights. 
 Thus, in answering the question “What would the ironist die for?,” we can appeal 
to what Rorty calls “the fundamental premise” of his Contingency, irony, and solidarity:  
“[T]hat a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among 
people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent 
historical circumstance” (Rorty 1989, 189).  In de-divinizing ethics, pragmatism does 
disavow appeals to the “holy” or the “sacred.”  Pragmatism’s wager, however, is that 
such appeals do more harm than good.  Not only do they often lead down the slippery 
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slope towards fundamentalism or authoritarianism, but such absolutes often get in the 
way of progressive inquiry.   
 Another crucial implication for an ethics that emerges from pragmatism’s respect 
for the situatedness of our experience is a redescription of the notion of freedom.  As is 
well known, the concept of freedom, for better or worse, has a central role in ethical 
discourse.  Indeed Kant’s moral system hinges on the very idea that our intelligible selves 
must be free from the empirical “distractions” of the phenomenal world.  Without the 
luxury of some supersensible realm removed from the movement of history and the 
constraints of the physical world, however, pragmatists adopt a different view of 
freedom.  In particular, pragmatism will have no truck with something like a radically 
free will.  To Nietzsche, it takes “boorish naiveté” to subscribe to the “famous concept of 
‘free will’” (Nietzsche 2002, 21), and Dewey laments the “inward turn” taken in moral 
theory, wherein the habitual nature of experience is denied, and the locus of ethical 
responsibility is situated within the subject’s supposed strength of conscience alone.  The 
rationale behind this rejection of “free will” goes back to the anti-representationalist view 
of experience espoused by the likes of Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty; for, once the 
isolated, autonomous subject standing against an objective world is dissolved, the only 
way to account for something like absolute moral freedom is through metaphysical 
appeals of the kind that Kant was forced to make.  Moreover, such a conception runs 
completely counter to pragmatism’s respect for the various ways our environment, in 
both its physical and social dimensions, shapes our conduct. 
  In many ways, the existentialist tradition suffers the same admonishments as 
pragmatism, in that it is seen as paltry and impotent as a normative guide for action and 
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conduct.  Not coincidentally, an existentialist approach to ethics, in departing from the 
traditional model of laying down absolutes, parallels pragmatism in focusing more on 
how one comports herself towards experience.  In fact, I would like to contend that the 
existentialist ideal of authenticity can be appropriated by pragmatists in constructing a 
normative ethics.  I will discuss this more in Chapter III, but for now it is important to 
note that Simone de Beauvoir’s ideal of authenticity, for instance, involves both affirming 
the creative license we have for self-authorship along with recognizing the various 
constraints placed on us by our situation.  Although some of these constraints are no 
doubt shared on a cultural, historical, and biological level, individuals’ situations are also 
idiosyncratically contingent.  In referring to Rorty’s poeticized focus on novelty and 
redesciption, Kenneth McClelland qualifies: “There are always constraints on our 
descriptions, and these constraints are embodied in the norms, mores, and customs of the 
cultures/communities we live in … [T]hese cannot be construed as absolute constraints, 
but they do impact our descriptions in-so-far as these constraints are themselves 
descriptions to which a future description will be relative.  We never create ex nihilo” 
(McClelland 2008, 431).  And it is this recognition of the impact of these constraints 
which gives rise to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the pluralism recognized by the 
American pragmatists. 
   
Commitment to pluralism  
   Many of the initial claims of pragmatism that I have been surveying thus far lead 
up to the last crucial characteristic of a pragmatist ethics that I want to discuss.  
Specifically, once the idea that we could become mirrors of nature and attain something 
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like a God’s-eye-view of reality is abandoned, we must take seriously the extent to which 
individuals’ understandings of the world vary.  In treating theory as an instrument of 
practice, pragmatism acknowledges the way in which beliefs and desires deeply shape 
people’s descriptions of the world, themselves, and others.  Pragmatism, as a distinctly 
American movement, is often, and rightly so, painted as an approach to philosophy 
growing out of a rather nascent American society.  Hailing from a country forged out of 
the desire to allow freedom of belief, one can easily see how some of early America’s 
most influential thinkers embraced pluralism and the promotion of tolerance.   
 Nowhere is this more apparent than in William James’s essay “On a Certain 
Blindness of Human Beings” (1899).  In this essay, James is specifically arguing for the 
significance of the affective dimensions of our experience.  Our judgments about reality 
are inextricably colored, James contends, by our emotional and passionate responses to 
certain ideas and experiences.  “Our judgments,” notes James, “concerning the worth of 
things, big or little, depend upon the feelings the things arouse in us.  Where we judge a 
thing to be precious in consequence of the idea we frame of it, this is only because the 
idea is itself associated already with a feeling” (James 1977, 629).  James continues to 
describe the main thrust of this essay: “Now the blindness in human beings … is the 
blindness with which we all are afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people 
different from ourselves” (James 1977, 629).  I will discuss James’s well-known anecdote 
he uses to illustrate this point in detail in Chapter IV, but for now it is simply enough to 
note that because those contingent factors discussed in the previous section, along with 
each individual’s idiosyncratic experiences, differ, the feelings of others, and thus their 
perspectives on the world, are going to be different as well.  Indeed, the pragmatist 
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commitments described above lead to this inevitable plurality of ways of making sense of 
and placing value on the various aspects of experience.  
 Now, this plurality of perspectives extant in our human community would seem to 
imply a radical relativism in which every individual lives in her own solipsistic universe, 
detached from others and simply relishing the show going on in her own little Cartesian 
theater.  Yet, we must remember that pragmatism’s anti-essentialism advances the claim 
that what a thing or person is is bound up in relations, either to other things or other 
people.  As I will argue in more detail in Chapter III, an anti-essentialist view of the self 
works to dissolve the traditional dichotomy in ethical philosophy between egoism and 
altruism by promoting a recognition of the inextricable web of relations between oneself 
and others in which one is caught.  This is not to say, however, that pragmatism pushes 
for a homogenization of society or a loss of individual identity, but rather simply that one 
would be well-served to recognize the interrelationality of human existence.  In fact, in 
defending pragmatism against charges of abnegating our, as human beings, difference 
from “lesser” animals, Rorty advances the claim that “the pragmatist sees our difference 
as a greater flexibility in the boundaries of selfhood, in the sheer quantity of relationships 
which can go to constitute a human self” (Rorty 1999, 81).   
One of the ethical implications of pragmatism’s commitment to this pluralism of 
perspectives, then, is a push for greater intersubjective awareness. 
19
  Without the 
possibility of a neutral, disinterested standpoint from which to engage experience, we 
would be wise to cultivate a sensitivity to the fact that others hold particular values, 
                                                 
19
 Intersubjective empathy, or the ability to recognize others as subjects and not mere objects within our 
own subjective experience, is a key notion in the ethics emerging out of existential phenomenology, as well 
as out of the dialogic tradition, specifically as it is embodied in the work of Martin Buber.  Moral 
psychology and naturalized approaches to ethics are also looking at the structures underlying 
intersubjective awareness, where mirror neurons are gaining prominence as a fruitful locus of study. 
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interests, and desires which shape their being-in-the-world just the same as we do; yet 
also with an acknowledgement that more often than not, those values, interests, and 
desires do not line up with our own.   
But in giving up any strong conception of a universal human nature to serve as a 
metaphysical thread to bind us together and give rise to a sense of duty to others, 
pragmatism’s push for social cooperation seems futile. 20  While intersubjective 
awareness is certainly key in promoting a sense of solidarity, something additional is 
needed if a more inclusive society is to be achieved.  Dewey and Rorty thus draw on the 
Humean notion that morality should aim at the cultivation of certain moral sentiments, 
namely fellow-feeling.  Though Dewey admits the Greek model of ethical education 
might have “over-emphasized the emotional element,” he closes “The Aesthetic Element 
in Education,” observing that “we have now gone to the opposite extreme” (Dewey, 
1882-1953, EW 5: 203-5).  Likewise, Rorty describes moral development as “a matter of 
increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety 
of people and things” (Rorty 1999, 81).  In Chapter IV, I will elaborate on the cultivation 
of this intersubjective awareness and development of inclusive sentiments, especially in 
regards to how aesthetic experience can help aid these invaluable forms of ethical 
enrichment.   
So, to summarize what has come thus far, a pragmatist approach to ethics can be 
seen as a response to the tradition within moral philosophy which sought certainty 
                                                 
20
 Again, a qualification is in order regarding Dewey here.  Dewey certainly does put forth the thesis, 
especially in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), that a better understanding of human nature and 
psychology is needed in ethical theory.  Yet, this shift in focus has as much to do with freeing morality 
from the shackles of supernaturalism as it has to do with actually gaining such understanding.  Moreover, 
what Dewey means by “human nature” is in no way limited to merely biological considerations.  Dewey’s 
sense of the term leaves room for the cultural element.  
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regarding models for the “good” life and for action-guidance.  This approach to ethics 
emerges out of the basic commitments held by the American pragmatists James, Dewey, 
and Rorty, as well as by their European counterpart, Nietzsche.  What I hope is somewhat 
apparent, then, is that any prescriptive ethics coming out of pragmatism cannot propound 
a priori principles for action, nor formulate any precise calculus in determining what is 
the right thing to do in any given situation.  Yet, it should also be vaguely apparent that 
pragmatists still want to offer something in the way of suggestions for how individuals 
might best prepare themselves to navigate the complexities and uncertainties inherent in 
human experience.  Instead of rules, though, it is my belief that these suggestions come in 
the form of proposals of particular dispositions or character traits, and in this way, a 
normative pragmatist ethics bears resemblance to the broad approach of certain virtue 
ethicists.   
   
Virtue Ethics and Pragmatism 
 I should begin by mentioning that in what follows I am in no way claiming to give 
an exhaustive account of the landscape of contemporary moral theory and the status of 
virtue ethics within it.  What I hope to do is give a succinct sketch of the renaissance of 
virtue ethics within ethical discourse, discuss some of the more contemporary approaches 
to virtue ethics while highlighting some of the common criticisms levied against them, 
support my contention that a pragmatist ethics might be best thought of as an approach 
that revolves around certain virtues or traits of character, and, finally, articulate what I 
take to be the cardinal virtue of pragmatism.  G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral 
Philosophy” (1958) is often regarded as ushering virtue ethics into contemporary moral 
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philosophy as a viable alternative to utilitarianism and deontology.  At the time her essay 
was published, these two models dominated the theoretical discourse surrounding ethics.  
Anscombe is rather dismissive of utilitarianism, and more generally consequentialism, on 
grounds similar to those espoused by Bernard Williams, in that focusing solely on the 
consequences in determining a course of action, utilitarianism might prescribe one to 
violate her integrity or, worse, the dignity of human life itself.  Concerning deontological 
approaches to ethics, then, Anscombe contends that notions such as “obligation,” 
“morally right,” and “morally wrong,” notions on which deontology hangs its hat, are 
empty without an absolute (i.e., theological) foundation from which they could be 
derived.  For the audience to whom she is writing, the belief in such a foundation has 
been greatly weakened if not outright relinquished, so out of the so-called “big three” 
moral theories (i.e., utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics), only virtue ethics still 
seems plausible as a normative system.   
  Writing on the problematic use of a phrase such as “morally wrong,” Anscombe 
insists, “It would be most reasonable to drop it.  It has no reasonable sense outside a law 
conception of ethics … and you can do ethics without it, as is shown by the example of 
Aristotle.  It would be great improvement if, instead of ‘morally wrong,’ one always 
named a genus such as ‘untruthful’, ‘unchaste’, ‘unjust’ ” (Anscombe 1958, 8-9).  In 
articulating the failures and incoherencies of the two dominant moral theories of her time, 
many read Anscombe as advancing virtue ethics, with its emphasis on admirable 
dispositions such as honesty, courage and justice, as the model most appropriate for 
contemporary moral philosophy.
21
   
                                                 
21
 There is another way to read Anscombe, one that takes off from her criticism of utilitarianism.  That is, 
Anscombe is sometimes painted as a moral absolutist, a stance supposedly informed by her religious 
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 Similar to Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, in his After Virtue (1984), appeals to 
Aristotle in the face of what he saw as the dysfunction of contemporary moral 
philosophy.  Like Anscombe, MacIntyre is concerned with what the lack of foundations 
means for moral theory, but thinks that in lieu of an absolute groundwork for morality, 
one could find more historically-situated rational criteria to employ in ethical inquiry.  
MacIntyre, thus, wants to guard moral philosophy against not only nihilistic relativism, 
but also against overly-emotivist responses to the collapse of transcendental conceptions 
of reason.  Hence his theory relies heavily on Aristotelian teleology in advancing a 
renewed conception of moral reason. 
 Yet, this is not to say that virtue ethics cannot place an emphasis on sentimental 
considerations.  Two more contemporary thinkers, Annette Baier and Martha Nussbaum, 
have advanced, albeit different, arguments in favor of a more virtue-based approach to 
ethics that nonetheless underscore the central role emotions play in our moral lives.  
Baier, in particular, is heavily influenced by David Hume, and lauds his “de-
intellectualizing and de-sanctifying the moral endeavor” (Baier 1985, 147).  This praise 
comes from Baier’s own commitment to the centrality of sentiment within morality, as 
well as the fact that Hume’s ethics situated humans within a naturalistic context.   
 In similar fashion, relatively recent work in contemporary virtue ethics by Phillipa 
Foot (2001) and Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) is set within the framework of what the 
latter calls “ethical naturalism,” a framework which “hopes to validate beliefs about 
which character traits are virtues by appeal to human nature” (Hursthouse 1999, 193).  
                                                                                                                                                 
beliefs.  Indeed Anscombe does not go into any sort of detail concerning what is seen as her support of a 
return to Aristotelian virtue ethics (and also openly questions the possibility of coming to a clear 
understanding of concepts key for such an approach, including, for instance, human “flourishing”), and so 
one may read her argument as actually calling for a return to a theologically-based moral theory.  For a 
brief account of this alternative reading, see Hursthouse 2010. 
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These naturalized approaches are not meant to be rigidly reductive, however, nor do they 
claim to have articulated the one “True” path to eudaimonia.  Indeed, as pointed out by 
David Copp and David Sobel, Hursthouse is cognizant that “the circumstances of human 
life are too variable for any … generalization to be acceptable” (Copp and Sobel 2004, 
530), and so one of the advantages of her proposal is that she presents the virtuous life (as 
she defines it, appealing to naturalistic terms) as merely the “best plan” for attaining 
flourishing.   
 This gets us back to the quest for certainty that I discussed earlier.  Despite 
recognizing the advantages of Hursthouse’s tentative explication of the connection 
between virtue and well-being, Copp and Sobel’s review of selected works on 
contemporary virtue ethics
22
 brings to the fore the lingering effects of a tradition which 
understands humans primarily as “knowers,” and which derides moral theories that do 
not provide justification for moral decision-making.  One of the most common charges 
levied against virtue ethics is its failure to provide definitive guides for action.  Despite 
even the defenders of utilitarianism and deontology slowly starting to accept the 
difficulty of trying to situate moral intuitions about right action within a system of 
universal principles (or one universal principle), as Hursthouse writes, “the complaint 
that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced 
criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to 
provide action-guidance (Hursthouse 2010).  
 This is indeed the thrust of Copp and Sobel’s review, as the majority of it is 
critical in tone, primarily for the reason that virtue ethicists are not able to codify conduct 
                                                 
22
 Copp and Sobel focus primarily on Michael Slote’s Moral from Motives (2001), Hursthouse’s On Virtue 
Ethics (1999),  and Foot’s Natural Goodness (2001). 
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sufficiently enough for action-guidance.  Seemingly trapping virtue ethicists within the 
logic of consequentialist/deontologist debates, Copp and Sobel continually flaunt virtue 
ethics’ failure to provide action-guidance in regards to various far-fetched moral 
dilemmas.  It is true that if you are searching for certainty regarding these situations, a 
virtue-based approach to ethics will not provide it.  In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
himself notes that “every discourse that concerns actions is obliged to speak in outline 
and not precisely,” as matters involved in actions “have nothing rigidly fixed about them” 
(Aristotle 2002, 23).  Copp and Sobel, however, take it for granted that “[i]t is a feature 
of the moral experience all of us share that we want to know what to do, and this calls for 
... not merely an assessment in terms of this or that virtue (Copp and Sobel 2004, 544, 
emphasis added).  Yet, Copp and Sobel never question the origin, or even value, of this 
intuition.  Yes, we might like to have certainty with regards to how we should live our 
lives and what we ought to do, but as Dewey argued, that quest for certainty has done 
nothing but lead us to numerous philosophical dead ends and inertia within the domain of 
moral discourse.  Moreover, to arrive at ethical certainty one must overly simplify the 
complexity and richness of our lives.  In so doing, though, we sadly narrow the horizon 
of possibilities for human thought and action. 
 
Pragmatism’s approach to virtue ethics 
 
 It is my contention that a pragmatist approach to ethics is best seen as a response 
to this tradition which sought to arrive at definitive guides for action.  Following 
MacIntyre’s insight that virtues are excellences, or admirable traits of character, arising 
out of a specific historical context, a pragmatist version of virtue ethics is conscious of 
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the situation now being one in which many individuals, for one reason or another, are 
starting to accept the possibility that such “instruction manuals” for living are chimerical.  
Part of this shift in thinking is no doubt due to the growing acceptance of a naturalistic 
understanding of moral deliberation.  Thus, a pragmatist virtue ethics would be 
sympathetic to the proposals of Foot and Hursthouse, where the aretaic quality of any 
virtue has to do with it aiding its possessor in achieving certain “naturalized” ends.23  It is 
hard not to see the framework within which they arrived at this conception of virtue as 
akin to Dewey’s own understanding of experience as the transactional relationship 
between an organism and environment.  Yet, what must be kept in mind is that human 
beings’ behaviors are made incredibly more complex, and, I would contend, irreducible 
to mere biologistic factors by the implications of language and culture.  To recall one of 
Margolis’ arguments for pragmatism’s advantage, pragmatism propounds a “moderate” 
naturalism, one which skirts the threat of materialist determinism through its unwavering 
emphasis on the “second-nature” in which humans are inextricably bound (i.e., the 
linguistic and cultural circumstances that are themselves environs with which we cope).   
 So, with all of this said, how exactly do pragmatists conceive of “virtue?”  As 
already noted, within contemporary moral discourse, pragmatism is often labeled as 
consequentialist in its theoretical orientation.  But, as Copp and Sobel themselves point 
out, “There has never been any doubt that consequentialist theories could accord to the 
virtues a … moral significance” (Copp and Sobel 2004, 515).  Perhaps, in the grand 
                                                 
23
 While Hursthouse and Foot acknowledge the gulf in sophistication between humans and lesser animals, 
they aim to draw connections between how we evaluate the “goodness” of sophisticated social animals and 
how we might think about human virtue.  The four criteria that they believe we look at in evaluating these 
non-human animals are: (1) the individual’s survival, (2) the continuance of the species, (3) the individual’s 
characteristic pleasure or enjoyment/characteristic freedom from pain, and (4) the good functioning of the 
social group” (Hursthouse 1999, 200-2).  
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scheme of compartmentalizing various moral theories into one of the “big three,” 
pragmatism may very well fit best in the consequentialist camp.
24
  Yet, if what we are 
after is a prescriptive ethics, pragmatists’ consequentialism does not provide any sort of 
calculus or procedure for maximizing demand-satisfaction or attaining societal progress.  
Instead, pragmatists such as James, Dewey, and Rorty give subtle hints about the types of 
characteristics their ethical exemplars would possess.
25
   
 In presenting Dewey’s normative ethics, as “not incompatible with the broad 
concerns of virtue ethicists,” Pappas states that “[p]hilosophical hypotheses about an 
ideal self and its virtues are no more than sophisticated ways of preparing the agent for 
what each situation requires” (Pappas 2008, 185).  Pragmatism’s ethical contextualism is 
what leads Pappas to describe pragmatic virtues as tools for dealing with particular 
“moral” situations in which an agent is inquiring about the best way to go forward.  One 
must keep in mind, however, that “[f]or a pragmatist there is no automatic criterion by 
which we can distinguish, once and for all, a virtue from a vice” (Pappas 2008, 187).  
Although, summing up a central theme of this account of a pragmatic approach to ethics 
(i.e., normativity can exist sans absolute foundations), Pappas writes:   
 But the abandonment of the notion of a single criterion does not entail that any 
 disposition is as good as any other or that there is no point in inquiring into 
 reasons why certain dispositions might be worth approving, cultivating, and trying 
 out.  After all, the issue is a matter of forced choice.  One can wait to arrive at the 
 single criterion if one likes, but meanwhile our characters are being formed in one 
 way or another.  (Pappas 2008, 187)   
 
                                                 
24
 James’s essay, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” (1891), indeed supports this claim, 
especially when he equates the good with “demand satisfaction.”  Yet, how one is best able to approach the 
moral life this way seems to be more a matter of character, and less a matter of definitive calculation. 
 
25
 This too harkens back to Aristotle’s claim in the Nicomachean Ethics that the right thing to do in any 
given situation can be determined by simply asking what the person of practical wisdom would do 
(Aristotle 2002, 29).   
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It is my contention that pragmatists can indeed extol certain virtues, virtues that are 
“contextual, instrumental, pluralistic, and experimental” (Pappas 2008, 186).  Yet, 
underlying these virtues is what I consider to be the cardinal pragmatist virtue, openness.   
 While a pragmatist cannot appeal to any teleological account of human nature in 
justifying once and for all the virtue of openness, they can attempt to show why this is 
worth “approving, cultivating, and trying out.”  Here this attempt consists in the idea that 
without absolute certainty regarding our normative practices, we would be well-served to 
ground our beliefs and values upon this realization.  Openness, then, can be seen as a type 
of comportment towards experience that proves to be incredibly useful within the 
pragmatist worldview sketched out above.
26
  
 In listing the characteristics he sees as constitutive of Dewey’s ideal moral self, 
Pappas himself begins with openness.  Pappas believes that “open-mindedness,” as he 
refers to it, has been given short shrift in ethical philosophy, as it is often regarded as 
pertaining solely to epistemological concerns.  “To be open,” writes Pappas, “is to be free 
from rigidity and fixity … It is to welcome new experiences, but in the strong sense of a 
willingness to be affected by participation with the new” (Pappas 2008, 188).  In short, 
this attitude involves primarily a “hospitality towards the new” (Pappas 2008, 188).  This 
hospitality, however, requires a certain vulnerability, for one must always be ready to 
revise, or even reject, some of their most deeply held beliefs if those beliefs are no longer 
proving to be of service in coping with experience.  It might be easy to see why, then, 
certainty, especially within the realm of ethical inquiry, is so alluring.  The values that 
                                                 
26
 As noted, Pappas qualifies that pragmatist virtues must be “contextual, instrumental, pluralistic, and 
experimental.”  Openness, I believe, meets these qualifications.  Moreover, openness, and the virtues which 
hinge on it, are virtues solely because of their utility in navigating experience.  This is important because 
Dewey’s reluctance to explicitly endorse virtue ethics was based on his wariness that an over-emphasis on 
character would alienate agents from their actions in a way similar to what existentialists call “bad faith.”   
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guide our lives and moral decision-making are some of the things that give our lives the 
most weight, and treating them as potentially vulnerable to revision can render us feeling 
adrift in the sea of experience.   
 In the next chapter I will approach this still rather opaque virtue from a slightly 
different angle in the context of the work of art, and in subsequent chapters will hope to 
add substance to it through discussing how it manifests itself in our everyday lives.  I 
would now like to present a brief argument for why I consider openness to be the cardinal 
virtue of a pragmatist ethics.  Regarding cardinality, Mark Alfano writes: “The notion of 
cardinality has about a long pedigree.  From the Latin cardo, meaning ‘hinge’, a cardinal 
virtue is a trait on which its bearer’s life turns” (Alfano, 2012: 10).  As such, I contend 
that the pragmatic cardinal virtue of openness is more than just a simple virtue, but is a 
matter of orientation, “a trait on which its bearer’s life turns.”   
 Although my central thesis here has been that a pragmatist approach to ethics 
seeks to propound a prescriptive ethics without appeal to absolute foundations, there is a 
sense in which openness serves as the bedrock for any detailed ethical theory which 
emerges out of the pragmatist tradition.  This “foundation,” though, is nothing more than 
the realization that there are no ultimate foundations upon which ethical prescriptions or 
systems can ground themselves.  With that said, taking openness to be the cardinal 
pragmatist virtue, we can say that it serves this “hinge” function mentioned above in that 
it gives rise to, and undergirds, other virtues that a “human of pragmatist wisdom” would 
possess.
27
  That is, if one truly possesses this virtue, other virtues come to light as useful, 
if not required, for the attainment of individual flourishing and the pursuit of social 
                                                 
27
 This moniker is simply a nod to Aristotle’s “Human of Practical Wisdom.”  If space had permitted, I 
would have tried to illustrate just how important ethical exemplars are for not only virtue ethics in general, 
but also for the specific, pragmatic, brand of virtue ethics I have been attempting to articulate. 
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melioration.  These virtues, however, do not necessarily give rise to openness.  Some of 
these virtues include (but are certainly not limited to): care (so as to not lapse into apathy 
in the face of pragmatism’s anti-absolutism), imagination (so as to be capable of 
engaging the wealth of possibilities for meaning and action contained beneath our current 
way of understanding things), sensitivity (so as to be attuned as possible to the various 
contingencies making up the context of any given situation), and empathy (so as to not 
just tolerate, or “let be,” the pluralism of our society, but actively try to understand 
others’ perspectives in the name of societal progress).  One can possess any of these 
virtues without necessarily being open.  But if one is open, these virtues reveal 
themselves as auxiliary dispositions worth attempting to cultivate.       
 In Chapters III and IV, I will be attempting to show how encounters with works of 
art help to develop openness, and provide substance to this virtue by highlighting its 
aretaic quality with respect to the prime ethical concerns of care of the self and social 
melioration.  But before discussing why I believe that openness is such a good tool to 
have at one’s disposal while navigating the landscape of our current historical situation, 
let us now turn to a discussion of the work an artwork can perform, and how exactly that 
work can be ethically-transformative.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
OVERCOMING THE MUSUEM: AN ENCOUNTER WITH  
THE WORK-ING OF ART 
Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; 
 they do not even just rest upon the earth.   
They are the earth in one of its manifest operations. 
- John Dewey, Art as Experience 
 
The Forgotten Significance of Art 
 
 Dewey opens his seminal work on aesthetics, Art as Experience (1934), by 
purporting to be enlisted in a “task to restore continuity between the refined and 
intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and 
sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience” (LW 10:10).  An 
attempt to restore continuity implies a divorce of some sort, and another way of phrasing 
what is motivating Dewey’s inquiry into aesthetics is that art seems to be separated in 
some way from our everyday lives, our very being-in-the-world.  This divorce is captured 
in what Dewey refers to as the “compartmental conception of fine art” (LW 10:15).  
Richard Shusterman succinctly describes this conception in noting its “compartmental 
institutionalization and elitism, its separation from life and praxis, its distance from 
ordinary people and their experience” (Shusterman 1992, 140).   
 Dewey does not believe, however, that art has always been disconnected from our 
lives in such a way.  Even the ancient Greek understanding of art as mimesis, Dewey 
believes, “did not signify that art was a literal copying of objects, but that it reflected the 
emotions and ideas that are associated with the chief institutions of social life;” thus he 
proclaims that art was “an integral part of the ethos and the institutions of the 
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community” (LW 10:15).1  Yet, art, according to Dewey, has become increasingly 
compartmentalized, and within this situation we fail to see that artworks emerge out of 
our ordinary day-to-day activities.  As Tom Alexander notes, this is problematic in 
leading us to “fail to see how the works we encounter in museums (likewise in galleries, 
concert halls, and classrooms) have actually grown from those common conditions in 
life” (Alexander 1998, 5-6).  In segregating art to its own autonomous realm, we thus also 
“fail to see how the artists’ success in making expressively meaningful, intrinsically 
fulfilling objects from the raw material of life can be applied across the whole spectrum 
of human existence” (Alexander 1998, 6).  In other words, we are failing to recognize the 
power art has to transform our lives.   
 Dewey cites one explicit cause of this schism between art and life, and hints at 
another.  The one historical force leading to this depreciation of art that Dewey names 
outright is the rise of capitalism.  For one, this has led to a fetishization of art collecting 
and the appropriation of art by the wealthy as a sign of their affluence.  “Generally 
speaking,” writes Dewey, “the typical collector is the typical capitalist” (LW 10:15).  
Moreover, capitalism is, according to Dewey, inextricably linked to increasing 
industrialization, which he contends is pushing art further and further away from our 
basic being-in-the-world through its over-mechanization of human labor.  One can see 
how the monotony of factory work could potentially occlude the artistic-aesthetic 
dimension of labor.  Under the influence of these related forces, Dewey concludes that art 
becomes nothing more than the “beauty parlor of civilization” (LW 10:347).   
                                                 
1
 Heidegger, in discussing the ancient Greek temple in “On the Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-36), 
makes almost the same point in noting that it reflected this historical community’s sense of what is and 
what matters (Heidegger 2002, 20-1).   
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 Yet, there is another factor Dewey sometimes hints at regarding the devalued 
station of art, one which is gestured at in the passage cited above from Alexander 
regarding our failure to recognize how the fruits of aesthetic experience can be “applied 
across the whole spectrum of human existence.”  Martin Heidegger’s thoughts on art are 
helpful to bring in here, for, just as Dewey did not see the museum conception of art as an 
isolated phenomenon, Heidegger too recognized the “aestheticization of art” as bound up 
with more a sweeping cultural transpiring.  The basic historical force underlying this take 
on art is, according to Heidegger, the growing human desire to achieve complete mastery 
over our environment.  In our modern age, where the goal of inquiry is “aimed at 
bringing each being before (the judging subject) in such a way that the (subject) who 
calculates can be sure – and that means certain – of the being,” we are involved in a 
“mode of human being which occupies the realm of human capacity as the domain of 
measuring and execution for the purpose of the mastery of beings as a whole” (Heidegger 
2002, 66 & 69).  This lines up with Dewey’s own critique of the quest for certainty, and 
what this points to regarding our collective ignorance to the intimate relationship between 
art and life is that scientific inquiry, and with the “objective” knowledge it is purported to 
provide, has come to be seen as the paradigmatic human activity.  Thus art’s value is now 
thought to reside solely in its ornamental, entertaining, and status-signifying purposes; 
for, like Plato thought, if it cannot provide knowledge, it cannot possibly be of any use to 
us besides mere frivolity, and, worse, it is potentially a corrupting distraction.
2
   
                                                 
2
 Plato does seem to recognize the transformative potential of art, in that he recognizes it has a power over 
people.  This, however, is Plato’s concern, for its power does not lie in leading people to the life of 
knowledge, but actually the opposite.  The poet is merely inspired when creating a work and is actually 
taking us further into the realm of appearances and, thus, farther from the Real. 
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 Implicated in this quest for certainty and the attendant depreciation of art is, 
according to Dewey and Heidegger, a mistaken and pernicious view of experience, one 
which posits a divide between the subject and object as metaphysically antecedent to any 
interaction between them.  In the spirit of Dewey’s critique of the museum conception of 
art, Heidegger laments how, in our day and age, “works are shipped like coal from the 
Ruhr or logs from the Black Forest” from one exhibition to another (Heidegger 2002, 3).  
The view that an encounter with a work of art is the experience of a judging subject 
apprehending an object, wherein there is a metaphysical gulf between the two, is exactly 
what Dewey seeks to overcome with his distinction between an art product and the 
working of art.  As with other emergent phenomena Dewey thinks have become reified, 
he wants to recuperate an understanding of the work of art as a verb (not a noun), in order 
to illuminate its situatedness in and emergence out of the embodied and temporal quality 
of our existence as organisms engaged in constant transaction with our environment.  In 
spelling out Dewey’s account of aesthetic experience (and, in using Heidegger as a 
supplement to it), I will hope to bring into relief art’s ability to cultivate the pragmatic 
orientation towards experience articulated in the previous chapter.   
 But before that, the following note is in order.  Although I believe that Dewey’s 
aesthetic theory lends itself to discussions across various media, for the purposes of this 
dissertation I am going to focus primarily on the visual arts.  Much has been written on 
literature’s role in our ethical development and the cultivation of moral sentiment, as well 
as on the transformative effects of music.  Yet, the visual arts seem to be somewhat 
forgotten in the discussion of art’s ability to transform the way we inhabit the world.  
While it is true that the use of visual art for propaganda has undeniable import within 
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moral discourse, for purposes that will become apparent, I am electing to focus more on 
the non-ideational character of painting in particular to highlight Dewey’s and 
Heidegger’s phenomenologies of aesthetic experience – phenomenologies that, I believe, 
help reveal an oft-ignored function of art as it relates to ethics. 
 
The Dynamic Movement of the Work of Art 
 Let us begin by first looking at how both Dewey and Heidegger understand an 
encounter with the work of art.  The “edifying” (to use Rorty’s sense of the term3) 
character of both thinkers’ aesthetic projects places them in opposition to more traditional 
and mainstream theories of art.  In holding our practical engagement with the world as 
the ground out of which our theoretical descriptions of existence emerge, Dewey and 
Heidegger actually see present theory as a potential hindrance to having a genuine 
aesthetic experience elicited by a work of art.  Dewey observes that more often than not, 
regarding traditional philosophical attempts to explain aesthetic experience, “it is shown 
that the system in question has superimposed some preconceived idea upon experience 
instead of encouraging or even allowing aesthetic experience to tell its own tale” (LW 
10:280).  It is indeed this intrusion of philosophical biases that motivates Heidegger’s 
own phenomenological attempt to simply describe the experience that is an encounter 
with the work so as to allow the work to tell its own tale. 
 Through such a phenomenology of aesthetic experience, it will be shown how art 
“represents” something about our basic engagement with the world.  In articulating how 
                                                 
3
 In contrast to mainstream “systematic” philosophers, “edifying” philosophers are “peripheral, pragmatic 
philosophers” who “are skeptical primarily about systematic philosophy, about the whole project of 
universal commensuration.”  Rorty claims that, “In our time, Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger are the 
great edifying, peripheral, thinkers” (Rorty 1979, 368). 
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art is grounded in our primary experiential engagement with our surroundings, both 
thinkers hope to show how misguided understandings of art compartmentalize the 
aesthetic and place art in an autonomous domain separate from our lived experience.  In 
other words, in focusing on what happens within the work of art (again, as a certain kind 
of working rather than merely an art “product”), as opposed to defining the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an experience of the beautiful, or the formal qualities of art 
objects, or the mechanics of the art world,
4
 Dewey and Heidegger attempt to disclose the 
very reasons why art’s significance for life must be recuperated.   
 
The “work” of art and Dewey’s conception of experience 
 Dewey opens Art as Experience by raising the paradoxical claim that “[b]y one of 
the ironic perversities that often attend the course of affairs, the existence of works of art 
upon which formation of esthetic theory depends has become an obstruction to theory 
about them” (LW 10:10).  Dewey here is using the phrase “work of art” in our rather 
commonsense understanding of it as synonymous with the “objective,” physical painting, 
novel, sculpture, song, etc. that is being perceived.  As he does with so many other 
philosophical concepts and problems, however, Dewey seeks to reshape our 
understanding of the work of art.  Dewey’s sense of the “work of art” is thus employed 
not only to show how rich and dynamic an aesthetic experience actually is, but also to 
highlight its emergence out of the basic materials of our lived experience.  Therefore, 
                                                 
4
 Iain Thomson contends that a “more contemporary example of this theoretical approach to art is found in 
the area of cognitive psychology and neuroscience.  For, once aesthetics reduces art to intense subjective 
experience, such experiences can be studied objectively through the use of EEGs,fMRIs, MEG and PET 
scans (and the like), and in fact aesthetic experiences are increasingly being studied in this way. At the 
University of New Mexico's MIND Institute, to mention just one telling example, subjects were given 
‘beautiful’ images to look at and the resulting neuronal activity in their brains was studied empirically 
using one of the world's most powerful functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging machines” (Thomson 
2010).  
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understanding what Dewey means by the work of art is crucial to grasping his account of 
art’s transformative potential, in particular with regard to our ethical comportment. 
 So, where is art?  An obvious answer would be that art resides in galleries, 
museums, art shows, the homes of the wealthy, and other similar abodes.  As just 
mentioned, art is typically associated with the novel, sculpture, painting, sonata, drama, 
or elegantly designed building; that is, with the object we encounter that gives rise to our 
aesthetic experience.  Following suit, many theories of art have honed in on art objects 
and attempted to spell out the nature of art through an account of their essential 
characteristics.  Formalist theories, for instance, while acknowledging the effects an art 
product has on the judging subject, focus fundamentally on the particular formal qualities 
of a painting or a musical arrangement in explicating what differentiates art from other 
things we encounter in our “objective” world.  This approach, however, also reinforces 
the idea that we are metaphysically separate from that world.  Moreover, it is the epitome 
of the view that art is radically distinct from our normal, everyday modes of experience.  
Kant, for instance, in his Critique of Judgment (1790), worked out a detailed account of 
an encounter with the beautiful that stripped the experience of any of its transactional, 
qualitative richness.  According to Kant, in making a pure judgment of taste, the judging 
subject brackets any subjective considerations (be them conceptual or emotional) and 
focuses solely on the object’s pure form.5  
 Clive Bell, whose book Art (1914) represents the acme of post-Kantian formal 
aesthetics, goes so far as to claim that:  
 If the forms of a work are significant its provenance is irrelevant … It is the mark 
 of great art that its appeal is universal and eternal.  Significant form stands 
 charged with the power to provoke aesthetic emotion in anyone capable of feeling 
                                                 
5
 That is, the play of shapes or intuitions in time. 
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 it.  The ideas of men go buzz and die like gnats … only great art remains stable 
 and unobscure.  Great art remains stable and unobscure because the feelings that it 
 awakens are independent of time and place, because its kingdom is not of this 
 world (Bell 1995, 109-10).    
 
Historical and cultural context, along with the idiosyncrasies of the perceiver, are clearly 
of no concern for Bell, as the significant form of the art object is the sole locus of his 
theory of art.  Bell is certainly not alone in making such a move, though, as a central 
thrust of analytic aesthetics is this emphasis on the art product.  Even concerning the 
creative process, this tradition tends to treat the art object as the be-all and end-all of 
aesthetic experience and, as Thomas Leddy has pointed out, within such theories of art, 
the “product is prior to process” to such an extent that the active processes of creation and 
appreciation are ignored (Leddy 1994, 1).   
 Dewey, on the other hand, employs a Hegelian-inspired organicism in regards to 
art, whereby the creative process, the appreciative encounter, and the art object are all 
intimately related.  Dewey indeed distinguishes mere art products from the work of art.  
Consider, for instance, Georgia O’Keeffe’s Ranchos Church (Figure 1).  The locus of a 
Deweyan analysis is not the 24 1/8 x 31 1/8 inch, oil on canvas painting hanging in 
whatever exhibition it is currently residing, but is rather the dynamic, transactional 
experience involving the live creature and that particular encounter with its environment.   
 Recall from Chapter I that one of the central commitments of pragmatism is an 
anti-representationalist view of experience.  In Dewey’s writings on traditional 
metaphysics and epistemology, he opposes what he refers to as the “spectator theory of 
knowledge.”  The underlying premise of the spectator theory is that there is an 
unbridgeable separation between the apprehending subject and the objective world 
independent of human interpretation, a separation which is metaphysically and 
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temporally-antecedent to our everyday being-in-the-world.  Within this theory, espoused 
in various forms throughout the history of western thought, this divide is the primary 
context of our experience.  The aim of inquiry, be it scientific or moral, is thus to bridge 
this gulf so as to arrive at certain knowledge.  Dewey, however, sees the subject-object 
divide to be the result of treating the conceptual resources gleaned from reflection as 
somehow immutable manifestations of The Way Things Really Are.  In other words, 
instead of treating our conceptual systems as derivative from a more primary level of 
experience, we have fallen into the trap of taking our tools of reflection (i.e., concepts) as 
metaphysical givens resting beneath (or swooping in from above) the ground of our lived 
experience.
6
   
 
 
Figure 1. Georgia O’Keeffe, Ranchos Church (1929). 
 This hypostatization is akin to “the philosophical fallacy” discussed in Chapter I, 
and Dewey’s rich notion of experience not only lies at the heart of his attempt to 
                                                 
6
 Nietzsche makes a similar observation in one of his earliest, yet perhaps most lucid, reflections on 
experience and knowledge in his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (1873).  In short, 
Nietzsche’s own take on this reversal is that the abstractions and discriminations we derive from our basic 
interaction with the world become hypostatized and then insert themselves into our experience in a way 
that obscures the very fact that they are merely abstractions and derivatives.     
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overcome this fallacy, but is also key to understanding his theory of art.  While there are 
numerous passages, chapters, essays, and even books devoted to explicating what Dewey 
means by “experience,” for our purposes here, a substantially abridged version should 
suffice.  Experience, according to Dewey, arises out of the transaction between an 
organism and its environment.  We are not isolated, autonomous subjects passively 
receiving brute sense data from the external world, nor are we isolated, autonomous 
subjects bestowing meaning and values on an inherently meaningless and blank canvas 
beyond our subjective horizons.  Instead, we are complex animals engaged in a much 
more intimate relationship with our world.  Clearly, our environment transcends the 
merely physical, for it incorporates the interpersonal, social and cultural context as well.  
Our beliefs, desires, past experiences all tinge and shape our experience of the world, yet 
the world pushes back, delimits and expands our horizons of meaning.  Therefore, the 
ground-level, so to speak, of our experience is not an intricate architectonic of conceptual 
schemas, but is this basic, primordial transaction between an organism and its 
environment.  Dewey thus seeks to undermine the spectator theory of knowledge and 
experience, along with the inertia-inducing “problems” it generates, by illuminating for 
us this primary level of engagement, or direct experience, out of which our conceptual 
systems emerge.   
 More will be said about this notion of primary, or direct, experience later, as it 
plays a significant role in both Dewey’s and Heidegger’s understandings of what art is 
uniquely capable of “representing.”  For now, I only note that both see the interpretation 
of an aesthetic experience in which the judging subject is separated from the art object as 
not only misguided, but also as inhibiting our ability to truly fathom the richness and 
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dynamism of an encounter with the work of art.  Yet, as noted, this view of aesthetic 
experience is rather intuitive and uncontroversially commonplace.  Amidst our collective 
understandings of art, how else are we to think about our experience of an artwork other 
than as the perception of an art product possessing aesthetic value?   
 The main clue to how we might reshape this commonsense perspective is found in 
Dewey’s pronouncement that “there is a difference between the art product (statue, 
painting, or whatever), and the work of art,” and that while “[t]he first is physical and 
potential; the latter is active and experienced” (LW 10:168).  Staying true to his anti-
reductionist tendencies and his Hegelian-inspired organicism, Dewey avoids isolating any 
one particular feature of aesthetic experience as more privileged than the rest.  However, 
lest one think, then, that Dewey disregards art products completely, in the vein of theories 
of artistic expression such as R. G. Collingwood’s,7 the former contends that expression 
must transform material, that is, become manifest in the physical, if it is to be properly 
considered art.  Although my focus here is primarily the phenomenology of artistic 
appreciation, this emphasis on transforming matter in creative expression is important, 
because without an actual art object to be experienced by an audience, there is no work of 
art.   
 Because the work of art exists within the intimate transaction between a perceiver 
and the art object, the work is best thought of as a dynamic movement through time.  
Now, with arts such as poetry, literature, drama, and music, it is clear that our 
appreciation of them involves a beginning, middle, and culmination.  For Dewey, 
however, it could be said that all artistic appreciation takes place in such a 
                                                 
7
 R. G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art (1938) puts forth the rather extreme view that the work of art is 
purely an expression of an idea in the artist’s mind.  That is, regarding music for instance, “the work of art 
is not the collection of noises, it is the tune in the composer’s head (Collingwood 1995, 150).   
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chronologically-unified fashion, because life itself unfolds temporally.  So, although the 
object itself might be static, Dewey’s transactional conception of experience highlights 
the fact that any aesthetic experience is going to happen in and through time.
8
  As will be 
seen, one of the crowning values of aesthetic experience is that it embodies an ideal 
movement through time by holding together the past, the present, and future in one 
organically-unified experience.  As Dewey himself states, “The real work of an artist is to 
build up an experience that is coherent in perception while moving with constant change 
in its development” (LW 10:58, emphasis added).   
 This segues nicely into Dewey’s argument for the central role of art in life, as it 
begins with his account of everyday experience.  “Experience occurs continuously,” 
writes Dewey, “because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is 
involved in the very process of living” (LW 10:43).  Yet, Dewey goes on to say that 
“[o]ftentimes … the experience had is inchoate.  Things are experienced but not in such a 
way that they are composed into an experience.  There is distraction and dispersion; what 
we observe and what we think, what we desire and what we get, are at odds with each 
other” (LW 10:43).  During such experience, we can easily feel frustrated and estranged 
from our world, and this can readily devolve into a forgetfulness of our primary, 
transactional engagement with our environment.  
There are, however, those times in our lives where we genuinely feel at home in 
the world, and where experience hangs together in a way that overflows with meaning.  It 
might have been that first date with your future spouse, or that presentation at the 
                                                 
8
 This view lines up with Nietzsche’s remarks on Friedrich Schiller’s claim that the act of creation is 
preceded by a musical mood (Nietzsche 1967, 49).  We obviously think of music as a “temporal” art form, 
but within this Deweyan view all art is granted a temporal dimension in the very basic sense that it 
fundamentally involves a movement through time.  Interestingly, Dewey himself cites the same claim by 
Schiller in Art as Experience (LW 10:196-7).    
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philosophy conference, or that encounter with Van Gogh’s painting of a peasant’s shoes, 
or even that time you got stranded in a blizzard atop the Sandia Mountains.  It is the 
ability to label these experiences with the distinguishing “that” which marks these off 
from the inchoateness regularly found in the flow of life.  “We have an experience when 
the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment,” writes Dewey, and “[i]n such 
experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and without unfilled 
blanks, into what ensues … flow is from something to something … An experience has a 
unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship” (LW 10:43-
5).  Note that it is not a “happy ending” that demarcates an experience from others, but 
rather that there is a unity, a single pervasive quality underlying the various elements, 
imbuing them with a heightened sense of meaning and aesthetic import.  I say aesthetic 
here, in the broad sense of aesthesis, because as we will see, an experience, whether it is 
discriminated in reflection as practical, intellectual, moral, etc., is something that first and 
foremost is felt. 
So, what does all of this have to do with the work of art?  First it should be noted 
that in lumping an aesthetic experience (as elicited by a piece of visual art) in with these 
other consummatory experiences, Dewey is already making strides towards overcoming 
an elitist and isolated conception of art.  It does not seem far-fetched to say that most 
individuals of a certain age have had an experience, an occurrence within the flow of life 
that stands out from the rest and whose parts all hang together in a way that provides a 
felt sense of unity and significance.  A work of art is an experience – a qualitatively 
unified and consummatory experience: “[A]rt … unites the very same relation of doing 
and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an 
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experience” (LW 10:55).  Art’s “material” (as manifested in its transformed matter) is, 
according to Dewey, the basic qualitative relations found in our primary engagement with 
the world.
9
  In other words, art is a concentrated example of not just experience in 
general, but of an experience, in that what it evokes “is experience freed from the forces 
that impede and confuse its development as experience; freed, that is, from factors that 
subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself” (LW 10:279). 
 Let us now flesh out the details of how exactly Dewey understands the work of art 
and just what happens in our appreciation of it.  With the aim of this inquiry into the 
relationship between aesthetic experience and ethics focused on the non-conceptual or 
non-ideational characteristics of art, let us look at the movement of the work of art as 
experienced in an encounter with a graffiti mural by the artist known as “Zephyr” (Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2. Zephyr, Zephyr (date unknown). 
                                                 
9
 Qualitative relations essentially make up the “moods” that accompany our pre-reflective experience.  
They are the subject matter for secondary reflection and analysis.  The artist uses these qualitative relations, 
described in reflection with such words as “balance,” “harmony,” “rhythm,” proportion” etc. (along with 
their opposites), to create a work.  These aesthetic terms of relation, however, are, according to Dewey, the 
basis of all thought.  This is similar to Heidegger’s own conception of moods and how they are felt at a 
primordial level of existence.   
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 As with any temporally-unified movement, an aesthetic experience has a 
beginning, middle, and end.  The beginning of this consummatory experience is what 
Dewey sometimes refers to as the moment of seizure or inception, wherein the artwork as 
a unified whole strikes you with its pervasive, underlying quality. “The total 
overwhelming impression comes first,” writes Dewey, so that the elements “fuse in one 
indistinguishable whole” (LW 10:151).  Thus “[t]here is an impact that precedes all 
definite recognition of what (the painting) is about” (LW 10:151).10  The actual journey, 
however, begins once we get lured into the work via one of its more striking elements.  
What first becomes focal may very well be different for different people, especially when 
perceiving a painting.  It is true that some paintings possess very striking images, colors, 
lines or other elements that catch the eye more than others, but because perception for 
Dewey is always funded by past experience and our storehouse of meanings and values, 
different elements may stand out more than others, and so there might be various points 
of departure for an aesthetic experience.   
 The particular piece I am going to discuss in terms of the aesthetic experience it 
may elicit is a painting on a wall in New York City of the artist’s name.  The mural is 
small enough to take in the whole of it from a distance, and so one will be able to have 
that Deweyan moment of seizure.  As for the development of the work, one of the more 
eye-catching features of this piece is the elegant swirl that stands in the center of the 
piece, and many may very well become captivated with the piece because of it.  As the 
process of discrimination ensues, the vibrant color combination of sun-yellow letters with 
                                                 
10
 Although it seems that with actual “temporal” media such as music, literature, and poetry, we do not get 
a sense of the whole at the moment of inception, Dewey seems to think we get a feel for the whole right at 
the start of our experience, and that that feel pervades and is reinforced throughout the journey.  Dewey’s 
emphasis on the unanalyzed qualitative totality of the work, however, might betray the reason why he 
focuses primarily on painting in his writings on art.   
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deep crimson outlines on a slate blue background is perhaps more than enough to draw 
one into a more careful appreciation of the piece.  Regardless of what it is that lures one 
into such appreciation, once one is engaged in the encounter with this painting, 
perception, rather than mere recognition, is taking place.  This is an important distinction 
within Dewey’s theory of art, as it emphasizes the creative and active aspects of artistic 
appreciation.   
 In contrast to more contemplative theories of art, such as Kant’s, where the 
judging subject is construed as a rather passive conglomerate of psychological faculties 
that, once in the presence of the pure form of an object deemed beautiful, goes through 
the mechanics of the “harmony in free-play” of the understanding and the imagination, 
Dewey wants to make it clear that, when immersed in an aesthetic experience, 
“receptivity is not passivity” (LW 10:59).  Passive recognition is, according to Dewey, 
“[p]erception arrested before it has a chance to develop freely,” and involves us falling 
back “upon some previously formed scheme” (LW 10:60).  Such recognition, though, is 
disconnected from the particularities of the context of our primary engagement with the 
world.  In recognition, we thus commit the philosophical fallacy through an over-reliance 
on our conceptual systems of interpretation, as we lazily try to fit the square peg of 
experience into the round hole of our pre-conceived general ideas. 
 Genuine perception, on the other hand, while it does involve receptivity, is “an act 
of the going-out of energy in order to receive” (LW 10:61).   There is an aesthetic 
sensitivity to the qualitative contours of the situation in such active engagement, thus 
allowing the perceiver to be much more open and flexible to the ever-changing dynamics 
of experience.  Effort and care are indispensible requisites for aesthetic experience, for a 
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quick glance at the “Zephyr” piece will not work in the way art needs to in order for its 
transformative potential to be actualized.  One must attend to the experience that is being 
afforded by the painting, bringing to bear one’s storehouse of meanings and interest 
gathered from previous experience. 
  This “working-through” of the piece on the part of the perceiver helps Dewey 
connect the act of artistic expression and doing with the aesthetic appreciation and 
undergoing of the work.  Constructing a bridge between the act of creation and the 
audience’s perception of the created work has proven to be a tenuous enterprise 
throughout the history of aesthetics.  Consider Kant’s Third Critique and the numerous 
attempts that have been made to unify the thesis of the Analytic of the Beautiful with his 
discussion of artistic genius in the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments.
11
  The 
Deweyan view of perception avoids this problematic, because “to perceive, a beholder 
must create his own experience.  And his creation must include relations comparable to 
those which the original producer underwent” (LW 10:61).  This appreciative creation 
means that the perceiver must simplify, clarify, abridge, and condense according to her 
interest (LW 10:61).  Thus there is an imaginative, but real, reciprocity between the artist 
and the perceiver. 
As the active appreciation of the “Zephyr” piece gets underway, the stimuli of the 
painting are not imposing themselves on one’s faculties as if impressing upon wax, but 
rather the perceiver is creating her experience of it through the way she organizes the 
various elements according to her interest.  One might be drawn to the arrows bracketing 
the piece, or the swirled figure in the center that is repeated throughout the whole.  The 
                                                 
11
 Mark Johnson attempts to spell such a unification in his “Kant’s Unified Theory of Beauty” (1979).  
Brent Kalar also engages this issue in his The Demands of Taste in Kant’s Aesthetics (2006).   
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complimentary colors of deep yellow and crimson create a harmonious tension, and the 
final outline in light blue fades into a cloud-like background of slate which not only 
frames the piece and obscures the wall on which it has been painted, but also gives it and 
emergent and transitory quality.  Furthermore, there is a movement in time experienced 
in the work.  Yet, it is not just a movement from left to right, reading, as it were, the 
artist’s name.  Indeed, while the conceptual content of the name “Zephyr” is certainly 
intriguing, even one who was not well-versed in reading graffiti, if carefully attending to 
the work, will move through the shapes, lines, colors, and shadings, as through a maze of 
varying emotional hues and intensities.
12
     
While Dewey does discriminate, for discussion’s sake, three separate phases of an 
aesthetic experience, there is a thorough interrelationality between these parts.  The 
movement from inception, through development, and to fulfillment is one of a continuous 
flow, where these elements can only be differentiated upon reflection.  In describing the 
moment of inception and Dewey’s distinction between the type of perception that occurs 
in a consummatory aesthetic experience and mere recognition, the development of such 
experience’s movement has already been introduced.   In noting the activity, the going-
out of energy, involved in the appreciation of a work of art, Dewey is able to introduce 
his version of a “golden mean” as it relates not only to his aesthetic ideal, but his ideal 
                                                 
12
 The conceptual content that I refer to is “zephyr,” meaning “a mild breeze.”  Indeed, graffiti is an art 
form rather fitting for a Deweyan analysis, as it is literally out of the museums and galleries, and graffiti 
artists are by no means ignorant of a piece’s transitory status (being that even on legal walls, there is a 
strong chance it will get covered over by another artist’s work).  It is also a form that captures the spirit of 
Nietzsche and Dewey’s insistence on the enigmatic quality of all “good” art.  If the aim of graffiti artists 
was simply to spread their name and reputation, they could simply write their names in a more legible 
fashion.  The deciphering of a piece is one of the most interesting facets of graffiti, and as such, graffiti 
pieces lend themselves quite nicely to Dewey’s conception of active appreciation.  Moreover, the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of people, most who have no real experience with or interest in graffiti, ignore 
or are even repulsed by its presence seems to illustrate the museum conception of art against which Dewey 
is fighting.  “If it is not in a gallery or museum, it cannot possibly be art” seems to be the mindset working 
here. 
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experiential orientation as well.  Dewey states, “Rigid abstinence, coerced submission, 
tightness on one side and dissipation, incoherence and aimless indulgence on the other, 
are deviations in opposite directions from the unity of an experience,” and surmises that 
“[s]ome such considerations perhaps induced Aristole to invoke the ‘mean proportional’ 
as the proper designation of what is distinctive of both virtue and the esthetic” (LW 
10:48).  These two poles line up with Dewey’s insistence that an artistic-aesthetic 
experience is a dynamic balance between doing and undergoing.
13
 
What is typically taken to be simply an undergoing – the passive reception of the 
artwork – is, for Dewey, something that also implies action.  The energy that is exerted 
on the part of the perceiver primarily involves a concern for the qualitative relations 
embedded in our temporal existence.  Again, one’s storehouse of accrued meanings and 
values has an unavoidable influence on one’s encounter with a work of art by 
contributing to the interest that guides the organization of its elements.  Yet another 
dimension of one’s past experience, along with one’s anticipations towards the future, are 
implicated in Dewey’s conception of the ideal mode of experience, the mode exemplified 
by a consummatory aesthetic experience.   
Dewey laments that, for the most part, we find ourselves in a state sadly 
comparable to that of a stone rolling haphazardly down a hill.  That is, “in much of our 
experience we are not concerned with the connection of one incident with what went 
before and what comes after” and thus “we drift” and “yield according to external 
                                                 
13
 It should be noted that Dewey continues his trope of bridging distinctions with a hyphen (literally, hypo 
hen, or “under one”) with regards to artistic doing and aesthetic undergoing.  Thus, the more proper way of 
describing the work of art is that it is an artistic-aesthetic experience.  That is, Dewey posits a rich 
reciprocity between the artist and the perceiver, whereby the artist is constantly taking the role of the 
perceiver, and the perceiver, as already mentioned, is engaged in a creative act. Thomas  Leddy (1994) 
discusses this point in regards to a pragmatic theory of artistic creativity which privileges the entire creative 
process (including relations between the art product, the artist, the audience, and the host of environing 
factors in the background) over the mere art product.  
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pressure, or evade, and compromise” (LW 10:47).14  Though, in working out his general 
conception of the aesthetic and how it is bound up with his notion of consummation 
(which will be discussed shortly), Dewey asks us to hypothetically reconsider the 
tumbling stone, albeit with a few imaginative additions to the story.  So, added to the bare 
facts that “the stone starts from somewhere and moves … toward a place and state where 
it will be at rest – toward an end,” Dewey suggests we add:  
The ideas that it looks forward with desire to the final outcome; that it is 
interested in the things it meets on its way, conditions that accelerate and retard its 
movement with respect to their bearing on the end; that it acts and feels toward 
them according to the hindering or helping function it attributes to them; and that 
the final coming to rest is related to all that  went before as the culmination of a 
continuous movement” (LW 10:47, emphasis added).  
 
Looking forward, desiring, bringing one’s interest to bear on her experience, 
acting and feeling, are the doings involved in aesthetic perception.  While Dewey is 
certainly a staunch critic of formalist aesthetic theories, it is clear that he is concerned 
with the organization of the work of art.  Again, though, the work is not the static art 
product, but exists within the transactional relationship between the perceiver and the art 
product.  The organization of the artwork, then, is always temporal, and the relations 
Dewey seeks to describe have to do significantly with the present moment’s connection 
to the past and future.   
As just mentioned, one’s accrued storehouse of meanings and values (i.e., their 
perspective, in the Nietzschean-Jamesean sense discussed in Chapter I), ineluctably shape 
one’s experience of the work of art, and embracing this fact (as opposed to ascetically 
                                                 
14
 In other words, time because a completely linear sequence of events wherein the dynamic interplay of the 
past, present, and future is neglected. 
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attempting to arrive at a Kantian state of disinterest
15
) will only be conducive towards 
richer and more meaningful encounters with art.  Yet, there is another, perhaps more 
subtle, way that the past influences the present within a consummatory aesthetic 
experience.  As I tour the painting, each element of the work, each shading, each color, 
each line and figure, all take turns at the foreground of my embodied experience,
16
 
though are not forgotten as they are replaced by another.  Moreover, the qualitative 
content of each element is carried through the experience and intensifies, mutes, 
illuminates, etc., the rest, and while each element maintains its integrity, there is a 
pervasive unity holding the experience together.  Drawing an analogy, Dewey writes, “A 
river distinct from a pond, flows.  But its flow gives a definiteness and interest to its 
successive portions greater than exist in the homogenous portions of a pond” (LW 10:44).  
The pervading flow is what provides the richness of meaning within experience, yet that 
fact is often obscured by the two main enemies of the aesthetic, “[r]igid abstinence, 
coerced submission, tightness” and “dissipation, incoherence and aimless indulgence” 
(LW 10:48).   
The pervasive quality of an aesthetic experience is one of the more important 
concepts within Dewey’s theory of art.  It is indeed the pervasive quality that makes an 
aesthetic experience consummatory.  Dewey contends, somewhat counter-intuitively, that 
although the work of art proceeds in the form of a journey through inception, 
development, and fulfillment, the conclusion of the journey is a whole that was felt 
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 Technically, Kantian “disinterest” involves the beholder’s indifference towards the existence of the 
object.  Yet, his theory can also be said to be disinterested in the sense of scientific disinterestedness, 
whereby any “subjective” factors (e.g., emotions) are supposed to be bracketed when making a judgment.   
 
16
 As Dewey points out in chapters such as “The Varied Substance of the Arts” from Art as Experience, 
even though painting is a “visual” media, the pervasive quality underlying our experience of a painting 
involves more than just the eye.  It is a felt quality that engages our whole body.  Only after the fact do we 
discriminate the various senses employed in our perception of the work.  
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throughout.  This is what it means that “the final coming to rest is related to all that went 
before as the culmination of a continuous movement” and that “[t]he experience, like that 
of watching a storm (at sea) reach its height and gradually subside, is one of continuous 
movement of subject matters” (LW 10:45-6).  In a consummatory aesthetic experience, 
the future is not perceived as foreboding and uncertain, but as a quiet anticipation 
drawing us through the work.  The future is not “ominous but a promise” and “consists of 
possibilities that are felt as a possession of what is now and here” (LW 10:24).  
Recalling some of pragmatism’s central commitments, however, it might be 
difficult to fathom how Dewey would appeal to what seems like such a teleological and 
idealistic view of aesthetic experience.  Richard Shusterman, though, qualifies Dewey’s 
use of consummation: 
The unity of aesthetic experience is not a closed permanent haven in which we 
 can rest at length in satisfied contemplation.  It is rather a moving, fragile, and 
 vanishing event, briefly savored in an experiential flux rife with energies of 
 tension and disorder which it momentarily masters.  It is a developing process 
 which, in culmination, destructively dissolves into the flow of consequent 
 experience, pushing us forward into the unknown and toward the challenge of 
 fashioning new aesthetic experience, a new moving and momentary unity from 
 the debris and resistance of past experiences and present environing factors. 
 (Shusterman 1992, 32) 
 
Furthermore, as Shusterman notes, “[f]or Dewey, the permanence of experienced unity is 
not only impossible, it is aesthetically undesirable” (Shusterman 1992, 32).  It is also 
important to keep in mind that this unity does not mean the dissolution of conflict and 
tension within the work.  Indeed, Dewey even contends that artists in the creative process 
do not avoid the breakdown of order, but actually “cultivate (moments of resistance and 
tension) … for their potentialities” (LW 10:22).  More about this conception of unity and 
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its allowance, even demand, for tension and conflict will be discussed in Chapter III with 
respect to the pursuit of a unified narrative self. 
 Returning to the graffiti example, then, at that moment of inception, of seizure, 
the organic unity of the work offered a subtle promise of just how my journey through the 
perceptual interaction with it would be fulfilled.  There is the sense that this piece is a 
singularity.  Moreover, the experience of it is likewise marked off as an experience, as 
opposed to mere experience.  Again, its fulfillment is no permanent harmony, and as 
randomly as the experience might have gotten underway, the experience will, and should, 
be fleeting.  For, as Dewey, notes, “The time of consummation is also one of beginning 
anew.  Any attempt to perpetuate beyond its term the enjoyment attending the time of 
fulfillment and harmony constitutes withdrawal from the world” (LW 10:24).  One of the 
more interesting items of note regarding graffiti is that, as Shusterman notes in reference 
to aesthetic experience in general, “[I]ts own sparkling career projects the process of its 
dying as it lives” (Shusterman 1992, 33).  From the graffiti artist’s point of view, this is 
an obvious and unavoidable fact.  As the artist Zephyr himself states, “99% of this (his 
work) doesn’t exist anymore” (Zephyr 2013).  Artists like Zephyr implicitly consent to 
Dewey’s definition of art as experience in electing to create their work in a milieu that 
makes it not only illegal and subject to deletion at any time, but also left exposed outside 
the confines of the gallery or museum.
17
   
 Dewey’s emphasis on the transitory nature of aesthetic experience reinforces the 
understanding of the work of art put forward throughout this discussion of his aesthetics.  
The work of art exists within the transactional relationship between the art product, the 
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 It is also worth mentioning that many graffiti artists choose train-cars as their canvas.  While this gives 
their work a sense of being on a touring exhibition, there is no way of keeping track of where their piece is 
or where it is going.  
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perceiver, and the context of the experience.  The temporal organization of a 
consummatory aesthetic experience sets it apart from the regular flow of life, in which 
mechanical, habitual rigidity or slack dispersion and incoherence occlude the aesthetic. 
Hence the sense of felt rightness had in the way that the various elements of the artwork 
hang together, a way that allows the undefined whole, the pervasive qualitative 
dimension of our primary engagement with the world, to shine forth.  
 Now that we understand what Dewey means by the work of art, we should 
explore in more detail why Dewey ascribes such a privileged status to art and aesthetic 
experience.  It should first be noted, however, that the motivation behind many traditional 
aesthetic theories’ attempts to describe the significance of art with reference to something 
other than mere aesthetic enjoyment (e.g., as providing knowledge, as putting us in touch 
with the noemenal, etc.) was an understanding of pleasure as something base and 
removed from the sterile domain of high art.  Dewey does not hold this same ascetic view 
of pleasure, and even laments the way pleasure and the emotions in general have been 
understood by traditional morality.  For Dewey, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
the desires and emotions of the body, and, as has already been mentioned, he goes as far 
as to advocate for a Humean cultivation of sentiment in his writings on education and 
ethics.  So, besides the pleasure to be had in an aesthetic experience,
18
 the other part of 
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 “Pleasure” here is used loosely to denote the “felt rightness” of an aesthetic experience.  In discussing the 
generic notion of a consummatory experience, Dewey uses the example of a job interview and notes that it 
can still be consummatory, can still have that sense of felt rightness, without one getting the job.  That is, 
consummation is not to be conflated with the happy ending associated with an encounter with the beautiful.  
Dewey also discusses a storm at sea as having this sense of felt rightness – a move that seems to free up 
theoretical resources to discuss the sublime or works of art meant to be jarring, unsettling, or simply not 
“beautiful” (in the very narrow sense).  This is also a point that reinforces the need for education, in the 
form of more experience, with regards to various types of art.  Dewey does not deny that background 
knowledge can inform and enrich experience, and this is no doubt true in regards to aesthetic experience.  
Richard Shusterman’s detailed analysis of a hip-hop song is a striking embodiment of Dewey’s 
understanding of the role of the critic (Shusterman 1992).  The critic, according to Dewey, does not simply 
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the answer to why Dewey values art so highly is captured in his bold assertion that, “[t]o 
esthetic experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is” (LW 
10:279).  Experience elicited by the dynamic work of art is “experience freed from the 
forces that impede and confuse its development as experience, freed, that is, from factors 
that subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself” (LW 
10:279).  In other words, the strong, sometimes overwhelming, sense of the pervasive, 
qualitative whole underlying the work of art, and indeed underlying all of our discursive 
reality, unsettles what Dewey sees as a pernicious and stunting inversion extant in much 
of our experience and reiterated in the theories of the traditional western philosophical 
canon.  To “subordinate an experience as it is directly had to something beyond itself” is, 
according to Dewey, to read too heavily into our direct, primary engagement with our 
environment elements of our secondary experience (our conceptual apparatuses, not 
limited to, but certainly including many of the bothersome distinctions that have dogged 
western thought).  Art, then, could be said to lessen the prescription on our conceptual 
lenses by putting us in touch with the primary level of our experience as an intimate 
transaction between organism and environment.      
 What is being buried here, however, is that art’s foremost significance, by 
Dewey’s lights, seems to lie where it intersects with ethics.  Throughout Art as 
Experience, Dewey drops hints that he, like Tolstoy, Kant, Schopenhauer, and various 
others before him, takes seriously the influence artistic appreciation can have for how one 
lives her life.  In the closing pages, for instance, Dewey avers that “art is more moral than 
moralities” (LW 10:351).  This is because moralities “either are, or tend to become 
                                                                                                                                                 
say what the meaning of the work is, but, rather, attempts to show how aesthetic experience can emerge out 
of a particular engagement with an art product. 
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consecrations of the status quo, reflections of custom, reinforcements of the established 
order,” while “[a]rt has been the means of keeping alive the sense of purposes that outrun 
evidence and of meanings that transcend indurated habit” (LW 10:351). 
 With the pervasive quality of the work of art being so strongly felt within our 
embodied experience, we come to feel, and thus understand, that our concepts and 
discriminations rest on an enveloping, emotional, qualitative background.  For, “In the 
discussion of the qualitative background of experience … we are in the presence of 
something common in the substance of the arts” (LW 10:206).  Again, “the undefined 
pervasive quality of an experience is that which binds together all the defined elements 
… making them a whole” and “the work of art operates to deepen and to raise to great 
clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole that accompanies every normal 
experience” (LW 10:199-200).   
 Another way of putting this point is that in an encounter with a work of art, we 
come to realize that our conceptual systems do not exhaust their source.  Our ways of 
understanding the world, ourselves, others, and the various ways these are interwoven 
and related are not fixed in some eternal heaven, but are creations themselves – created to 
help us not only survive, but find meaning, value, and happiness, along with ways to 
increase the social good.  Yet they are created out of fabric that is much more extensive 
and inclusive than we might ever fathom, and in this way Dewey seems to put forth an 
ecstatic theory of art’s effect on us: 
 A work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of 
 belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we 
 live … We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is 
 nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary 
 experience.  We are carried out beyond ourselves to find ourselves. (LW 10:200) 
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 Art has the capacity to take us out of ourselves and our idiosyncratic perspectives – in a 
way that is not unsettling – allowing us to feel a part of a bigger whole.  Recognizing the 
interrelations between us and our environment, in both its social and physical aspects, 
helps not only cultivate the wider self, that, as will be seen, is key to Dewey’s normative 
ethics, but also helps us feel more at home in the world – a world that does not always 
present itself to us in the most hospitable fashion. 
 So despite his disdain for appeals to the transcendent and extranatural, Dewey 
does think that the value of art rests in its ability to put us in touch with the ideal.  Yet 
this ideal, offering us a redeeming “answer” to our earthly problems does not come “by 
way of anodyne or by transfer to a radically different realm of things” (LW 10:286).  
What this means is that Dewey’s conception of the ideal mode of reality is not 
extranatural, but exists in the potentialities of present experience to realize new meanings 
and stabilities.  Such transformation is potential because of the wealth of possibilities 
afforded by direct experience – possibilities often glossed over by the hypostatization of 
the conceptual tools gleaned from secondary, reflective experience.      
 The attainment of this ideal thus calls for a (re)grounding of our secondary, 
discursive experience in our basic level of engaged existence.  As romantic as it might 
sound, this involves a (re)connection with “nature,” or the primordial, qualitative rhythms 
of our transaction with it.  Bertram Morris has indeed gone as far as to argue that 
Dewey’s account of art contains a strand of the ultra-traditional mimetic aesthetic theory 
propounded most famously by Plato.  But, regarding mimesis, as Plato “was probably 
thinking about the kind of fore-shortening that Apollodorus discovered in making a two-
dimensional bunch of grapes look like a three-dimensional bunch,” Morris contends that 
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“what Dewey actually means is that art sets up rhythms in man, rhythms which are also 
found in nature” (Morris 1971, 190).   
 So, as opposed as Dewey is to Kant’s bland formalism and extranaturalism with 
respect to his theory of art, there is a similarity between the two that highlights Dewey’s 
stance with respect to the transformative potential of aesthetic experience.  That is, art 
helps us to feel at home in the world by giving us a sense that we are not alienated from 
it, that we seem fitted for it in a way that allows for the experience of meaning.  With 
Kant, this fit involved a rigid faculty psychology, and it is supposed to buoy our rational 
faith in the Kantian moral Ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality.  For Dewey, this 
fitness lies in the fact that our intelligence and ways of making meaning emerged out of 
our intimate intercourse with the world.  What this does, then, is expand our horizons of 
meaning and possibility by making us aware that there is more to our lives than our 
conceptual systems of interpretation would have us believe.
19
  Our various ways of 
carving up the world, or of describing ourselves and others, in no way exhaust the 
possibilities available to us, and so what art gestures at is that things can be different – 
and so things maybe can be better. 
  
Heidegger, art, and contingency 
 I would now like to briefly discuss Heidegger’s aesthetic theory to reinforce and 
perhaps illuminate some of the points just made concerning Dewey’s conception of the 
transformative potential of art.  Heidegger provides an insightful and supplemental 
                                                 
19
 I see this as Dewey’s take on a rather recurrent idea found throughout the history of aesthetics.  Kant 
himself presented the view that the genius of the artist lied in her ability to manipulate and express aesthetic 
ideas – “ideas” or experiences that cannot be captured by concepts.  Nietzsche follows suit in contending 
that “many stimuli and entire states of stimulation which cannot be expressed in language can be rendered 
in music” (Nietzsche1995, 47). 
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conversation partner here because (1) as noted above, Dewey and Heidegger both lament 
the depreciated status of art in contemporary society and have similar views on the root 
cause of that status, (2) both articulate phenomenologies of aesthetic experience which 
attempt to show how the dynamic work of art (which, for both, exists in the encounter 
between the art product and the perceiver) puts us in touch with the primary level of our 
engaged existence, and, finally, (3) both believe there are important ethical implications 
involved in being put in such a ecstatic mode of experience.   
 However, it is first worth mentioning a few caveats concerning this syncretic 
exercise.  First of all, it might be argued that while there are some superficial similarities 
between Dewey and Heidegger, if one wants to hold the former together with a 
continental thinker, there are better options, most notably Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
20
  I am 
certainly not claiming that Heidegger and Dewey are the best possible match if what you 
are looking for is a closer philosophical family resemblance (indeed, I would argue that 
Nietzsche and his emphasis on the physiological dimensions of experience might be 
closer to Dewey’s philosophical project than Heidegger’s).  My point rather is simply to 
buttress my interpretation of Dewey’s aesthetics by bringing a different, yet sympathetic, 
perspective on the issue at stake.  Furthermore, I should also make it clear that my 
treatment of Heidegger’s aesthetics is meant only as a supplement to my overarching 
discussion of Dewey’s understanding of the work of art.  I am in no way supposing that I 
am putting forth a comprehensive account of Heidegger’s theory of art (or even Dewey’s 
                                                 
20
 Joseph Margolis makes just this claim in his essay “Dewey in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy” in 
Larry Hickman’s (ed.) Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation (1998).  Margolis’ 
main point is that the extranaturalism found in Heidegger’s divinization of Being and language is 
incompatible with Dewey’s own naturalist commitments.  While I grant this, the similarities between 
Dewey and Heidegger on the point I am trying to make about art’s transformative potential are too striking 
and informative to pass up. 
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for that matter).
21
  My aims are geared towards the end-in-view of this project: 
highlighting the significance that the appreciation of art can have for a particular 
conception of ethics. 
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, Heidegger, like Dewey, sees the quest for 
certainty, for technological and epistemic mastery over all that is, as the primary factor 
contributing to the degradation of art within our collective mindsets.  In fact, the very 
idea of “aesthetic experience” is a notion Heidegger wants to challenge.  What he means 
by “aesthetic experience,” though, is actually an example of the aestheticization of art, 
whereby “The artwork is posited as the ‘object’ for a ‘subject,’ and this subject-object 
relation, specifically a relation of feeling, is definitive for aesthetic consideration” 
(Heidegger 1979, 78).  Within this understanding of our encounter with a work of art, one 
which is couched within the same representationalist model of experience pragmatism 
eschews, the idea is that an external object, ein Gegenstand, stands opposed to a human 
subject and, either compels that subject to recognize its inherent meaning or is an 
inherently meaningless object upon which the judging subject projects her own meanings 
and values.   
 It is the latter of these two possibilities that Heidegger primarily discusses, as this 
aestheticized approach to art emerges out of and reinforces the subjectivism with which 
he is so concerned.  As Iain Thomson describes, subjectivism is “the ‘worldview’ in 
which an intrinsically-meaningless objective realm (“nature”) is separated epistemically 
from isolated, value-bestowing, self-certain subjects, and so needs to be mastered through 
the relentless epistemological, normative, and practical activities of these subjects” 
                                                 
21
 Heidegger’s discussions on art are scattered throughout many of his writings, both early and late.  But, 
for my purposes here, I will only be looking at some of his general ideas on art as gleaned primarily from 
two essays, “The Age of the World Picture” (1938) and “On the Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-36).   
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(Thomson 2010).  This worldview lines up with the view of experience and quest for 
certainty against which Dewey rails, and also posits and entrenches the same subject-
object divide that he attempts to dissolve in not only his aesthetics, but his 
epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical projects as well.   
 So what does art have to offer vis-à-vis this problematic worldview?  Thomson 
proposes that Heidegger’s phenomenology of the work of art, as exemplified in the 
latter’s meditation on Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes (Figure 3), is meant to 
illuminate a “more fundamental level of experience, a primordial modality of engaged 
existence (zuhandensein) in which the self and world are united rather than divided” 
(Thomson 2010): 
 [I]n what begins as an ordinary aesthetic experience of an object – Van Gogh’s 
 painting of a pair of shoes – that stands opposite us, we notice and carefully attend 
 to the way these shoes take shape on and against an inconspicuously dynamic 
 background, a background which is not nothing at all but, rather, both supports 
 and exceeds the intelligible world that emerges from it … Our phenomenological 
 encounter with Van Gogh’s painting shows us that its meaning is neither located 
 entirely in the object standing against us nor is it simply projected by our 
 subjectivity onto an inherently meaningless work; the work’s meaning must 
 instead be inconspicuously accomplished in our own engagement with the work.   
 Through our engagement with Van Gogh’s painting … we lucidly encounter the 
 negotiation by which we are always-already making sense of the world. 
 (Thomson 2010) 
 
 Van Gogh’s painting is a paradigmatic work of art in that it represents how art 
itself works.  With its rich texturing, shading, and the play of light and shadows, the 
painting of a pair of shoes offers a hint at the possibilities for meaning contained in 
experience.  It does so by emphasizing the fragility of form, as inchoate shapes and 
figures offer themselves up for Gestalting, while simultaneously retreating into the 
background.  For Heidegger, the phenomenological encounter with Pair of Shoes reveals 
the strife between our intelligible “worlds” and the “earth.  So, it is not just that art 
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presents us with a world of intelligibility in which to inhabit, but it does so without 
neglecting or occluding the dynamic background, the earth, out of which that world 
emerges.  Thus, one of art’s highest functions is how it “represents” the basic idea that 
our conceptualized, secondary experience, with all of its discriminations and distinctions, 
rests on a more fundamental level of experience where there is a dynamic and intimate 
engagement between the self and the world.  In sum, like Dewey, Heidegger believes that 
art reflects an ideal mode of experience; one where our secondary, reflective ways of 
structuring our intelligible worlds are intimately entwined with and thus informed by the 
primordial, qualitatively-rich universe of which we are a part. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Vincent van Gogh, Pair of Shoes (1886) 
 
The Ethical Stakes of the Work of Art 
  Through engagements with works of art, then, “we can learn to approach the 
humble things that make up our worlds with care, humility, patience, gratitude, even 
awe” (Thomson 2010).  We are clearly now involved in a discussion of the ethically-
transformative potential of an encounter with a work of art.  The next two chapters, then, 
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will explore (1) how two of the central concerns of ethics (i.e., care of the self and care 
for the other) are redescribed within a pragmatist framework, and (2) how, following 
such redescription, the significance that the visual arts can have for these two concerns 
comes into relief.  In concluding this chapter, it will be helpful to reintroduce the basic 
premise of this dissertation, and sharpen the point I am making in regards to the work of 
art’s transformative potential.    
 Despite focusing more on the literary arts as they inform our ethical lives, Rorty is 
quite helpful in synthesizing Dewey’s and Heidegger’s aesthetic theories in the name of 
spelling out one of art’s more significant moral functions.  The main claim being made 
here is that a pragmatist ethics involves, as a most basic requirement, embracing the 
central commitments of pragmatism laid out in Chapter I.  To remind ourselves, those 
commitments are: (1) its anti-representationalism, anti-foundationalism, and anti-
essentialism; (2) its orientation towards the future; (3) its respect for the contingent 
constraints on inquiry and our being-in-the-world; and (4) its deep commitment for 
pluralistic perspectivism.  The ethical imperative of a pragmatist ethics involves 
cultivating a certain type of character that is responsive to these, and its crowning virtue, 
I claim, is openness.  Now, I would like to try and fill in some of the details regarding this 
disposition by drawing slightly on the views of art previously discussed. 
 In making his case for the pragmatist tendencies found in Heidegger, Rorty offers 
an interpretation of the former’s notion of “letting beings be,” one which sheds light on 
this virtue of openness and what it is exactly art can do for how we live.  In seeking to 
explain the normative sense Heidegger has for “primordiality” and the ability to “let 
beings be,” Rorty suggests the following: “an understanding of Being is more primordial 
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than another if it makes it easier to grasp its own contingency” (Rorty 1991, 43).  
Heidegger’s (and perhaps Nietzsche’s) admiration for the Presocratic Greeks is due to the 
belief that “their understanding of Being in terms of notions like arche and physis was 
less self-certain, more hesitant, more fragile, than our own supreme confidence in our 
own ability to manipulate beings in order to satisfy our own desires” (Rorty 1991, 43).  
This idea, coupled with Heidegger’s tenet that un-concealing is always necessarily a 
concealing, leads to the prescription that “the best you can do is to remember that you are 
not speaking the only possible language – that around the openness provided by your 
understanding of Being there is a larger openness of other understandings of Being as yet 
unhad.  Beyond the world made available by your elementary words there is the silence 
of other, equally elementary, words, as yet unspoken” (Rorty 1991, 46).  Heeding this 
suggestion, while not catering to our seemingly innate desire to get things right and 
certain, does help us inhabit our pluralistic universe in a way that keeps our horizons of 
meaning and possibility for action open by clueing us into the ineluctable reality of our 
existence.  That is, there is nothing necessary about our description of ourselves, of 
others, of the world, nor the relations between.  So, if need be, in the name of individual 
flourishing or social amelioration, we can transform and redescribe things as needed.  For 
both Dewey and Heidegger, art, more so than any other cultural phenomenon, opens our 
eyes to the fact that “there are no a priori or destined limits to our imagination or to our 
achievement” (Rorty 1991, 48) towards the overarching goals of a liberal morality. 
 Obviously, Heidegger would rue this last claim by Rorty, as, following Nietzsche, 
he took the tenets of liberal morality as validating the tyranny of das Man.  Moreover, 
Heidegger thought of pragmatism as the acme of power-driven humanism and calculative 
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thinking.  I follow Rorty, however, in seeing Dewey’s project as evidence that one can do 
justice to both poetry and inquiry.  That is, Dewey’s conception of inquiry is not 
reducible to the drive to attain mastery over nature and make humanity the measure of all 
things.  Inquiry, in the scientific sense, is just one possible way of coping with 
experience, of expanding our horizons of meaning and possibility, of making the world a 
better place.  Art and imagination, according to Dewey, are just as valuable in this regard.  
And, the key to understanding this sometimes ignored facet of Dewey’s thought lies in 
his brief discussion in Art as Experience of “negative capability.”   
 For all of his praise of science and inquiry, Dewey undoubtedly adheres to the 
Socratic dictum that human wisdom will forever be finite and thus limited.  As seen in 
the discussion of the pervasive qualitative background of experience above, there is an 
excessiveness to human existence that cannot be captured in propositions or concepts, 
and Dewey believes art is evidence of this.  But art also teaches us that this 
excessiveness, and the resultant limits placed on what we can know, is not to be feared, 
but rather, embraced.  Drawing on letters written by the English Romantic poet John 
Keats, Dewey argues for the importance of “negative capability,” or the ability to accept 
“life and experience in all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge” (LW 
10:42).  This is in contrast to Keats’ contemporary Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who the 
former believed “would let a poetic insight go when it was surrounded with obscurity, 
because he could not intellectually justify it” (LW 10:40). 
 This is strikingly similar to Nietzsche’s critique of Euripides’s tragedies.  
Euripides, Nietzsche supposes, despised the tragic works of Aeschylus and Sophocles on 
account of their ambiguities and obscurity.  This led to the death of the tragic art form 
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Nietzsche so admired, as Euripides brought the quest for certainty and clarity onto the 
stage.  For both Nietzsche and Dewey, there is a sense in which art is meant to be 
inherently vague. Euripides, according to Nietzsche’s interpretation, disdained that in 
Aeschylean tragedy he “observed something incommensurable in every feature and in 
every line, a certain deceptive distinctiness and at the same time an enigmatic depth, 
indeed an infinitude in the background,” for, “[e]ven the clearest figure always had a 
comet’s tail attached to it which seemed to suggest the uncertain, that which could never 
be illuminated” (Nietzsche 1967, 80).   And, in claiming that poets, in particular, exploit 
this indefinite phase of art, Dewey makes a similar point in noting that “Poe spoke of ‘a 
suggestive indefiniteness of vague and therefore spiritual effect,’ … and the poets’ belief 
“that every work of art must have about it something not understood to obtain its full 
effect” (LW 10:199).  Yet in staying true to his tenet that art emerges out of everyday 
life, Dewey asserts that “[a]bout every explicit and focal object there is a recession into 
the implicit which is not intellectually grasped” (LW 10:199, emphasis added).  It is only 
in reflection that we would take this implicitness to be somehow negative.  This seems to 
be why both Nietzsche and Dewey see as one of the highest functions of art the 
communication of experiences, meanings, and values that cannot be wrought into a neat 
discursive form.  Keats’s take on Coleridge and Nietzsche’s on Euripides with respect to 
their discomfort in the face of “uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge” speaks 
to the existential discomfort we feel upon realizing that there is nothing necessary about 
how we describe the world and prescribe our lives.
22
   
                                                 
22
 As will be discussed in the following chapter, this is not to say that there are not any constraints on our 
experience.  As discussed in Chapter I, pragmatists respect the natural and cultural constraints shaping our 
being-in-the-world.  This claim is simply meant to convey the idea that there are always possibilities open 
to us for how we make sense of experience.   
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 It is my contention that one of the underlying themes of Dewey’s aesthetic theory 
is that aesthetic experience as elicited by a work of art cultivates in us such a “negative 
capability.”  Such a capacity allows one to take all of the vagaries of human existence 
and turn “that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its own qualities – to 
imagination and art” (LW 10:42).  On this view, openness and “negative capability” go 
hand-in-hand, in that instead of lamenting the fact that we are not speaking the only 
possible language, and thus not living the one right way or doing the one right thing, we 
relish the artistic and imaginative license thereby granted to us regarding these ethical 
concerns.  In the next two chapters, I will explore how this cardinal virtue of openness 
plays itself out in the context of care of the self and care for the other, with its cardinality 
lying in how it illuminates the need for supplementary virtues that include (but are 
certainly not limited to): care (so as to not lapse into apathy in the face of pragmatism’s 
anti-absolutism), imagination (so as to be capable of engaging the wealth of possibilities 
for meaning and action that exist beyond our current way of understanding things), 
sensitivity (so as to be attuned as possible to the various contingencies making up the 
context of any given situation), and sympathy (so as to not just tolerate, or “let be,” the 
pluralism of our society, but actively try to understand others’ perspectives in the name of 
inclusivity and societal progress).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
HANGING BY A NARRATIVE THREAD:  CARE OF THE SELF 
AS AESTHETIC SELF-CREATION 
It is easy in the world to live after the world’s opinion; 
it is easy in solitude to live after our own; 
but the great man is he who in the midst of the crowd 
keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of solitude 
- Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance” 
 
Care of the Self 
 
 In our common vernacular, “ethics” or “morality” is typically associated with a 
set of rules, precepts, and principles that will govern one’s relations to others.  Yet, in The 
Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (1998), Alexander Nehamas 
contends that altruistic considerations have not always been, nor need be, the central 
focus of ethics.  “Morality,” Nehamas writes, “is not exhausted by our relations to others, 
by codes of moral behavior that govern the interaction of various individuals and groups 
with one another.  It also concerns the ways in which individuals relate to and regulate 
themselves” (Nehamas 1998, 179).  Nehamas, following the French historian and 
philosopher Michel Foucault, contends that this promotion of caring for oneself is the 
underlying motive of Socrates’ entire philosophical mission.  Philosophy, according to 
this relatively standard interpretation of Socrates’ thought, is not simply a matter of 
propounding doctrines about truth, justice, and beauty, but is first and foremost a way of 
life.  One of Socrates’ famous proclamations from the Apology captures this very spirit: 
“For I go around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among you not to care 
for your body or your wealth in preference to or as strongly as for the best possible state 
of your soul” (Plato 2000, 32-3). 
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Platonic-Christian-Kantian care of the self 
 This care for the soul can be taken synonymously with the care of the self I am 
discussing when we consider what exactly such care involves.  Nehamas, again drawing 
on Foucault, states that caring “suggests not the surveillance of prison guards but the 
solicitude of parents” (Nehamas 1998, 160).  A significant feature of Socrates’ mission, 
then, as illustrated in the passage from the Apology quoted above is “to attend to his 
fellow citizens like a father or an older brother in order to show them that what is 
important is not money or reputation but the care of themselves” (Nehamas 1998, 165).  
In this light, philosophy as a way of life, as well as ethics as care of the self, is a matter of 
self-correction.  Socrates’ call to live the examined life consists in constantly trying to 
better oneself through the testing of one’s supposed “knowledge” in the name of purging 
oneself of false belief.
1
 
 While there are various competing interpretations of Socrates, one of the more 
standard ones takes such testing itself to be the most important part of this care.  This 
clearly involves a critical orientation towards the commonly received opinions of one’s 
day.  But self-correction also implies the existence of a criterion by which to gauge 
whether one’s beliefs are in need of revision.  The ancient Greek conception of humans 
as rational animals, employed by both Plato and Aristotle, served as this benchmark, 
leading both to privilege reason over sense, the mind over the body, and knowledge over 
mere opinion.  As such, self-correction, or care of the self, involved bringing the “lower” 
part of our nature under the rule of our God-like faculty of logos. 
                                                 
1
 For Socrates, this was not a mere epistemological concern, but had deep ethical significance.  If one knew 
the good, they would do it. 
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 One does not have to go back all the way to the ancient Greeks, though, to witness 
the centrality of self-care in various moral traditions.  Let us consider here two: 
Christianity and Kantian deontology.  There is a prima facie take on Christian morality 
that regards it as solely concerned with altruistic thought and conduct.  Jesus’ “Sermon 
on the Mount” and “Parable of the Good Samaritan” no doubt illustrate Christianity’s 
commitment to neighbor-love.  Moreover, there is also, as Nietzsche rightfully pointed 
out, an inversion of “noble” Greco-Roman virtues such as pride and greatness of soul 
within Christian morality, where such self-centered traits become regarded as sinful 
distractions.  Paradoxically, they are distractions from working on the self.  Within this 
worldview, adherence to Church doctrine and partaking in various ascetic practices are 
the primary ways in which one ought to care for oneself and they are the means of 
purifying one’s soul in order to actualize their essence as a child of God. 
 Similarly, despite its emphasis on duties owed to others, Kantian ethics also 
advances a proper concern for the self, and again we see a common theme emerge as it 
relates to the idea of self-correction.  Our essence, who we really are, according to Kant, 
is our intelligible, rational self.  Our earthly, embodied, and empirical self is simply our 
manifestation within the sensible, phenomenal world.  Thus, caring for the self involves 
heeding our rational essence and overcoming “the dear old self” and its crude emotions 
and desires.  For instance, Kant’s third example in the  “Four Illustrations” from his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) goes so far as to condemn those who 
do not labor to better themselves and does so on the grounds that, qua rational being, one 
could not possibly will such indifference to one’s betterment to be a universal law. 
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 In looking at these examples from the Platonic-Christian-Kantian tradition’s 
understanding of care of the self there is a similarity that emerges.  That is, care of the 
self is about self-discovery in the name of well-being and flourishing.  It is about 
discovering your essence and deducing from that the only possible route towards 
actualizing the potentialities contained therein.  As already cited in Chapter I, Rorty 
claims that those writing out of this tradition are under the impression that they can 
“inform us what we really are, what we are compelled to be by powers not ourselves.  
They would exhibit the stamp which had been impressed on all of us … It would be 
necessary, essential, telic, constitutive of what it is to be human.  It would give us a goal, 
the only possible goal, namely, the full recognition of that very necessity, the self-
consciousness of our essence” (Rorty 1989, 26).  The criteria used for self-correction in 
these various approaches are thus something beyond the vagaries of social practices and 
historical circumstance. 
 Yet, one of the central commitments of the pragmatist worldview I have 
attempted to explicate so far is its anti-essentialism, especially as it relates to selfhood 
and human nature.  I say selfhood and human nature here to convey the idea that, for 
pragmatists, there is neither an underlying human essence, nor such a thing as one’s 
individual “true self.”  Both forms of essentialism, species-specific and individual-
specific, posit that self-correction is simply a matter of finding out who one really is.  
Pragmatists, however, in eschewing such essentialism, can echo Rorty’s praise of 
Nietzsche in that the latter “rejected that this tracking (of finding out who one really is) 
was a process of discovery.  In his view, in achieving this sort of self-knowledge we are 
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not coming to know a truth which was out there (or in here) all the time.  Rather, he saw 
self-knowledge as self-creation” (Rorty 1989, 27). 
 In sum, pragmatism’s denial of an essential self or human nature means that 
selfhood is not given to us in advance.  Who we are, then, is a process of becoming.  As 
we will see, care of the self, within this framework, is about taking control of this 
process, and actively attempting to form and shape our sense of who we are.  Foucault, 
who was deeply influenced by Nietzsche, and who, as noted, greatly informed Nehamas’s 
conception of care of the self, might have said it best when he averred: “From the idea 
that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we 
have to create ourselves as a work of art … Couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of 
art: Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?” (Foucault 1994, 
261). 
 
Pragmatism’s Conception of the Self 
 Before exploring what exactly goes into shaping one’s life into a work of art, it 
will be helpful to explain in more detail the conception of the self held by Nietzsche, 
Dewey, and Rorty.  All three radically break from the traditional view of the self as 
“ready-made” in strikingly similar ways and paint a picture of selfhood that readily lends 
itself to an ethics of aesthetic self-creation.  Let us now look briefly at each thinker’s 
critique of the traditional view of the self in order to get a sense for the general pragmatist 
conception of selfhood. 
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Nietzsche’s “regulative fiction” 
 “What separates me most deeply from the metaphysicians is,” writes Nietzsche, “I 
don’t concede that the ‘I’ is what thinks.  Instead, I take the I itself to be a construction of 
thinking … in other words to be only a regulative fiction … However habituated and 
indispensable this fiction may now be, that in no way disproves it having been invented: 
something can be a condition of life and nevertheless be false” (Nietzsche 2003, 21).  In 
his Meditations, Rene Descartes affirmed the certainty of the cogito, the “I think,” as the 
foundation of his edifice of knowledge.  According to Descartes, the self is the 
unshakable core at the center of human being that dictates existence.  In no way is it 
fragile or in-process – in fact it even comes equipped with the mark of its maker so as to 
expand the scope of clear and distinct ideas from just the “I” to facts about the external 
world. 
 Nietzsche, however, refutes this stability of the self.  Descartes’ cogito ergo sum 
(I think, therefore I am) is actually, according to Nietzsche, cogitare ergo sum (thinking, 
therefore “I” am).  Contrary to popular belief, the self is not the source of thought, but is 
a product of thought.  But thought, for Nietzsche, is a phenomenon that emerges out of 
our basic, embodied interaction with the world.  “Everything which enters consciousness 
is the last link in a chain, a closure,” writes Nietzsche, and “[b]elow every thought lies an 
affect” (Nietzsche 2003, 60).  Our “I” is not given to us in advance.  We are animals 
trying to cope with an environment who have come to possess complex ways of planning 
and coordinating action.  A part, albeit an important one, of this complicated process is an 
awareness of the self – our self-image.  Sentient beings, by their nature, are affective.   As 
humans, we are simply able to associate those affects with an abstraction, our “self.”    
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 The self is merely another one of the ways we cope with the flux of experience by 
stamping a relatively stable concept of “being” onto our world of becoming.  And, though 
he proclaims the self a fiction, Nietzsche actually endorses editing this fiction, so to 
speak, in the name of creating a coherent narrative.  Indeed as we will later see, he, along 
with Dewey and Rorty, redescribes self-correction as the artistic creation of an 
organically-unified self.  The point here is simply that who we are is not something that is 
given to us in advance, either through a universal human essence or a predetermined 
individual character.  In order to get around in the world we need to have a sense of 
stability regarding our identity, which comes in the form of one’s self-description, yet we 
must keep in mind that, at bottom, there is nothing necessary about the way one is 
describing oneself at any given time.
2
  So, it is this understanding of the self that allows 
one to become who one is – or, in other words, shape one’s identity through the process 
of aesthetic self-creation.
3
  
 
Dewey’s “self-in-process” 
 There is a resounding similarity between Nietzsche’s view of the self and that of 
Dewey.  Dewey opens his chapter “Nature, Mind, and the Subject” of Experience and 
Nature (1925) by stating, “Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that 
emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social. Personal individuality 
has its basis and conditions in
 simpler events” (LW 1:163).  In order to fully grasp 
                                                 
2
 There are certainly aspects of one’s existence that are inextricable parts of their self-description, and, thus, 
“necessary.”  But when these “necessities” (e.g., aspects of our biological makeup as human animals) enter 
into the realm of description and communication, the words we use to account for them are up to us.   
 
3
 Nietzsche advises: “We should learn from artists while being wiser than they are in other matters.  For 
with them this subtle power [of arranging, of making things beautiful] usually comes to an end where art 
ends and life begins; but we want to be the poets of our life” (Nietzsche 1974, 299). 
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Dewey’s conception of selfhood, and to fill in some of the details of Nietzsche’s view, it 
is helpful to bring in the former’s distinction between primary and secondary experience.  
As Nietzsche argues so plainly and effectively in his early essay “On Truth and Lies in an 
Extra-Moral Sense” (1873), our conceptual tools are metaphorical abstractions gleaned 
from a more intimate entwinement between us, as embodied creatures, and our 
environment.  That is, our concepts are not written into the fabric of the universe, but are 
derivatives of a pre-discursive level of existence.  In secondary, reflective experience, 
then, we make distinctions in experience; distinctions that organize, give meaning, 
bestow value, and make sense of the primordial and qualitative level of existence which 
is the antecedent of all thought and reflection. 
 One of the most significant of these distinctions is our sense of self.  In describing 
ourselves, we are giving meaning to our embodied existence in the form of an identity.  
We use language to communicate who we are to other people, and, as such, our sense of 
selfhood is always already embedded within a matrix of social practices, roles, labels, 
types, etc.  The self, then, emerges out of a situation involving a developing, growing 
organism interacting with a dynamic physical and social environment.  Dewey thus rails 
against the “dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness of the soul,” and endorses 
the view that “selfhood is in the process of making,” whereby there exists “the relative 
fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood” (MW 14:97).4   
 Like Nietzsche, Dewey takes it to be more than reasonable that “any self is 
capable of including within itself a number of inconsistent selves, of unharmonized 
dispositions” (MW 14:97).  Contra Descartes, the self is in no way certain, but rather is 
fragmented and in a state of flux.  This opens the door for an understanding of self-care 
                                                 
4
 For Dewey, these constituents consist in the habits of thought and action that make up our character.   
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not as a matter of discovery, but as the creative endeavor to establish a relative stability 
of selfhood in order to flourish.
5
  Dewey notes that the key difference between his 
conception of selfhood and the traditional one is “between a self taken as something 
already made and a self still making through action.”  The latter, Dewey continues, is “an 
adventure in discovery of a self which is possible but as yet unrealized, an experiment in 
creating a self which shall be more inclusive than the one which exists” (MW 14:98).   
 Our sense of self, Dewey contends, has the potential to flexibly adapt to novel 
situations and is intimately bound up with its actions and conduct.  What is important to 
keep in mind is that, even though the self emerges out of a more primary level of engaged 
existence, it can still have a transformative effect on that basic existential level.  That is, 
our secondary, reflective distinctions we make, such as our sense of self, can indeed 
transform our very being-in-the-world.  As will be argued, the story we tell ourselves and 
others about who we are has a significant impact on our conduct and how we live. 
 
Rorty and the contingency of selfhood 
 Rorty’s own view of selfhood is very much influenced by Nietzsche and Dewey, 
as well as by Freud.  All three, Rorty contends, helped de-divinize the self by refuting the 
traditional metaphysical view of the self as wholly-contained and non-relational.  Such 
de-divinization involves substituting “a tissue of contingent relations, a web which 
stretches backward and forward through past and future time, for a formed, unified, 
present, self-contained substance, something capable of being seen steadily and whole” 
                                                 
5
 Here is a worthy place to qualify what is meant by human flourishing in this context.  Dewey’s regulative 
ideal of “growth” is often criticized for its vagueness, and, moreover, for seemingly conceiving of “growth” 
as the only inherent good.  Growth, in itself, is not necessarily always good, though (e.g., cancer, 
overpopulation, etc.).  “Flourishing,” thought of as “healthy growth,” seems to be a better descriptor for 
what Dewey had in mind.   
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(Rorty 1989, 41).  In employing this strategy, pragmatists are often charged with robbing 
humanity of that special ingredient that distinguishes us from the animals; for, the core 
that supposedly accounts for the unity of the self is commonly thought of as something 
akin to the soul or divine spark of Reason.  As already mentioned in Chapter I, Rorty 
contends that “the pragmatist’s best defense against this sort of charge is to say that she 
too has a conception of our difference from the animals,” but it is simply a difference in 
“a much greater flexibility in the boundaries of selfhood, in the sheer quantity of 
relationships which can go to constitute a human self” (Rorty 1999, 81). 
 In other words, what distinguishes us from the “lower” animals is our ability to 
transcend, through our use of language and our embeddedness in a complex of pre-
established social meanings, the here and now, and therefore have a heightened 
awareness of our existence as a self.  We can tell stories about ourselves not only to 
ourselves, but to others, as a way of navigating the social landscape and making sense of 
experience.  Considering Rorty’s poeticism, with its neopragmatic focus on language, it 
is no surprise that his view of selfhood and aesthetic self-creation is one of narrative 
description and redesciption.  The “I” is simply the protagonist of one’s narrative life 
story.  The “I,” or sense of self, is not Descartes’ unextended substance, but is rather an 
abstraction, a symbolic narrative construction, that can be redescribed and transformed.
6
  
One’s “essence,” then, on this Rortian view, is the narrative that they use to make sense 
of who they are, which itself depends on the vocabularies they use to describe 
themselves, others, the world, and the relations between them all. 
                                                 
6
 In his book I am a Strange Loop, contemporary cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter makes essentially 
the same point about the “I” being a self-referential symbol.  The thesis of this book is captured in his 
claim: “In the end, we are self-perceiving, self-inventing, locked-in mirages that are little miracles of self-
reference” (Hofstadter 1997, 363). 
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Pragmatism’s advantage as regards the self 
 In summing up this pragmatist conception of the self, let us look again at Joseph 
Margosis’s Pragmatism’s Advantage: American and European Philosophy at the End of 
the Twentieth Century (2010), where he advances the argument that one of pragmatism’s 
primary benefits to philosophical discourse is its understanding of the human “self” as an 
emergent artifact.  In many ways, Margolis articulates in an overarching fashion the most 
salient features of the three conceptions of the self discussed above.  While Nietzsche 
understands the “I” to be a “conceptual synthesis,” he takes it to be a function of a more 
general “self” – that is, the body.  The “[s]tarting point (for inquiry)” writes Nietzsche, is 
“the body and physiology: why? – what we gain is the right idea of the nature of our 
subject-unity – namely as rulers at the head of a commonwealth, not as ‘souls or ‘life 
forces’” (Nietzsche 2003, 43).  Similarly, Nietzsche argues: 
 The belief that regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as 
 a monad, as an atomon; this belief ought to be expelled from science! … But the 
 way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such 
 conceptions as “mortal soul,” and “soul as subjective multiplicity,” and “soul as 
 social structure of the drives and affects” want henceforth to have citizens’ rights 
 in science. (Nietzsche 2002, 14).  
  
Nietzsche clearly wanted us to get back to a naturalized understanding of the human self.  
Whatever self-conception or self-descriptions we employ, they cannot be disconnected 
from the complex of biological instincts and drives beyond our ken that have developed 
as a part of our ongoing interaction with the environment.  But, what is important to keep 
in mind is that because there is such an entwinement between our sense of self and our 
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physiology, our self-descriptions can indeed be used to transform facets of our embodied 
being, specifically our habits of action.
7
     
 Likewise, Dewey emphasizes that ethics as a whole, including considerations of 
self-correction, need to pay heed to the insights afforded by a naturalistic approach to 
human being.  As he writes at the outset of Human Nature and Conduct (1922), “A 
morals based on the study of human nature instead of upon a disregard for it would find 
the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics 
with physics and biology” (MW 14:12).  Regarding selfhood, then, which has profound 
ethical implications, Dewey situates the conceptual tool known as the “self” within a 
much more complicated organization of habits formed in the interaction between the 
human organism and its environment.  Thus, the process of self-creation cannot be 
severed from our embodied existence. 
 Yet, however naturalistic Nietzsche and Dewey’s conceptions of the self might 
sound, it is difficult and disingenuous to classify either as reductionist.  This is because 
both thinkers constantly remind us of the profound effect that sociolinguistic factors have 
on our identity.  Beyond presenting genealogies that de-hypostatize many of the concepts 
once thought to be absolute and eternal, Nietzsche is deeply concerned with questions of 
authorship and authenticity.  In Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985), Nehemas presents 
the thesis that how one becomes who one is, how one gives style to one’s character, for 
Nietzsche, is through an interpretative and creative process akin to the crafting of a work 
                                                 
7
 While I do not have the space here to give a full treatment of it, the psychotherapeutic process of 
cognitive restructuring supports the claim being made that thought and language can transform our 
physiological being.  For instance, cognitive restructuring is used by psychiatrists as a way of correcting 
maladaptive thoughts, such as those connected with various anxiety disorders, addictive behaviors, and 
depression.  Although these disorders are rooted in a person’s neurological and biological makeup, the 
underlying premise of cognitive restructuring is that linguistic practices such as inner dialogue and 
redescription can have a salutary effect on embodied habits of thought and action. 
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of art – in particular, literature.  This is what underlies Nietzsche’s decree that we should 
become “the poets of our life” (Nietzsche 1974, 299).  Through the language and web of 
meaning provided to us by our culture, we can artfully reinterpret even features of our 
physiological “first nature.”  I will have to forgo the details of how this process occurs 
until later, as for now I simply want to make the point that Nietzsche sees the human self 
as grounded in naturalistic considerations, yet not reducible to those considerations, on 
account of the transformative potential granted by our cultural and linguistic practices.  It 
is through such practices that we can write the story of our lives and, thus, alter our 
conduct and way of being-in-the-world. 
 Dewey’s similar non-reductive view is evinced in such declarations as: 
 Of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful.  That things should be able 
 to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing  
 themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of 
 communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side of which 
 transubstantiation pales. When communication occurs, all
 
natural events are 
 subject to reconsideration and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the
 requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that preliminary 
 discourse termed
 
thinking. Events turn into objects, things with a meaning. 
 (LW 1:133)  
 
Our reality consists of our interaction, as organisms, within an environment that is both 
physical and social.  Language and culture, then, are granted the power, within Dewey’s 
view, to actually transform reality.  So, countering the individual who holds fast to the 
idea that human nature and our native instincts are the unalterable determinants of our 
being, Dewey claims, “He is ignorant … that the human being differs from the lower 
animals in precisely the fact that his native activities lack the complex ready-made 
organization of the animals’ original abilities” (MW 14:78).  Dewey continues on to 
rebuff “[t]hose who argue that social and moral reform is impossible on the ground that 
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the Old Adam of human nature remains forever the same.”  The “permanence and 
inertia” they see as belonging to human nature, Dewey concludes, “in truth belong only 
to acquired customs” (MW 14:79).   
 It is this social constructionist vein in both Nietzsche and Dewey with which 
Rorty is most sympathetic.  As has been noted by numerous commentators, Rorty is 
unabashed in his disregard for the facets of Nietzsche’s thought that have to do with our 
embodied existence, as well as for what he thinks is Dewey’s overstated confidence in 
psychology and the scientific method.
8
  The notion that our culturally-situated language 
has the potential to shape and reshape our reality through reinterpretation is one of the 
central tenets of Rorty’s neopragmatism.  Thus, as noted, regarding his treatment of the 
self, Rorty focuses entirely on narrative self-creation.  Who we are is something that can 
be transformed through altering the story that one tells about oneself, redescribing our 
relations to the various other descriptions making up our reality.    
 In straightforward fashion, Margolis articulates the common thread running 
through Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty regarding the self, and presents pragmatism’s 
treatment of the human person as the most compelling account currently around.
9
  To 
remind ourselves, Margolis frames pragmatism as having Darwinized Hegel, through the 
                                                 
8
 Daniel Conway makes this point in his essay “Diembodied Perspectives: Nietzsche contra Rorty,” in 
claiming that Rorty’s view of self-creation through the reinterpretation of one’s perspective is not only 
paltry, but that it misses the basic thrust of Nietzsche’s own perspectivism (which is a condition for the 
possibility of narrative self-creation) which is that idiosyncratic affects undergird any perspective and so 
the constraints of our embodied existence rule out the “free-floating” act of redescription Rorty seems to be 
advocating.  I disagree with this interpretation for reasons I will spell out later in this chapter. 
 
9
 As I have tried to make clear throughout, I am in no way discrediting the sometimes stark differences 
between these thinkers.  The most common of these differences trotted out has to do with Rorty’s critique 
of Dewey found in his essay, “Dewey’s Metaphysics.” This essay, along with the other aspects of his 
thought, does not, I believe, preclude Rorty from being “naturalistic” in his account of selfhood.  Rorty’s 
main point of criticism against Dewey’s naturalism is not that our embodied existence should be 
completely disregarded, but rather that we should not fool ourselves into thinking we can say anything 
absolute about human nature that would allow us to formulate something like “generic traits of existence,” 
which we could use, once and for all, to erect a systematic philosophy. 
 101 
 
abandonment of the teleology of the Hegelian system, and as having Hegelianized 
Darwin, by observing that the conceptual resources of science (and, hence, Darwinian 
theory) are themselves human constructs.  In his discussion of the human self, Margolis 
employs a distinction between what he refers to as “internal Bildung” and “external 
Bildung.”  The former, Margolis claims, is the process by which an individual is 
enculturated into a society by means of education.  The latter, then, refers to “the long 
evolutionary process that accounts for the emergence of the unique primate gifts (of 
Homo sapiens) that bridge … the advanced forms of primate communication and their 
transformation into true speech.”  This process, Margolis continues, “entails the original 
formation and continually evolving transformation of the artifactually ‘second-natured’ 
site of linguistic and cultural competence – the being that we call a self or person” 
(Margolis 2010, 11).    
 Thus, the self is a hybrid artifact – it is emergent out of natural evolutionary 
processes, yet is not reducible to purely biologistic or physicalist terms.  Moreover, the 
self, who we are, is “prone to cultural transformation by way of the contingent 
penetration of its own natural competences” (Margolis 2010, 87).  In presenting this 
conception of the self, Margolis does justice to the more naturalistically-grounded 
projects of Nietzsche and Dewey, as well as the sociolinguistic-centered approach of 
Rorty.  Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous quotation, Margolis holds that selfhood 
includes, “as in painting and architecture, parts of mere physical nature transformed, 
made hybrid by one or another form of human ‘utterance’” (Margolis 2010, 88).  On the 
ontological status of the “self,” Margolis harkens back to Nietzsche in hinting that the 
“site” of selfhood may very well be a grammatical placeholder (i.e., a “fiction”), yet it is 
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a placeholder that is a phenomenological reality (Margolis 2010, 87-8).  That is, for better 
or worse, we experience the world from a first-person perspective.  I would also imagine 
that this is not a phenomenon exclusive to humans, but that, again, we are able to employ 
the tools we have gleaned from culture and language to tell a story, varying in degrees of 
complexity, about that perspective. 
 In conclusion, Descartes was correct in recognizing the internal sense of self that 
we all possess.  Where he went wrong, however, was in taking it to be something stable, 
unified, and isolated from the vagaries of our empirical existence.  Pragmatism takes the 
self to be an emergent phenomenon, with natural and cultural factors shaping its growth.  
Nietzsche and Dewey work to unsettle the notion of a ready-made self, and in lieu of 
such a notion, both present the self as something that is in-process – a process involving 
the intimate entwinement and interaction between the human organism and its 
environment.  This is not merely a physical process, but is one that is subject to the 
formative influence of culture and language.  Yet, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty, in their 
positive ethics, all give credence to the idea that there is also room for individual 
authenticity – that is, all three urge us to embrace the fragility of our selfhood in the name 
of not merely following convention, but taking the artistic license such fragility affords us 
human beings and creating a work of art out of our lives.   
 
Care of the Self as Aesthetic Self-Creation 
 In discussing the so-called “aestheticization of ethics,” Richard Shusterman nicely 
captures the main theme of this chapter.  Shusterman claims that those advancing an 
ethics of aesthetic self-creation begin with the premise that because “who we are is not 
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there to be definitively discovered,” who we are is “open to be made and shaped and 
should therefore be shaped aesthetically” (Shusterman 1992, 242).  In Nietzsche, Dewey, 
and Rorty one can find similar accounts of just what such a process entails, and in briefly 
introducing their suggested approaches to self-fashioning, it should come to light how the 
work of art, in cultivating the virtue of openness and expanding our horizons of meaning 
and possibility, can serve as a model for how we might create ourselves.   
 
Nietzsche’s “Dionysian free spirit” 
 Recall that within the pragmatist framework there is no essence residing within us 
that certifies the unity and stability of the self.  Instead, the self is conceived as unstable, 
fragmented, and vulnerable to the ever-changing dynamics of experience.  Nietzsche thus 
advocates an approach to self-creation, then, that is about attaining a coherent unity 
regarding one’s self.  There must, however, be a pre-existent individuality that is 
fragmented.  As mentioned earlier, this substratum upon which our self-creation will take 
place is, for Nietzsche, the body.  We are a collection of competing drives, instincts, 
wants, desires, and thoughts, and phenomena such as akrasia, whereby we are unable to 
act according to some preferred judgment, signals that, as Nehamas writes, “competing 
habits, patterns of valuations, and modes of perception are at work within the same 
individual” (Nehamas 1985, 186).  In other words, there is no monolithic unity of the 
bodily self.   
 With this in mind, let us consider Nietzsche’s conception of care of the self, 
which is perhaps best summed up in the following passage from The Gay Science: 
 One thing is needful – To “give style” to one’s character – a great and rare art!  It 
 is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature 
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 and fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason  
 and even weaknesses delight the eye.  Here a large mass of second nature has 
 been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed – both times 
 through long practice and daily work at it.  Here the ugly that could not be 
 removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime … In the 
 end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single 
 taste governed and formed everything large and small … For one thing is needful: 
 that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means 
 of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. 
 (Nietzsche 1974, 232-3)   
 
This passage, along with Nietzsche’s vague and difficult prescription that one ought “to 
become who one is,” neatly encapsulates his understanding of care of the self.  However, 
self-correction as the practice of becoming who one is can be misconstrued in two 
common ways, so it is worth sharpening what exactly Nietzsche means by such a 
suggestion.  First of all, it does not mean that there is some true self lying beneath one’s 
being, which it is her duty to somehow discover and actualize.  Secondly, it is also 
important to keep in mind that this process of becoming who one is is a never-ending 
one.  That is, at no point in one’s life will she be able to proclaim that she has finished her 
work and that she is done becoming.   
   So, what exactly does it mean that one ought “to become who one is?”  It is 
helpful to note that the end-in-view of this process is “attaining satisfaction with oneself,” 
or, as Nietzsche elsewhere describes as having “peace of soul,” or “the expression of 
maturity and mastery in the midst of doing, creating, working, and willing – calm 
breathing, attained ‘freedom of the will’ “ (Nietzsche 1968, 489).  This satisfaction is 
derived from the feeling that one’s self is no longer a conglomerate of contingent 
happenings, habitual patterns of thought and action, and unconscious drives, but rather is 
a cohesive and authored whole.  As Nehamas puts it, “The creation of the self therefore 
appears to be the creation … of a higher-order accord among our lower-level thoughts, 
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desires, and actions (Nehamas 1985, 188).  In order to attain this higher-order accord 
these aspects of one’s embodied being must be manipulated.  Yet, to do so, one needs to 
have a sort of narrative blueprint for how such reconstruction might take place and what 
exactly it will involve.   
 With this plan in mind, one will be on their way to becoming “Dionysian.”  While 
the “Dionysian” aspect of existence meant, for early Nietzsche, the unordered flux of 
nature underlying our structures of intelligibility, his later writings suggest a more 
prescriptive dimension to the meaning of “Dionysian.”  This is exactly Walter 
Kaufmann’s contention, and he explains that the “Dionysian man is … one who gives 
style to his own character … (he) is able to redeem his every impulse and to integrate into 
the sublime totality of his own nature even ‘the ugly that could not be removed,’ 
assigning it a meaning and redeeming function” (Kaufmann 1974, 282).10  Furthermore, 
as Kaufmann contends, the Apollonian form-giving force, which was opposed to the 
Dionysian in Nietzsche’s early writings on the birth and death of Greek tragedy, is folded 
into Nietzsche’s later conception of the ideal “Dionysian man.”  So, what we have as the 
basis of Nietzsche’s ideal approach to selfhood is a form-giving force that will arrange 
the various aspects of one’s existence into an organically-unified whole without the 
pretense that there is anything absolute about that narrative form; for it affirms the 
Dionysian reality that all form is contingent and transient.  This self-unity, however, is 
also not homogenous.  Much like Dewey’s contention that the organic unity of a work is 
not at all without tension and strife, the goal of self-creation is not to do away with 
conflicting habits, drives, thoughts, and desires.  Rather, it is to craft a self where such 
                                                 
10
 I cannot help but think this is a regulative ideal to which we can strive, but never actually attain.  With 
this end-in-view, however, we have a model for how to proceed in crafting a cohesive “self.” 
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conflict does not get in the way of one’s pursuit of individual flourishing and is therefore 
a self one can wholeheartedly affirm.       
 The Dionysian human, in creating herself, gives style to her character by 
artistically forming the various givens constituting her existence.  We develop traits of 
character that we may have no conscious control over.  We are born into familial, social, 
cultural, and historical situations we did not choose.  We have made choices in the past 
that cannot be undone.  We are clearly not radically free to make of ourselves whatever 
we so like, but this does not mean that who we are is causally determined.  Indeed, 
Nietzsche’s (and as we will see Rorty’s) notion of authenticity is based around an artistic 
model.  Not only are artists constrained by their particular medium, but also by the 
traditions in which they are either conforming to or revolting against.  Our existential 
constraints should not be the cause of pessimism, though, and this is why Nietzsche so 
often refers to his “Dionysian” ideal type in artistic terms.  Through the creative acts of 
“selection, reinforcement, and correction,” Nietzsche avers that the “tragic artist is no 
pessimist: he is precisely the one who says Yes to everything questionable, even to the 
terrible – he is Dionysian” (Nietzsche 1968, 464).    
 Therefore Nietzsche’s take on  self-correction is not about conforming to a pre-
established blueprint regarding what it is to be human or who one Really is, but is about 
unifying into a cohesive whole the various facets making up one’s existence.  Being 
unencumbered by preconceived notions of who they supposedly “Really” are, 
Nietzsche’s ideal type is a “free spirit.”  And, despite emerging out of the “greater self” 
that is one’s body, the story one tells about who they are can, Nietzsche believes, help 
shape and transform their embodied being-in-the-world.  While self-correction, for 
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Nietzsche, certainly involves working on one’s embodied being, that work is not done 
capriciously.  One must have an “artistic plan” in mind when attempting to weave 
together the various aspects of their existence.  This plan is our self-description, and like 
any artistic vision, it is subject to constant reinterpretation in the name of attaining 
Nietzsche’s regulative ideal – amor fati, or the love of fate.11  
 
Dewey’s “ideal moral self” 
 Dewey similarly takes language and communication to be a powerfully 
transformative force within our basic experience of the world.  It is social communication 
through language and the growth in meaning it engenders that Dewey believes can 
literally shape and reshape reality.  Recall that, for Dewey, our self-description is merely 
one of many conceptual apparatuses that have been fashioned in the mill of reflective, 
secondary experience.  Through language, we are able to give ourselves a self-description 
that gives a depth of meaning to our basic embodied existence.  In this way, the “self” is a 
tool we can use to work with and possibly transform our first-order habits of action, 
desire, and thought.   
 Before going on, it is important to again try and make clear what exactly I mean 
by the “self” involved in self-fashioning.  As we saw with Nietzsche, the “self” as a 
concept is emergent out of the “self” that is our embodied existence.  For Dewey, this 
embodied self consists in our biological impulses, drives, and the interpenetration of 
habits.  But in the former’s writings on self-creation and the latter’s on language, the 
importance of one’s narrative self-description, the story they tell about themselves to 
                                                 
11
 “I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those 
who make things beautiful.  Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth!” (Nietzsche 1974, 276). 
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themselves and to others, becomes apparent.  While there is undoubtedly an intimate 
entwinement between these two selves (i.e., one’s embodied existence and their self-
concept), I am focused more on the level of the narrative self with regards to the virtue of 
openness.  There is a sense in which our physical make-up can be made into a work of 
art, but before that can happen, one must have a plan.  For instance, in Human Nature 
and Conduct, Dewey captures the interplay of these two senses of self in his discussion of 
a man who wants to improve his posture.  Dewey’s point is that the man cannot simply 
alter his posture by wishing it, but that he must actually practice sitting in positions that 
will improve his posture so as to make them habits.  This is crucial to note, as I want to 
make it clear that self-fashioning cannot just occur in one’s head.  If one wants to form 
the matter of their existence into a work of art, including altering one’s bodily drives and 
habits, one must actually enact their narrative self.  Yet, the thought to alter one’s 
posture, or one’s bodily self, is something that occurs at the level of narrative.  When one 
wants to make a change with respect to their body, their thought, or their attitude, it 
begins with an act of authorship.  In short, the narrative self is my concern as regards 
aesthetic self-creation.  Although, as already emphasized, it is simply bad faith to neglect 
that such a process involves a complex interplay between the one’s bodily being and their 
conceptual self-description. 
 So, in terms of care of the self as self-creation, we can say that for Nietzsche, 
Dewey, and Rorty, our self-narrative is where we can work on crafting a higher-level 
unity among our lower-level drives and habits, not to mention the various contingencies 
making up one’s life.  Yet, Dewey is constantly on guard against the hypostatization of 
this self.  Indeed, much of what I have to say about Dewey’s understanding of care of the 
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self is simply my best guess at what he would say about such a process. This is because, 
similar to why he balks at many agent-based ethical theories, Dewey thought such a focus 
on selfhood, on what type of person one is or is trying to become, could easily alienate 
one from their actions within the realm of our everyday existence.  “The key to a correct 
theory of morality,” claims Dewey, “is recognition of the essential unity of the self and 
its acts” (LW 7:288).   
 As previously discussed, narrative self-creation is not a project disconnected from 
our embodied being-in-the-world.  The story we tell about ourselves cannot be removed, 
and indeed must be one with, our actions here on Earth.  For Dewey, this is not so much 
due to an insistence on authenticity (although authenticity, as we will see, can prove to be 
a useful regulative ideal for a pragmatist ethics), but has more to do with his contention 
that the primary locus of ethical deliberation is an indeterminate and problematic 
situation.  As Pappas notes, however, this focus on concrete action does not preclude 
Dewey from presenting hypotheses about what type of approach to selfhood is going to 
best equip one to deal with the particularities of any given situation.  
 As with other habits and modes of experience Dewey endorses, one can employ 
his “aesthetic ideal” to articulate the sense of self that he takes to be the most useful 
towards the amelioration of an indeterminate and problematic situation.  One of the ways 
Dewey explains this ideal is that in the aesthetic, the precarious and the stable traits of 
existence are brought into a harmonious balance:   
 The doings and sufferings that form experience are, in the degree in which 
 experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a union of the precarious, 
 novel, irregular with the settled, assured and uniform—a union which also defines 
 the artistic and the esthetic.  For wherever there is art the contingent and ongoing 
 no longer work at cross purposes with the formal and recurrent but
 
commingle in 
 harmony. (LW 1:270) 
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 Keeping the focus on action, it is nearly impossible to deny that who we are, the 
story we tell ourselves about ourselves, has a significant effect on our conduct.  Because 
the self is in-process, and, as such, is fragile and vulnerable, the fragmentation of the self 
is an ever-looming threat.  This fragmentation is to be avoided because it leads one into 
the type of discontinuous mode of experience where meaning is impoverished and 
intelligent conduct is hampered.  Moreover, self-fragmentation is often a root cause of the 
indeterminate situations Dewey is so concerned with helping us navigate.  Competing 
drives and habits disrupt the flow of experience.  As Nehamas writes, “Akrasia, the 
inability to act according to our preferred judgment, is a clear sign that unity [of self] is 
absent” (Nehamas 1985, 186).   
 If we think about the self, as Nietzsche did, as a political body comprised of 
competing drives, interests, and concerns, then we might be able to get a sense for what 
this sense of unity means.  If we think about these various facets as delegates within this 
body, a lack of unity is akin to a government that lacks the ability to compromise.  Any 
one drive dominating the collective is tyrannically, and while it might provide a sense of 
“unity,” it does so by suppressing other drives and interests.  This can lead to 
phenomenon such as akrasia, where we might have a preferred course of action in mind 
that gets stifled by another drive.  There is also the possibility that these drives and 
interests are completely at odds with each other to the point where purposeful action is 
stagnated (similar to the political climate in America today).  The ideal, then, exists when 
these various competing drives, interests, and concerns can be melded together in a self 
that can move confidently forward.   
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 With pragmatism’s emphasis on practicality, one of the foremost criteria to be 
mindful of when fashioning a self is its instrumentality in helping us navigate these 
indeterminate situations.  As Dewey points out, we are thus well served to avoid any sort 
of self-fragmentation on account of the temporality of our existence.  When engaged in 
practical inquiry, we need to be able to draw on our past experiences as guides for present 
action.  Dewey notes, however, that the temporal nature of our being can often hamper 
our experience:  “Most mortals are conscious that a split often occurs between their 
present living and their past and future.  Then the past hangs upon them as a burden; it 
invades the present with a sense of regret, of opportunities not used, and of consequences 
we wish undone.  It rests upon the present as an oppression, instead of being a storehouse 
of resources by which to move confidently forward” (LW 10:24).  In order to get the 
most out of the storehouse of resources that is our past we need to recognize that our 
“past selves,” even those we would like to ignore, are indelible facets of who we 
presently are.
12
  This appropriation of the past, though, often involves an act of 
reinterpretation, whereby the past is transformed within the narrative that is our present 
self-description.  The past does not come to us as bare facts.  There is always room to 
reinvent the past in order to enrich the present.  The onus of regret is often one of the 
biggest hindrances to meaningful and intelligent conduct, yet through redescribing those 
aspects of our past that feel like they belonged to a completely different person, we can 
work on drawing a narrative thread between our past selves and who we are now.      
                                                 
12
 I assume that we can all relate to the remembrance of things from our past that seem as though they were 
of a completely different self from the one we presently feel ourselves to be.  Yet, as Nietzsche notes, 
“However vigorously a man may develop and seem to leap over from one thing into its opposite, closer 
observation will nonetheless discover the dovetailing where the new building grows out of the old.  This is 
the task of the biographer: he always has to bear in mind the fundamental principle that nature never makes 
a leap” (Nietzsche 1986, 359).  It is our task, as the autobiographers of our own self, to act on the same 
principle if we are to achieve the sort of dynamic unity most conducive towards individual flourishing.   
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 The sense of stability Dewey prescribes regarding self-correction can thus be 
thought of as the cohesion of one’s habits and drives, their various social roles, as well as 
the narrative self-description that links the past with the present and projects forward into 
the future.  The sense of self that emerges out of our more primordial level of engaged 
existence can be used towards the end of this stability, but it is important to note that this 
stability must remain only relative.  One’s sense of self cannot become too rigid, as such 
inflexibility would actually make selfhood a less effective tool.  It is less effective 
because it can all-too-easily alienate one from her actions.  It is simply acting in bad faith 
(or inauthentically – to borrow ethical concepts from existentialist ethics) for one to hold 
that the self-creative process has an absolute terminus, or that one has completely 
inalterable components of her existence.  The excuse “That’s just who I am” stems from a 
premise that Dewey explicitly rejects whenever he discusses the self; that is, the fallacy 
that who we are is fixed in certain ways that will forever resist reinterpretation and 
transformation.   
 To create oneself in an aesthetic manner, then, one must be hospitable towards the 
new and possess a vulnerability that will allow one to redescribe and thus reconstruct 
who they are in ways that might end up being more useful as we navigate the flux of 
experience.  Our narrative self-description can be reinterpreted and used to reshape our 
habits and revitalize the past. Because our self is always already emergent out of our 
embodied being, it is always going to involve so-called “natural” elements (e.g. our 
genetic makeup), not to mention other contingent factors related to our socio-historical 
situatedness (e.g., class, race, gender, etc.)   In other words, the creation of a self is never 
ex nihilo.  The process that is the formation of a self is going to be delimited, but this is 
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not to say that we cannot mold the givens of our existence into an authentic, individual 
life.   
 Mark Johnson tackles this very issue in the context of how we “experience 
ourselves as ‘in process’ rather than as fixed metaphysical entities with unchanging 
identities” (Johnson 1993, 162).  Johnson asks us to consider “the situation of an Afro-
American woman in the American South of the 1950s” (Johnson 1993, 162).  This 
woman is, Johnson rightly notes, incredibly constrained by her situation.  She is a female.  
She has black skin.  Those are facets of her existence that she cannot change.  She also 
exists within a shared network of meanings and values which marginalize and oppress 
her on account of those very inevitabilities.  “For her,” writes Johnson, “the idea of 
radical freedom is a joke” (Johnson 1993, 162).   
 But, “she is not without the resources to transform her situation and her identity in 
ways that reveal the measure of her modest freedom” (Johnson 1993, 162).  Johnson goes 
on to explain the range of imaginative possibilities open to her for “what she can 
experience and who she can become” (Johnson 1993, 162).  When enacted, these 
possibilities can manifest in the way she comports herself in interpersonal relations, or 
how she might push back against the socially-constructed limits placed on her.  Thus 
Johnson concludes that “this woman is constituted by forces, institutions, and historical 
circumstances beyond her control, and she simultaneously constitutes her identity by 
certain sorts of restrictedly free acts.  That is the kind of limited, situated freedom we all 
possess” (Johnson 1993, 162).  
 Her use of this restricted freedom exists within a plan that she has for the type of 
person she is and wants to become.  Therefore, this individual’s story is going to be a tool 
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used to transform experience.  When in a moment of secondary reflection about how best 
to go forward within the context of the present situation, one of the tools drawn on most 
heavily is a sense of self.  As just noted, however, context cannot be forgotten, so it is 
crucial to have an orientation towards one’s “self” that is flexible to the ever-changing 
dynamics of experience, as well as being willing to learn from that experience going 
forward. 
  
Rorty’s “poetic ironist” 
 As stated, allthough Nietzsche and Dewey take care to articulate the physiological 
starting point of selfhood in the form of bodily drives, habits, and desires, both seem to 
implicitly endorse a narrative view of selfhood.  That is, while both take selfhood to be an 
emergent function of a more engaged level of embodied existence, the starting point of 
actual self-care is at a level of reflection, or more precisely, at the level of narrative.  The 
story we tell ourselves about who we have been, who we are, and who we are going to 
become is the locus of aesthetic self-creation, as it is this story that we can reinvent and 
use to unify, modify, and transform our embodied character.  An important caveat is in 
order, however, which is that such transformation demands that objective conditions, 
either in the world or in our physical character, be reconstructed as well.  In other words, 
self-creation is not a process that is “all in the head.”  Yet, as I have been gesturing at, we 
need to have a plan for self-work if we are to be mindful of what we are doing or why we 
are doing something with respect to fashioning a self.  Without the ability to use the tools 
of language and culture to work on our “natural” selves, who we are would be just as 
ready-made and reductionist as if we had been implanted with an essential human nature.  
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If we are to actualize Nietzsche and Dewey’s ideal of self-care as the creation of a work 
of art, then we should keep in mind the latter’s claim that art occurs “when the natural 
and cultivated blend into one” (LW 10:70).   
 I mentioned before that Rorty is sometimes accused of making self-creation a 
completely disembodied, linguistic affair.  Unlike Nietzsche and Dewey, Rorty has very 
little to say about our physical, embodied existence.  It is not entirely accurate, though, to 
say that Rorty’s view of self-creation is completely disembodied or that he is not painting 
the same emergent portrait of selfhood found in Nietzsche and Dewey.  As with Rorty’s 
distaste for Dewey’s talk of “experience,” it is not that the former denies there being a 
level of existence that is pre-linguistic or that we are embodied creatures.  He simply does 
not think anything can be said about either that somehow captures the truth about that 
pre-linguistic field of experience or our physiological being.  But, Rorty does insist that 
his liberalism is grounded in the belief that cruelty is an absolute evil.  And, when 
discussing this regulative belief, while Rorty also grants that cruelty, for us humans, can 
come in the rather pernicious form of humiliation, whereby someone’s deepest values 
and beliefs are belittled, he also means simply brute, physical pain.  Furthermore, Rorty’s 
conception of selfhood is heavily influenced by Freud, in that it was Freud who carefully 
detailed the various elements of chance that shape our unconscious desires, beliefs, and 
concerns.  The process of self-creation is thus always occurring at a level that is grounded 
in a less-conscious background of culturally-shared and idiosyncratically-variant 
meanings.  These meanings, however, are not all in the head, but are rather experienced 
at an embodied and felt level of existence.  “Anything,” Rorty writes, “from the sound of 
a word through the color of a leaf to the feel of a piece of skin can … serve to dramatize 
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and crystallize a human beings sense of self-identity” (Rorty 1988, 37).  Rorty does not 
deny that the meaning contained within these bodily phenomena has a profound effect on 
one’s perspective and very being-in-the-world. 
 So, while it is easy to fuss over the differences between these three accounts of 
self-care, there is enough of an overlap to hold them together in a fruitful dialogue.  The 
central theme running throughout is that the self is fragile and often fragmented, pulled 
apart by temporality, chance, and competing desires.  Without something like a soul or 
transcendental psyche holding our sense of self together, we are left with the self as an 
artifactual construct fashioned out of an amalgam of contingencies.   
 Are we, though, supposed to be content with this sense of who we are, or does 
Rorty also prescribe some form of self-correction?  Dewey’s ideal model of the self as a 
balance between the stable and the precarious does, in fact, fit Rorty’s own model quite 
well.  This balance is not so apparent, however, as Rorty is often accused of focusing 
solely on the precarious, or novel, within the process of self-creation.  Shusterman, for 
example, contends that Rorty “confuses the aesthetic with the radically novel, just as he 
conflates artistic creation with unique originality” (Shusterman 1992, 253).   
 In rebuking the view that selfhood is about following some pre-conceived 
blueprint, Rorty does make the rather strong suggestion that care of the self should be a 
matter of describing oneself in a new language.  More will be said about the nuances 
involved in such suggestions, but it is clear that Rorty elects to focus more on the 
precarious and novel when discussing self-fashioning.  He is proud to highlight that the 
ironist, the ideal citizen of his liberal utopia, is one who “has radical and continuing 
doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses” (Rorty 1989, 73).  By “final 
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vocabulary,” Rorty means “a set of words which (individuals) employ to justify their 
actions, their beliefs, and … [t]hey are the words in which we tell, sometimes 
prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives” (Rorty 1989, 73).  He 
continues: 
 A small part of a final vocabulary is made up of thin, flexible, and ubiquitous 
 terms such as “true,” “good,” right,” and “beautiful.”  The larger part contains  
 thicker, more rigid, and more parochial terms, for example, “Christ,” “England,” 
 “professional standards,” “decency,”  “kindness,” “the Revolution,” “the Church,” 
 “progressive,” “rigorous,” “creative.” (Rorty 1989, 73) 
 
The ironist, then, has realized how chance has tinged and helped shape those very 
vocabularies, and it is the healthy skepticism bred by this realization that Rorty is 
constantly trying to advance.  And, although these influential “parochial” words are 
supposedly “more rigid,” his overarching point is that there is nothing necessary about 
how we describe ourselves, and, thus, who we are.
13
  They are only “final” in the sense 
that they are used to justify one’s life, but they themselves lack any noncircular 
justification. 
 But, the ironist does have a “final” vocabulary through which to tell the story of 
her life.  Rorty never proposes that we try to do away, once and for all, with such a 
stability.  It is simply our orientation towards this stability that Rorty seeks to transform.  
For the sake of our attempt to cope with experience, Rorty, like Nietzsche and Dewey, 
acknowledges the significance of trying to establish coherence with regards to one’s 
sense of self, so that one’s self-identity can be carried forward into the uncertain and 
precarious nature of our existence.  For Rorty, this unity of self is achieved by 
constructing a poem out of one’s life.  Rorty, though, acknowledges that this analogy can 
                                                 
13
 Rorty would not deny that there are certain designations that capture necessity, particularly those that 
relate to our embodied being (e.g., “one who breathes,” “one who needs food,” etc.).   Yet, Rorty would 
probably deny that these necessities do much work as regards aesthetic self-creation.   
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be taken two ways.  A poem can be seen as something with a fixed and static sense of 
unity and meaning, as captured in the naïve belief that every text has just one “true” 
interpretation.  Critics of this view, which is sometimes associated with new criticism, 
however, understand the dynamic nature of the poem, and, to recycle a quote Rorty 
presented earlier, see it as “a tissue of contingent relations, a web which stretches 
backward and forward through past and future time” (Rorty 1989, 41).  Rorty clearly 
prefers this latter take on the poem, and, as such, his poetic approach to care of the self 
involves giving up the idea that aesthetic self-fashioning can even be completed because 
“there is only a web of relations to be rewoven, a web which lengthens every day” (Rorty 
1989, 43).   
 Rorty does, then, have a place for stability within his account of selfhood.  The 
very act of “reweaving” the set of relations comprising our life’s narrative implies that a 
fragmented self is less than desirable.  But Rorty’s almost tiresome emphasis on 
contingency also points to another facet of his view that seems to undercut those who see 
him as privileging only the radically novel as it relates to self-fashioning.  In his most 
focused treatment of the issue of selfhood, Rorty indeed criticizes Nietzsche for the 
latter’s hope that the highest human life would be one of complete novelty:  “[O]ne may 
say that there can be no fully Nietzschean lives, lives which are pure action rather than 
reaction – no lives which are not largely parasitical on an un-redescribed past” (Rorty 
1989, 42).  Although he hyperbolizes the novelty he advocates for in regards to self-
creation, Rorty realizes that there is no self-creation ex nihilo.  This is because who we 
are is always going to be something cast into our interactions with others, and so in self-
creation we are always going to be working from roughly the same background network 
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of words, values, meanings, etc., as anyone else in our society.  Rorty’s point is that, all-
too-often, we take that network to be somehow written into the fabric of the universe and 
thus impervious to any attempts to redescribe it.  This is the view that there is only one 
way to be a “man,” “woman,” “father,” “lover,” “student,” “professor,” etc.  There are 
always adjustments that can be made to these pre-established roles, and thus always 
alterations that can be made to who one is, the story that one tells about themselves to 
themselves and to others.  Admittedly, Rorty probably should not have used such strong 
language when describing self-creation, as it has led to a misunderstanding that obscures 
the main idea he is attempting to convey.  That idea seems more aimed at simply calling 
for us to not take the “old” language for granted.   
  Such minor adjusting might not seem like the radical self-creation Nietzsche had 
in mind, but as Rorty argues, “What makes Freud more useful and more plausible than 
Nietzsche is that he does not relegate the vast majority of humanity to the status of dying 
animals.  For Freud’s account of unconscious fantasy shows us how to see every human 
life as a poem … He sees every such life as an attempt to clothe itself in its own 
metaphors” (Rorty 1989, 35-6).14  More than anything, Rorty just wants us to realize that 
we often have more artistic license than we typically imagine in regards to our identity.  
On this view, the devout Catholic who understands that her worldview and conception of 
herself is only one perspective among many other possible ones is going to be living a 
more poetic life than the believer who has never critically scrutinized her way of carving 
                                                 
14
 Rorty does qualify that certain lives (i.e., those handicapped in one way or another, either from birth, 
accident, or societal oppression) may not possess the full capability to engage in genuine self-creation.  
This, like the concept of freedom within existentialist ethics, can be used to critique entire societal 
structures which may hinder one’s possibilities for self-creation.  More importantly, though, Rorty’s liberal 
principle against doing any harm would preclude him from ignoring the dignity of those who will never be 
able to engage in the process of self-redescription, 
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up the world.  We must avoid falling into the trap of simply describing ourselves in pre-
conceived terms, and, rather, conceive a self of which we can take ownership.  Such a 
poetic approach to selfhood is preferable within this pragmatist framework for a few 
reasons which I will now discuss. 
 
A Justification for Aesthetic Self-Creation 
 Up to this point I have attempted to illustrate Nietzsche’s, Dewey’s, and Rorty’s 
suggestions for how one ought to live, especially regarding how one fashions a self, in 
light of the fact that there is no essential, absolute, fully-defined self to be found (or even 
created).  Two pressing issues remain to be addressed: (1) the question of why aesthetic 
self-creation should be of any concern to ethical theory, and (2) how aesthetic experience 
can be salutary with respect to this process.  The former is linked to the larger question 
about how a normative pragmatist ethics can be justified while the latter is concerned 
with the basic focus of this dissertation, the intersection of art and ethics.   
 Let us first, though, summarize this chapter’s discussion thus far.  The main 
thread tying these three conceptions of selfhood together is the disavowal of what Dewey 
calls the “ready-made” self.  Such a complete and certain sense of self, however, is 
undeniably alluring.  Who would not like a definitive answer to the question of “Who am 
I?” with which to navigate the complexities of experience and render them more secure 
and predictable?  The notion of a “soul” distinct from the body (as we get in the Phaedo, 
Christian metaphysics, and Descartes’ Meditations), the idea of a “true self” lying behind 
a fluctuating existence as an unshakable essence, and even the thought that we can create 
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something like a fixed self through fully actualizing some inherent, always already there, 
potentials are motivated by this same desire.   
 Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty all deny that this is a good way to think about 
selfhood.  It is detrimental for the typical pragmatist reasons, in that it forgets the context 
of experience, it reinforces the status quo, and discourages the experimental mindset so 
vital to growth and progress.  We become who we are, yet this is a process of becoming 
which only ends in death.  But, before filling in some of the details concerning what these 
thinkers believe is the upshot of such an approach, it will be useful to address the 
question of what, if any, import art, specifically the visual arts, can have for this process. 
 If anything, as Rorty and Nehamas contend, it seems it is literature that has the 
most significance regarding the process of narrative self-creation.  However, the virtue of 
openness that I claim is cultivated through genuine encounters with any work of art is an 
absolutely crucial prerequisite for accepting aesthetic self-creation as an adequate and 
even preferred approach to the care of the self that I argue is at the heart of ethical 
philosophy.  Recall that openness, as I have described it, relates to our orientation 
towards our conceptual systems, our ways of carving up experience so as to make sense 
of it.  And, as we have seen, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty all take our sense of who we 
are, our self-description that no doubt greatly influences our conduct, to be nothing more 
than just another one of our conceptual tools, emergent out of our embodied interactions 
with a contingent and ever-shifting environment.  This self-description is, though, a 
rather complex concept, or better yet, a narrative system of interrelated concepts, which 
allows us to tell a story about where we have been, where we are, and where we are 
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headed.  So, the virtue of openness in this context is about our orientation towards this 
self-description.   
 Within this framework, care of the self, or self-correction, becomes a matter of 
creating a work of art out of one’s life.  Put differently, it is about “giving style to one’s 
character” by doing all of those things that Nietzsche prescribed in the passage from The 
Gay Science quoted earlier in this chapter.  This includes cultivating aspects of one’s so-
called “second nature” (perhaps through education, or experience itself), as well as 
working to mold one’s deep-seated habits and drives so as to achieve coherence among 
the plurality of competing “selves.”15  But, while this self-work is always going to be 
rooted in our embodied being, I have been trying to illustrate how creating a work of art 
out of one’s self begins with the story one tells about who they are and who they want to 
be. 
 If care of the self is about self-correction, and this self-correction involves 
forming one’s self into a work of art, it is fair to ask by what standard are we to judge 
one’s most intimate work.  I have been hinting throughout this chapter that Dewey’s 
“aesthetic ideal” might be a fruitful way to approach this question.  Rorty would no doubt 
balk at the very idea of coming up with such a criterion, but let me just say that, in 
keeping with the pragmatist spirit underlying this dissertation, I am by no means claiming 
this to be the only possible criterion.  Rather my hope is that this discussion will provide 
a useful way of thinking about aesthetic self-creation and its relation to artistic 
appreciation, so as to bring into relief a previously neglected function of works ranging 
                                                 
15
 It is important to keep in mind that this unity in self-coherence does not equate to a homogenization of 
the plurality of “selves,” drives, and patterns of thought and action that make up a person.  For pragmatists, 
the attempt to weave order out of the chaos making up our life is “that of ordering the diversity of 
experience into a unity without slighting variety” (Seigfried 1990, 112). 
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from Cassatt’s The Bath to an anonymous boxcar graffiti mural to Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
Robie House.  By my lights, there are two ways in which artistic appreciation can inform 
self-fashioning.  The first way might seem obvious, but is worth mentioning here as it 
intimately relates to the ideal approach to self-creation we are working towards.  So, 
recall that one of the definitions of what I am calling Dewey’s “aesthetic ideal” presents 
the aesthetic as a mean between the stable and precarious features of existence.  There is 
a sense in which every work of art, for it to be that work, is a stability.  There is 
something that holds the various elements of the work together in an organic unity.  
Nietzsche and Dewey both endorse, in ways that transcend their discussions of just art, an 
ability to weave order out of chaos.  For instance, Nietzsche praises the ancient Greek 
creation of a beautiful order (through their Apollonian spirit) “out of the chaos that was 
the plurality of foreign, Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, and Egyptian forms and concepts” 
(Nietzsche 2001, 122).  This is to say that, within this framework, the mark of beauty, or 
even aesthetic merit in general, is the forming of the various elements of the work into an 
organic unity in which each element plays off of one another and enriches the qualitative 
value of each other and the whole of which they are a part.
16
  Recall from Chapter II that, 
on Dewey’s view, the experience of the work of art is a model of dynamic organization.  
The dynamic unity of aesthetic experience provides us with possibilities for how we 
might organize the contingencies of our existence into an aesthetically-shaped self.  That 
is, how might we take the seemingly muddled matter of our existence and form it into a 
self that will help us feel at home in experience? 
                                                 
16
 Works that are meant to be jarring or unsettling are no objection to this, as their elements are also bound 
together in a way that makes it that work.  That is, again, Dewey’s notion of consummation is not 
synonymous with a “happy ending.”  To reiterate, what defines such consummation is simply the various 
facets of the experience hanging together in a way that feels “right.” 
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 Yet, with respect to selfhood, our common sense conception of it seems to imply 
that attaining stability is not necessarily a problem.  Most of us take for granted that there 
is something called the “self” which underlies our existence and is the source of our 
actions, thoughts, beliefs, and desires.  Whether or not one believes in something like a 
soul or transcendental psyche, popular opinion seems to hold that, save for those with 
certain mental disorders, the self comes neatly packaged and unified.  It is the idea that 
the self is actually an emergent creation, that it is fragile and oftentimes fragmented, that 
Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty all want us to recognize.  Indeed, while all three stress the 
need to weave a cohesive self-narrative that will hold the various aspects of one’s life 
together, they also spend a considerable amount of time critiquing overly stable, 
essentialist conceptions of the self.  In the end, it is about grounding one’s sense of self – 
that undoubtedly needed stability – on a flexible footing.  While this makes it merely a 
relative stability, it is open to experience in a way that rigidly fixed conceptions of the 
self are not.  It can be altered, transformed, reworked, in order to better deal with the 
contingencies the future and the ever-growing past will thrust upon us.  It is a self that is 
stable enough to help us organize our competing habits, drives, social roles, and varying 
temporal “selves” into a coherent unity, while at the same time is loyal to the 
precariousness of our situation. 
 So, in Nietzsche, this aesthetic ideal can be thought of in terms of the harmony 
between the form-giving Apollonian force and the precarious Dionysian undercurrent of 
existence.  This concordant discord, Nietzsche believes, was at the heart of what he 
considered the pinnacle of artistic endeavor: the tragic dramas of Aeschylus and 
Sophocles.  Those tragedies, he claims, somehow gave form to and made communicable 
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the Dionysian reality that all form is transitory and incapable of capturing the 
excessiveness of existence.  This ideal translates into Nietzsche’s view of the self, as he 
does not eschew giving form and unity to oneself, but rather advocates for a sense of self 
that is aware of its fragile and transient nature.  This awareness allows for one to reinvent 
herself when need be in the name of Nietzsche’s regulative ideal of life-affirmation.  The 
cornerstone of Nietzsche’s ideal type is the ability to affirm one’s life in its totality, 
including those events, choices, and moments of our past that we might want to reject.  
How one might incorporate a regretful part of their past into their present in a way that 
establishes a beautiful unity is exemplified by Nietzsche himself.  As Nehamas points 
out, Nietzsche’s academic career began in philology, a field with which he eventually 
grew discontent.  Yet, instead of ruing that initial choice he made and distancing himself 
from Nietzsche the philologist, Nietzsche found a way to make use of his philological 
training by incorporating it into his burgeoning philosophical interests.  Nietzsche’s 
penetrating genealogies of our moral concepts and values is but one example of how one 
might unite a past “self” with their current self-narrative in a way that is not only 
therapeutic, but productive going forward in experience. 
 In Dewey, the ideal approach to self-fashioning involves crafting a self that is 
stable enough to serve as a useful tool for navigating our physical and social 
environment, but fully respects that selfhood is not insulated from the flow of experience.  
To be a useful tool, our self-description should be temporally-unified, in that it draws 
readily on past selves, as well as projects into the future; both in order to serve the 
present.  This self must also be grounded in the network of socially-established meanings 
and values so as to allow one to cast her “self” into the social world and connect with 
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other people.  In this way, Dewey disparages Romantic views of the self that disregard 
the profound ways in which custom and tradition set the stage for any sense of 
individuality.  That is, like the work of art, Dewey’s conception of the ideal mode of 
selfhood is one that has enough footing within the shared community of meanings and 
values to have an effect on the audience, while at the same time is not a mere replica or 
copy of a pre-established form.  As such, it is poised between the stable and the 
precarious. 
 Rorty’s preferred model of selfhood also captures Dewey’s aesthetic ideal, in that, 
despite being enthralled by the possibilities opened up because of this precarious nature 
of the self, Rorty too seems to believe that one of the foremost purposes of the self is as a 
means of social engagement.  The creation that is our self is, to some degree, an exercise 
in a sort of metaphorical poetry in that it involves the transformation of literality in order 
to suit one’s own idiosyncratic purposes.  But, Rorty asserts:  
 [N]o project of self creation … can avoid being marginal and parasitic.  
 Metaphors are unfamiliar uses of old words, but such uses are possible only 
 against the background of other old words being used in old familiar ways.  A 
 language which was ‘all metaphor’ would be a language which had no use, hence 
 not a language but just babble … (Languages are) media of communication, tools 
 for social interaction, ways of tying oneself up with other human beings.  (Rorty, 
 1989, 41) 
 
Rorty’s ideal approach to selfhood demands that we avoid falling into the trap of 
allowing one’s identity to be dictated by some preconceived blueprint.  We must use the 
freedom we have regarding our narrative self to describe and redescribe ourselves in our 
own terms.  Failing to put one’s own gloss, however small, on the web of literality we are 
always already immersed in neglects the mutable quality of our existence.  But, as seen in 
the passage cited above, our self-creation will be woven out of the shared network of 
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meanings binding our society.  The self must, then, if we are to engage in any sort of 
communicative praxis, have not only the stability of self-coherence, but also be one that 
can be cast into our interpersonal environment.  Though, as should be clear, our self is 
ours, and we would do a disservice to the complexity of thought and action granted us by 
our evolutionary legacy if we did not take up the call to author that self in whatever small 
way we can.   
 As I see it, art can be of great service towards this end in two ways.  For one, art 
presents us with a model for how to form a dynamic and organic cohesiveness out of 
component parts.  Instead of line, color, figure, and space, we use the contingencies of 
our existence to paint a narrative self that will help us feel at home and flourish in the 
world.  But, more importantly, in cultivating openness, aesthetic experience will help us 
become more comfortable with the wealth of possible ways to live a human life and form 
a “self.”    
    
The pragmatist redescription of authenticity  
   In concluding this chapter, I would like to say a bit more about why we should 
concern ourselves with self-fashioning in the first place.  I believe there are two 
compelling reasons for why ethical theory should bother with aesthetic self-creation: (1) 
it promotes authenticity, while guarding against blind conformity; and (2) it combats the 
pernicious effects of ressentiment.  Concerning authenticity, we should first get clear 
about what exactly it means to live an “authentic” life and how this notion manifests 
itself within the pragmatist framework I have been constructing.  The authentic, in our 
common understanding, denotes the genuine, or that with an undisputed origin.  
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Originality typically implies being free, in some respect, from the constraints of tradition 
and custom.  Thus we can think of an “authentic self” as one which is founded on a 
certain freedom of thought and choice regarding how one describes oneself, or who one 
is.   
 As such, Socrates can be read as one of the first advocates of living an authentic 
life.  Challenging the doxa of his time, prompting individuals to think for themselves and 
examine their inherited beliefs and value systems, was the cornerstone of Socrates’ 
mission – the mission to get individuals to care for themselves through the process of 
self-examination and correction.  Such a mission presupposes that individuals possess 
some level of distance from which they can assess their acculturated beliefs.  When 
Socrates defends his incessant questioning of his fellow Athenians’ beliefs about such 
topics as justice, love, piety, and knowledge by proclaiming that what he seeks is a 
revaluation of their ends (e.g., to not care more about wealth, honor, and fame, than for 
the best possible state of their souls), one can read him as advancing a version of 
authenticity which demands that individuals not blindly follow custom and tradition and 
the preconceived hierarchy of ends handed down by them.   
 However, it was not until the middle 20
th
 century that authenticity, as an ethical 
concern, really wedged itself into the western intellectual discourse.  In their works on 
existentialist ethics, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir hold up authenticity as the 
cardinal moral virtue.
17
  Similar to the pragmatist line of thought, both Sartre and 
Beauvoir deny any ontologically-grounded status to the “ego,” or self.  As per Sartre’s 
own well-known example from his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” unlike the 
                                                 
17
 Again, similar to the pragmatist ethics I have been fleshing out, existentialist ethics move away from 
articulating moral rules and principles for action-guidance and focus more on one’s general disposition, her 
being-in-the-world.   
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paper-knife, whose essence and purpose is preconceived and formulaic, “man first of all 
exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards” 
(Sartre 1946, 348-9).  As referred to earlier, attempting to excuse one’s behavior with the 
claim “That’s just the way I am” is a paradigm case of inauthenticity.  But inauthenticity 
can also stem from neglecting to acknowledge the incorrigible facets of one’s situation, 
or believing that one can be anything they want to be simply by wishing it.
18
  To 
existentialists, both forms are types of self-deception whereby we are not accepting the 
inherent ambiguity of human existence.   
 Beauvoir opens her Ethics of Ambiguity (1948) by articulating the “tragic 
ambivalence” of our condition: “(Man) asserts himself as a pure internality against which 
no external power can take hold, and he also experiences himself as a thing crushed by 
the dark weight of other things” (Beauvoir 1996, 343).  Thus, authenticity within this 
existentialist (and, I would argue, pragmatist) framework is achieved by affirming the 
anti-essentialism of the self in the name of continually striving to transform the factical 
givens encountered in experience. In other words, it is about living within this 
ambivalence, using our artistic license to create a self out of the “thingness” of our 
condition. 
  Put slightly differently, when discussing his pragmatic conception of authenticity, 
Rorty draws on Martin Heidegger.  According to Rorty’s reading of the Heideggerian 
hope for authenticity, which is “the hope to become one’s own person rather than merely 
the creation of one’s education or one’s environment,” to achieve authencitity:  
 [Is] not necessarily to reject one’s past.  It may instead be a matter of 
 reinterpreting that past so as to make it more suitable to one’s own purposes.  
                                                 
18
 Such factical constraints include the physiological, physical, socio-economic, cultural, historical, 
familial, and idiosyncratic aspects that make up one’s situation. 
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 What matters is to have seen one or more alternatives to the purposes that most 
 people take for granted, and to have chosen among these alternatives – thereby, in 
 some measure, creating yourself. (Rorty 2010, 476)   
 
So, again, I do not see Rorty as espousing the approach to self-creation often ascribed to 
him, one that is all about radical novelty.  Self-care, according to Rorty, is not about 
rejecting one’s past, one’s situation, or any of the other circumstances beyond her control, 
but is about using these contingencies as the matter she will imbue with form in order to 
create a self.  Granted, education and experience are important for this project.  We need 
to be made aware of the fact that there are many different ways to live a human life.  But, 
what is important to note about Rorty’s account of authenticity is that, contra 
Shusterman’s reading of him, Rorty seems to believe that one can live an authentic life 
that is, in many respects, still somewhat “traditional.”   
 In his chapter “The Contingency of Selfhood,” Rorty lauds Nietzsche for his role 
in getting us to think about selfhood as a process of creation rather than one of discovery.  
Although, as already touched upon, Rorty ends up turning a critical eye towards 
Nietzsche’s “inverted Platonism” and “his suggestion that a life of self-creation can be as 
complete and as autonomous as Plato thought that a life of contemplation might be” 
(Rorty 1989, 43).  Obviously, electing to focus on language in the process of self-
creation, Rorty takes up Wittgenstein’s claim that there are no private languages as a way 
of pointing out that narrative self-creation is always going to take place against a 
backdrop of pre-established meanings and values (i.e., “literality”).   
 In other words, as previously noted, even Rorty, champion of the precarious, 
discredits the idea that creating a radically novel self is desirable or even possible.  The 
view of creation that we get in Dewey’s aesthetics clearly lines up with Rorty’s account.  
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Recall that for Dewey, creation is always a matter of transforming material, whether it be 
the poet’s manipulation of the stock of shared meanings contained within our language, 
or Michelangelo’s careful bringing forth of David from a block of marble.  Dewey’s 
theory of expression is quite clear about this, as, contra expressionist theories of art 
which deny the need for physical manifestation (e.g., that of R. G. Collingwood 
mentioned in Chapter II), he holds that expression is the act of transforming material 
given by the “world” in order to inject “new” material in an expressive way back to the 
public in the form of a “new” art object.  Again, as noted above, Rorty seems to believe 
that authenticity is achieved by simply recognizing that there is nothing necessary about 
one’s sense of self, that the tool of self-redescription is always available for use in our 
attempts to cope with the contingencies and factical givens of our situation.  We will then 
come to understand that self-creative praxis is a tool readily at our disposal and we will 
feel the “unconscious need everyone has: the need to come to terms with the blind 
impress which chance has given him, to make a self for himself by redescribing that 
impress in terms which are, if only marginally, his own” (Rorty 1989, 42-3).  
 Care of the self, traditionally conceived within the framework which takes the self 
to be ready-made, involved reason as the tool of self-discovery.  On the pragmatist model 
I have attempted to explicate, self-correction is a matter of imaginatively reshaping and 
transforming who one is.  Thus authenticity is about taking ownership of one’s self-
description.  While I am presenting this as the pragmatic conception of authenticity, it 
could also be considered a redescription of Kantian autonomy.  If care of the self, self-
correction, is about affirming the creative license one has to craft a self that is aptly suited 
to navigate the complexities of our dynamic experience and be a tool in action-guidance, 
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then one should be giving the law to herself.  How one should live and what one ought to 
do are not, however, laws handed down from some transcendental, intelligible self, but 
are bound up in the story one uses to describe who they are, where they have been, and 
where they are going.  Such autonomy not only adds a depth of meaning to experience by 
presupposing an enlarged horizon of possibilities for selfhood, but also leads to a healthy 
sense of empowerment.  One can view who they are not as the mere product of genetics 
or socialization, but as a work of art they had a hand in forming.  
 This pursuit of autonomy also has significant implications with respect to moral 
reflection as well.  Rorty sees one’s self-narrative as one of the most important tools one 
has at their disposal when deciding what to do.  The vocabularies we use to construct our 
self-descriptions help us, Rorty believes, by being the “terms one uses when one tries to 
solve moral dilemmas by asking ‘What sort of person would I be if I did this?’” (Rorty 
1999, 155).  Rorty acknowledges that this is not the only question one asks when 
deciding what to do, but thinks that this question and the answer to it give substance to 
other considerations one might have when engaged in ethical deliberation.  Thus Rorty 
argues that the richer the vocabulary one has to employ in such problem-solving the 
better.  One of the chief virtues Rorty thinks aids us in attaining a richer vocabulary to 
use for our projects of self-creation is a “desire to embrace more and more possibilities” 
(Rorty 1999, 154).  
 In praising Freud, Rorty notes that the conceptual resources he provided “helped 
us think of moral reflection … as a matter of self-creation rather than self-knowledge” 
(Rorty 1999, 155).  Again, there is a tie, then, between so-called “moral reflection,” 
inquiry into what to do with ourselves, and our narrative selves.  To reinforce a point I 
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have been trying to make throughout this chapter, Rorty contends that the narratives we 
spin about who we are and where we are at are “the best tools to use in tinkering with 
ourselves” (Rorty 1999, 163).  What the virtue of openness contributes to this, as it does 
with all of the tools of moral inquiry, is a heightened sense of when such tools need to be 
adapted to fit the contexts of new experience. 
       
The avoidance of “ressentiment” 
 Yet, this might not have been enough to answer why treating one’s self as a work 
of art rather than the realization of some metaphysical essence is actually beneficial, on 
an individual and societal level.  In concluding this chapter and transitioning to the next, I 
would like to briefly introduce Nietzsche’s conception of ressentiment and how care of 
the self as aesthetic self-creation should not be thought of as Martha Nussbaum sees it, as 
a “repellently narcissistic ideal” (Nussbaum 1999, 33).  While I will discuss most of those 
benefits in the next chapter, exploring the issue of ressentiment seems apt to address here, 
as it and its relation to self-creation were hinted at in the passage from Nietzsche, “One 
Thing is Needful,” quoted above.  Prima facie, Nietzsche seems to be saying that the one 
thing that is needful is for a human being to give style to herself.  Though, later on in that 
passage, Nietzsche qualifies this by stating that what is actually needful is for an 
individual to attain satisfaction with herself and that creating herself, giving style to her 
character, is the foremost means of doing so.   
 Without delving too deeply into some of the thornier issues of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy (i.e., the eternal recurrence), it is safe to say that his regulative ideal is 
captured in his notion of amor fati.  As Kaufmann points out, one who has achieved the 
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love of fate characteristic of Nietzsche’s Dionysian ideal is free from any sense of 
ressentiment.  Ressentiment, the French for “resentment,” lies at the crux of many of 
Nietzsche’s polemics against such targets as Christianity and romanticism; for, Nietzsche 
believes some of the central tenets of the Christian worldview were created not from a 
feeling of strength and love of life, but from weakness and woe.  This resentment, or 
internalized hostility, arises from a sense of inferiority or weakness – in short, by self-
dissatisfaction.  Ressentiment precludes one from achieving the life-affirming love of 
fate, but moreover, it can prove to be a source of a vicious attitude towards others in that, 
according to Nietzsche, those suffering from ressentiment are constantly seeking out a 
scapegoat for their self-loathing.   
 Although Nietzsche is often thought of as propounding a version of ethical 
egoism, his intense concern with ressentiment evinces a more nuanced view.  Indeed, 
why should one attain satisfaction with oneself via self-creation?  Because, Nietzsche 
notes, “Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we 
others will be his victims” (Nietzsche 1974, 233).  To bring this lofty diagnosis down to 
earth somewhat, upon reflection, I am sure most of us are familiar with the unfortunate 
phenomenon whereby we make others suffer on account of our own personal suffering.  
Similarly, while an account of Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power is beyond the 
scope of this discussion, it is worth pointing out that he believes that it is those lacking 
power who are most likely to use crude and cruel ways to exhibit influence over others.   
 This sense of resentment, the inability to say “Yes” to life, stems, Nietzsche 
seems to think, from a feeling of helplessness in regards to who one is.  While it takes a 
certain amount of resolve, Nietzsche wants us to never lose sight of the fact that we 
 135 
 
always have a hand in shaping who we are.  While he extols us to love fate, this is not 
synonymous with a stoic resignation.  For, according to Nietzsche, we are not bestowed 
with an essence upon birth, nor is there a predestined telos for us to achieve.  If one is 
therefore not satisfied with herself, she should be reminded that she always has at her 
disposal a degree of artistic license with which to reconstruct her “self.”   
 Thus, at bottom, care of the self as aesthetic self-creation is about self-correction 
in the name of individual flourishing.  The pragmatist wager is that viewing the self as 
something that is in-process rather than ready-made is more conducive towards this end.  
It is more conducive because it appropriates the fragility of the self towards gaining a 
sense of ownership over one’s life and allows one to be adaptive and flexible in their 
attempts to cope with experience in an ethically-responsible fashion.  Moreover, 
pragmatists want people to attain this sense of self-satisfaction so as to avoid the 
pernicious effects of ressentiment.  While not everyone must be a Raphael in the creation 
of their life, the pragmatist ideal regarding selfhood involves at the very least realizing 
the creative freedom one has in determining who they are.   
 To return to Nehamas’ claim that “ethics is care of the self,” we can understand 
how the pragmatic redescription of self-correction as aesthetic self-creation can be 
considered a central moral concern with an appeal to the self-help cliché that you cannot 
love others until you love yourself.  As Dewey notes, though, “Many a person is 
unhappy, tortured within, because he has at command no art of expressive action.” (LW 
10:72).  Again, for Dewey, to be expressive is to have a grasp on the world, to be able to 
transform matter, and thus experience.  That material includes the givenness of our lives 
– our past, along with the various other contingencies making up our existence.  Not only 
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does art provide us with a model for how we might unify these various elements into a 
cohesive, dynamically-organized self, but it also cultivates an open comportment in 
regards to that process.  This openness allows us to embrace the simple fact that we are 
selves in-process and that there always exists the possibility of self-transformation 
through reconstructing facets of the work that is our life. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ALLEVIATING A CERTAIN BLINDNESS: 
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND PLURALISM 
      If you don’t know the kind of person I am 
And I don’t know the kind of person you are 
A pattern that others made may prevail in the world 
And following the wrong god home 
We may miss our star. 
 - William Stafford, “A Ritual to Read to Each Other” 
 
 
An Ethics of Self-Creation and Liberal Morality 
 
 As I noted in the last chapter, those advancing an aestheticized ethics of self-
creation are often accused of propounding a narcissistic ethos devoid of any 
considerations of others.  Although I began to try to assuage this concern by gesturing at 
the wider societal implications of projects of self-fashioning, one might take the 
organization of my discussion as evidence that a pragmatist ethics is still bound up in the 
logic of the traditional egoism vs. altruism debate in morality.  For the purposes of 
highlighting the significance of art, and visual art in particular, for ethical development 
within a pragmatist framework, I have separated my discussion into the previous chapter, 
which was concerned with care of the self, and this current chapter which will explore 
how the cardinal pragmatist virtue of openness manifests itself in regards to a concern for 
others.  From this, one might assume that there is no relation between the considerations 
pertaining to self-creation and those related to treating others fairly, and that there is an 
entirely separate set of “altruistic” virtues needed to keep self-creators in check.    
 Yet, Gregory Pappas notes:  
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 From a philosophical perspective the preoccupation with the egoism vs. altruism 
 issue is a consequence of the same starting point in ethics that created the being 
 vs. doing debate.  If the self is a fixed subject, then any object of one’s interest is 
 always external to and a mere means for the self … The same Cartesian starting 
 point that in epistemology leads to the problem about epistemic states of other 
 knowers, leads in ethics to the problem of accounting for emotional, direct, and 
 genuine interest for other things – including other persons – that are outside the 
 self. (Pappas 2010, 213) 
 
In other words, the logic behind moral theory’s preoccupation with the egoism/altruism 
debate takes for granted the same ready-made self that pragmatism rejects.  Because the 
self is inextricably tied to its actions, interest is always going to be a factor in conduct.  
And, where else can this interest reside than in the self as agent?  But we should not 
confuse acting as a self with acting for a self.  While all actions are done by a self, not all 
actions are “egotistical” in the pejorative sense.  That is because, as we saw in the last 
chapter, a large part of narrative self-creation involves how you weave your relations to 
others into your own sense of self.  What I want to suggest is that there is going to be 
overlap between the ethical considerations involving ourselves and others.  Indeed, I hope 
to show how the virtue of openness which is cultivated through engagements with works 
of art can prove to be salutary for not only projects of self-fashioning (as discussed in 
Chapter III), but also for the pursuit of a thriving democracy and social melioration. 
  
Sketching a bridge between the public and the private 
 It is true that Rorty wholeheartedly endorses the strict separation between the 
public and private spheres of our lives.  He even states that “there is no way to bring self-
creation together with justice at the level of theory” (Rorty 1989, xiv).  In light of this, 
one might be skeptical of the aim just mentioned (i.e., articulating how openness serves 
both the quests for private autonomy and public solidarity).  Although some have claimed 
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that Rorty’s public/private split is an impenetrable barrier, I think it is more accurate to 
refer to it as a functional separation.  With respect to his emphasis on maintaining a 
separation between the public and the private, Rorty notes that his “point was not that 
there is a barrier, but that there is often irrelevance” between these spheres (Rorty 2010, 
21).  We may like to think that the fruits of our private pursuits of meaning and purpose 
have relevance for establishing a better society, and indeed sometimes “public” causes 
such as the promotion of justice and solidarity help individuals feel at home in the world.  
But how justice and solidarity are conceived can be incredibly varied, thus we cannot 
simply hope that eventually individuals’ conceptions of these concepts will just converge.  
For Rorty, a champion of liberal morality, the establishment of a better society is 
something that is achieved through discourse, dialogue, compromise, hard work, and 
luck.  The irrelevance that Rorty notes regarding the private sphere’s effect of the public 
is, in itself, often harmless.  What is more his point is to warn us of that overzealousness 
which leads individuals to employ their private purposes (and perhaps conceptions of 
justice and solidarity) as justification for prejudice and hatred, and which can also go so 
far as to try to legislate the private lives of others.   
 Rorty, however, in a rare moment of explanatory theorizing (albeit not theorizing 
that will have any sort of predictive function), also suggests that “poetic, artistic, 
philosophical, scientific, or political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a 
private obsession with a public need” (Rorty 1989, 37).  Innovation, by its nature, must 
break to some degree from the common sense of the public sphere and it is when such 
breaks prove more useful than the old way of thinking that we get progress.  And, in 
order to promote such occasions, we individuals need the space to experiment with 
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different possibilities of human thought and action; hence, public policy should do what it 
can to respect the freedom of the private sphere.   
 A totalitarian public, on the other hand, is one that swallows up the private and 
discourages breaking from the collective doxa.  In looking at just these two cases (i.e., 
individuals bringing their private pursuits of meaning into the realm of justification with 
respect to the treatment of others and the public space of governance interfering with 
those private projects) it should be clear why Rorty is so adamant about maintaining a 
buffer between the public and the private.   
 But, as we just saw, societal and cultural progress depends upon the possible 
interaction between these spheres.  Yet, for a new way of thinking about some facet of 
experience, one generated through one’s private attempt to make the world her home, to 
gain any traction beyond its author, there is a sense in which the public sphere must itself 
be open.  That is, the crust of convention that holds society together should be flexible 
enough to accommodate novel and progressive ways of thinking about human 
experience.  Thus the spirit of openness, which again is best thought of as a hospitality 
towards the new or a willingness to be affected by experience, that is crucial for the 
project of self-creation also lends itself towards a healthy democracy.  Such openness not 
only tolerates a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good, but is also willing to 
consider a variety of different ways individuals can live a meaningful life, and, on a more 
local scale, act in any given situation.  
 The virtue of openness, then, binds aesthetic self-fashioning (something of which 
Nietzsche is often seen as being the champion) and the democratic way of life so central 
to Dewey and Rorty.  Jarold Abrams identifies the spirit of experimentation as the key to 
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reconciling the seemingly disparate concerns of private autonomy and democracy.  
Abrams draws on the work of Stanley Cavell, who takes up the charge of defending self-
creation against charges such as the one mentioned in the last chapter levied by Martha 
Nussbaum – that is, that an ethics so concerned with self-care is insufferably narcissistic 
and negligent with respect to issues of social justice.  On the contrary, Abrams insists that 
self-fashioning, or moral perfectionism, is actually central to the development of robust 
democratic citizenry, and, as such, is an exercise in social responsibility. (Abrams 2002, 
188-9).
1
    
 Abrams argues that, “perfectionism generates multiple hypothetical models of 
characters, for studying and critiquing, especially as democratic perfectionism (here) is 
fractured – with many different models of how to live rather than just one” (Abrams 
2002, 188-9).  Richard Shusterman’s own defense of an ethics of self-creation resonates 
with this view.  “[P]erfectionism,” writes Shusterman, “serves the democratic search for 
better life and greater justice by offering three related resources: an inspiring example of 
untiring meliorism, specific hypotheses about how best to live, and critique of such 
hypotheses” (Shusterman 1997, 102).  A society which promotes projects of self-creation 
is going to be one in which there exists a plurality of ways to live a human life – 
essentially leading to a multitude of “laboratories” exploring how best to achieve 
individual well-being.  Moreover, the drive to continually try to better oneself through 
projects of self-fashioning easily translates into the melioristic spirit Shusterman believes 
is indispensible for a flourishing democracy.   
                                                 
1
 Moral perfectionism is simply another term used to describe the practice of care of the self discussed in 
detail in the last chapter.   
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 All of this is meant to reinforce the claim I made at the end of the last chapter that 
care of the self as aesthetic self-creation is important for promoting the pragmatist 
redescriptions of authenticity and autonomy, while at the same time discouraging blind 
conformity.  These moves are clearly aspects of a healthy and fruitful democracy, and as 
Abrams notes, “Shusterman and Cavell … seem to see self-creation as a conversation 
starter because it stimulates the pragmatic dynamic of inquiry with hypotheses and 
critiques thereof” (Abrams 2002, 189).  It is difficult to imagine Rorty disagreeing with 
the overarching idea here that experimentation in the private sphere can be conducive to 
experimentation in the public sphere.  Again, it seems most appropriate to take Rorty’s 
insistence on the public-private split as merely a functional distinction that helps prevent 
authoritarianism.
2
  
 
Dewey’s “wider self” 
 Before getting to the main point of this chapter concerning how aesthetic 
experience can help us navigate our society’s pluralism in a more ethically-responsible 
fashion, it will be useful to go back one more time to the pragmatist conception of 
selfhood to see how the process of self-fashioning, of creating an artwork out of one’s 
life, is always going to be inextricably tied up with others, and, that as such, we should 
strive to be mindful of this fact.  As discussed briefly above, Dewey, as per his usual, is 
keen on dissolving what he saw as a pernicious dualism within the history of ethical 
                                                 
2
 Koopman gives a nice account of this: “What is crucial to see here is that, for Rorty’s purposes, the failure 
to make distinctions between … the private and the public, is tantamount to an open invitation to 
authoritarianism in its subtlest and most insidious forms.  If we fail to distinguish the public from the 
private, for instance, then it is not clear how we can collapse these two together without opening the door 
both to those fanatics who are eager to railroad their morality down everyone else’s throat and to those 
other fanatics who are all too eager to give up on shared public conceptions as hopeless illusions” 
(Koopman forthcoming, 7).   
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philosophy.  Dewey’s criticisms of the egoism/altruism debate were discussed above in 
the context of his rejection of a fixed self, but they are also predicated on what he sees is 
a fundamental fallacy underlying it.  This fallacy “consists in transforming the (truistic) 
fact of acting as a self into the fiction of acting always for a self” (MW 14:96).  As 
organisms interacting with an environment, we are always going to be acting from the 
standpoint of that organism which we are.  This does not mean, however, that all of our 
actions are self-centered, or that we cannot have interests emanating from our “self” that 
concern others and our relations to them.  In fact, Dewey is trading on common sense 
here.  When we define who we are, when we tell the story of our lives, we obviously do 
so through our relations to objects in the world, to institutions, but probably most 
significantly, through other people.  We are “mothers,” “sons,” “teachers,” “friends,” etc., 
and while these descriptions and how we play these roles out certainly come from us as 
“selves,” they are not even conceivable facets of our identity or conduct sans others.  As 
Pappas observes, for Dewey, “The self lives through and by social relations” (Pappas 
2008, 216). 
 Moreover, recalling the anti-essentialism of Nietzsche, we are defined in and 
through what we affect and what affects us.  Thus, our self-image is going to be crafted 
out of nothing more than our relations in the world, most specifically, through our 
relations to others.  This has important ethical implications for how we might think about 
the process of aesthetic self-creation.  In his meditation on what he feels we can learn 
from the writings of Vladimir Nabokov, Rorty suggests that our private projects of self-
creation should not be taken as removed from the lives of others.   
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 Rorty believes that there are two types of books that can help us “reconcile private 
irony with (liberal) hope” (Rorty 1989, 141).  Books such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Les 
Misérables are, Rorty contends, beneficial in helping us see the pernicious effects societal 
structures can have on individuals.  There are also books, though, that help us “see the 
effects of our private idiosyncrasies on others” (Rorty 1989, 141).  According to Rorty, 
the work of Nabokov is incredibly poignant in regards to the latter.  Characters such as 
Humbert Humbert of Lolita, Rorty claims, “[D]ramatize … the particular form of cruelty 
about which Nabokov worried most – incuriosity” (Rorty 1989, 158).  While engulfed in 
his own attempts to cope with experience and find meaning in aesthetic and sexual bliss 
(as evinced by his treatment of Lolita as a mere character in his story, not as someone 
with her own story), Humbert completely neglects to notice the effects of his private 
pursuit on others, in particular young and vulnerable Lolita.  As Rorty notes, “Lolita does 
have a ‘moral in tow’.  But the moral is not to keep one’s hands off little girls but to 
notice what one is doing, and in particular to notice what people are saying.  For it might 
turn out … that people are trying to tell you they are suffering.”  And, if one is mindlessly 
obsessed with the private aesthetic or sexual subplots within his project of self-
fashioning, “people are likely to suffer still more” (Rorty 1989, 164).3  
 People will also suffer, though, when their attempts at creating a self are stifled by 
government censorship, or are greatly hindered by unjust economic structures.  
Regardless of how much one desires to fashion an artwork out of their life, if their sexual 
                                                 
3
 It is crucial here to note that openness and curiosity go hand-in-hand.  Indeed thinking about their relation 
reflects the cardinality of openness.  That is, one may be curious, but not open, not willing to let what they 
discover through their curiosity genuinely affect them.  But, when one is open, they possess, to some 
degree, curiosity about the new.  Again, though, the degree to which one is curious – how active they are in 
seeking out the new – is going to vary from person to person.  In advocating for openness, the hope is that 
those who do not actively seek out the new will still, at the least, be hospitable towards it when it strikes 
them.   
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orientation is deemed illegal, or if their entire allotment of psychic energy is spent 
worrying about where their family’s next meal is going to come from, such a project will 
seem impossible.  This appears to be one of Rorty’s main reasons for his extreme distaste 
of any form of authoritarianism.  Under an authoritarian societal structure, one’s horizons 
of possibilities for private self-creation are narrowed and dictated by a public sphere 
which is guided by fundamentalist ways of thinking.  
 So, we can bring together Dewey’s dissolution of the egoism/altruism dichotomy 
with Rorty’s thoughts on how the private and the public spheres of our lives are 
intimately entwined (in both positive and negative ways) to illustrate how our projects of 
self-fashioning do not exist in a vacuum.  I have, in various ways, attempted to show how 
the material we imbue with form in creating a self is taken from the public, but we have 
also seen how elements of those creations transcend the individual organism.  While it is 
easy to get lost in solipsism while self-fashioning, we must be mindful of Nietzsche, 
Dewey, and Rorty’s emphasis on relationality and recognize that our stories are 
inextricably bound up with others’ stories.  In doing so, not only might we be careful to 
avoid causing unnecessary suffering or humiliation, but we might also recognize that 
others are on the same journey of trying to make a self out of the various contingencies 
making up their existence. 
 
 
Perspectivism, Pluralism, and the Problem of Myopia 
 
 In the opening sentence of “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” (1891) 
William James succinctly lays out the guiding idea behind a pragmatist approach to 
ethics:  “[T]here is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up 
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in advance” (James 1977, 610).  While James clearly has a few motivations in mind with 
respect to this short, yet effective, articulation of his moral theory, one of the foremost 
seems to be to explain why there cannot be an a priori ethics.  This is an explanation 
most lucidly articulated by James in the form of a thought experiment.   
 In attempting to answer what he calls the “metaphysical question” of ethics, or the 
inquiry into the meaning of the words “good” and “obligation,” James points out that in a 
world devoid of sentient beings, talk of ethics or moral relations is absurd.  This is 
because, according to James, the good exists only within consciousness.  So, once there 
exists at least one thinker, moral considerations come into play.  In this moral solitude, 
however, a thinker’s valuations and ideals could only possibly be at odds with one 
another.  In other words, there is no sense of external obligation.  But, James continues, 
“If now we introduce a second thinker with his likes and dislikes into the universe, the 
ethical situation becomes much more complex, and several possibilities are immediately 
seen to obtain” (James 1977, 615).  For brevity’s sake, let us even suppose a plurality of 
thinkers, but assume that they are indifferent to one another’s hierarchies of values, 
ideals, and demands.  James, though, contends that this is “the kind of world with which 
the philosopher, so long as he holds to the hope of a philosophy, will not put up with” 
(James 1977, 615).
4
  Nor, because of the simple fact that we live in a shared world and 
the pursuits of our ideals are, more often than not, at least indirectly in contact with 
others’ such pursuits, is this a universe that is even possible.  And, to complicate matters 
                                                 
4
 James seems to think that one of the essential functions of the philosopher is to critique ideals through the 
determination of which ones possess “more truth or authority” (James 1977, 615).  “Truth” and “authority,” 
it must be remembered, are not, on this pragmatist view, measured by their correspondence with a non-
human Reality.   
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even further, we live in a society which evermore so is pluralistic in regards to the ideals 
that guide individuals’ conduct.   
 In short, once we come to realize that the pursuit of our own ideals may very well, 
and usually does, come into conflict with others’ pursuits, we necessarily take interest in 
their demands.  Maybe we attempt to keep our ideals away from them, maybe we can 
find a way to get along with them, or maybe we actively seek to change, or failing that, 
destroy the other’s ideals.  If we all had the same set of values and, thus, more uniform 
perspectives of the world, this would not be a problem.  But this is simply not the world 
in which we live.  As James eloquently puts it, “The wars of the flesh and the spirit in 
each man, the concupiscences of different individuals pursuing the same unshareable 
material or social prizes, the ideals which contrast so according to races, circumstances, 
temperaments, philosophical beliefs, etc., – all form a maze of apparently inextricable 
confusion with no obvious Ariadne’s thread to lead one out” (James 1977, 619).  It seems 
safe to say that with the world ever shrinking and the continuing dissolution of meta-
narratives which would trump the various discrepancies between cultures, groups, and 
individuals, we do find ourselves in such a labyrinth.   
 So, what exactly are we to do if we want to progress towards the social 
melioration James hints at when he defines the “good” as demand-satisfaction and avers 
that the “ideal universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole” (James 1977, 
628)?  Now, admittedly, his pragmatist disciples, Dewey and Rorty (not to mention his 
European contemporary, Nietzsche), would probably distance themselves from what 
seems to be the underlying thrust of “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.”  That 
is, while James puts forth a humanistic ethics that seems more than feasible, especially 
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considering the difficulties posed to inclusivity by supernatural religions, he makes the 
rather extreme claim at the end of his essay that the “moral universe for which the ethical 
philosopher asks is fully possible only in a world where there is a divine thinker with all-
enveloping demands” (James 1977, 628).  In the end, James simply does not think that a 
purely humanistic approach to morality will provide enough motivation for us to strive 
for a better society.  To James, a humanistic ethics is merely a matter of prudence and the 
alleviation of present ills, whereas a divinely-sanctioned morality will keep awake in us 
the strenuous mood that will give us the courage and endurance to continually fight life’s 
evils.    
 Needless to say, within the framework I have explicated, this solution will not 
hold sway, as it is predicated on the idea that the plurality of demands in our incredibly 
diverse and globalized world can be reconciled if we all just find the one true source of 
Good.  I want to suggest that James’s view does not necessarily require a transcendent 
ground of value.  As mentioned, I do think that James hints at a more naturalistic answer 
to how we might be able to achieve a more inclusive society that maximizes the range of 
reasonable ideals and demands that are met.
5
  As will be discussed in more detail later, if 
we are trying to satisfy as many demands as possible, it is first requisite to have a sense 
for what those demands might be.  From what set of beliefs and values do they emerge?  
Although presented in a thought experiment, the moral solitude James describes is all-
too-often a reality for some, whereby their demands are the only ones in existence.  
Whether out of a lack of social interaction or concern, this solipsistic orientation is not 
                                                 
5
 I qualify here that these demands and ideals must be reasonable only to highlight the obvious point that 
ludicrous demands which are completely idiosyncratic and based on justifications that no reasonable person 
could accept are clearly not worthy of consideration.  The ideals and demands I am speaking of are those 
that, while we might disagree with them, we can at least acknowledge their reasonableness as a society.  
What counts as reasonable is obviously fluid, but that should not discredit the point being made here. 
 149 
 
going to contribute to the pursuit of “the most inclusive whole.”  However, educating 
ourselves to the value pluralism extant in society by accepting the limits of our own 
perspectives, as well as coming into contact with others and experiencing their 
perspectives, can help foster such inclusiveness.  Before I elaborate the details of how we 
might take strides towards forging this more inclusive society, it will be helpful to revisit 
the pragmatist worldview that gives rise to this respect for pluralistic perspectivism in the 
first place, and, more importantly, bring into relief the problems that this perspectivism 
can cause with respect to social cooperation. 
 
Pluralistic perspectivism  
 
 James notes in “A Pluralistic Universe” that “a man’s vision is the great fact about 
him” (James 2004).  One’s unique perspective on experience holds such weight because, 
as noted in Chapter I, the pragmatist worldview out of which the ethical approach I am 
articulating arises is one that rejects the idea that one can ever wholly escape that 
perspective.  While such transcendence, in traditional models of epistemic and ethical 
inquiry, might have been hoped for, pragmatists eschew this aim.  As Kant rightly 
pointed out, experience makes sense to us because we filter it through our categories of 
understanding and catalog of concepts.  But, where Kant thought that this process was 
part of some inherent human nature and relatively the same for all humanity, Hegel 
introduced the idea that this process and the concepts used within it fluctuate with 
history.  Going a bit further, thinkers such as Nietzsche and the American pragmatists 
made the, what now seems commonplace, observation that this interpretative work can 
differ even among individuals.  This is because the various contingent and idiosyncratic 
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factors that have shaped our descriptions of the world, of ourselves, and of others, are just 
that – incredibly and increasingly variegated. 
 Even in his earliest works, Nietzsche disparages the belief in something like an 
objective and disinterested view of the world.  As noted last chapter, in “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” (1873) he opines on the arbitrariness of language and our 
conceptualizations in chastening the belief that we can have knowledge of reality-in-
itself.  It is simply the inevitability of these media for making sense of the world that 
leads him to this conclusion.  As his thought develops, this veil of language becomes the 
broader veil of perspective in general that prevents us from obtaining absolute, objective 
knowledge.  But, even this language of “veiling” is somewhat misleading, as it might 
give one the impression that if they are just rigorous or pious enough then they might be 
rid of the veil and gain access to The Way Things Really Are.  Predictably, Nietzsche 
scoffs at such a belief: “[A]s if a world would still remain over after one deducted the 
perspective!” (Nietzsche, 1968, 305).  Fittingly, Nehamas analogizes Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism with painting: 
 There is no sense in which painters, even if we limit our examples to realistic 
 depictions of one’s visual field, can ever paint “everything” that they see.  What 
 they “leave out” is in itself quite indeterminate, and can be specified, if at all, only 
 through other paintings, each one of which will be similarly “partial.”  
 Analogously, Nietzsche believes, there can be no total or final theory or 
 understanding of the world.  On his artistic model, the understanding of 
 everything would be like a painting that incorporates all styles or that is painted in 
 no style at all – a true chimera, both impossible and monstrous. (Nehamas 1985, 
 50-1) 
 
Again, the reason for this is because we simply cannot avoid our conditional relations to 
any object of “knowledge.”  We are complicated physically and socially-constructed 
organisms in an ongoing interaction with our environment.  In the context of the above 
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quotation, we have a unique “style” that has been wrought by our biology, by our family, 
by our culture, by our time, and by numerous other contingencies.  While this perspective 
is malleable to some degree, it inevitably delimits our experience.   
 The perspectivism espoused by Nietzsche, while having profound implications for 
morality and his various polemics against traditional moral systems, seems at bottom to 
be an epistemic matter.  And, although the American pragmatists, in their most 
traditionally “philosophical” moments, justify their own versions of perspectivism with 
appeals to epistemological concerns, the very fact that they were writing in a still 
relatively nascent America should not be ignored.  America was established upon a 
concern for religious freedom and a more general freedom from the often oppressive 
pursuit of uniformity practiced by the British Empire, and, as such, the founding ideals of 
our nation included a respect for pluralism.
6
 
 There is a sense in which the respect for a plurality of reasonable conceptions of 
the good present in the Founders’ minds also evinced an awareness that the fate of the 
world was not fixed a priori.  In this way, they foreshadowed James’s favoring of 
pragmatism in the contest between it and rationalism: “The essential contrast is that for 
rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it 
is still in the making, and awaits part of its complexion from the future.  On the one side 
the universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its adventures” (James 
1981, 151).  The revolutionary spirit of the early Americans was seemingly spurred by a 
belief in what James would later dub meliorism.  While a melioristic orientation can be 
used to approach various concepts, it is helpful to illustrate it with respect to salvation, 
                                                 
6
 I will grant that American history provides us with many tragic reminders that such ideals are not always 
realized.  Yet, it must be said that we have been and remain one of the more tolerant cultures with respect 
to the varying ways people find meaning and purpose in their lives. 
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and James allows that you “may interpret the word ‘salvation’ in any way you like, and 
make it as diffuse and distributive, or as climacteric and integral a phenomenon as you 
please” (James 1981, 128).  So, one way to take “salvation,” then, can simply be in terms 
of overall societal progress with respect to individuals’ well-being and flourishing.  
Pessimism is thus the grim and deterministic doctrine that believes such “salvation” is 
impossible to secure and, as such, is not worth striving after.  Optimism, on the other 
hand, takes this social melioration as inevitable, being guided by the hand of God or 
Spirit.  “Midway between the two,” writes James, “there stands what may be called the 
doctrine of meliorism,” which “treats salvation as neither necessary nor impossible.  It 
treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more 
numerous the actual conditions of salvation actually become” (James 1981, 128).  A 
significant implication of this doctrine is that moral progress towards a better society is 
possible, but can only be realized through human effort.   
 The metaphysical and epistemological assumptions underlying this doctrine might 
not have been in the consciousness of these early Americans, but they are assumptions 
that Nietzsche and other European thinkers back to Kant articulated in eloquent and 
compelling ways.  The basic idea is that reality is in the making.  Our reality is a human 
reality, and interpretive praxis is always already at work.  Our experience is inextricably 
linked to our socio-linguistic tools, and we filter the phenomena of our environment 
through our conceptual lenses and value systems not only in order to plan and predict, but 
also to enrich with meaning, bestow value, and communicate our hopes, beliefs, and 
desires to our fellows – all of which can help us reconstruct the actual conditions of 
experience.     
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 The belief that the world does not come to us wholly intransigent and ready-made 
is bound up with pragmatism’s respect for pluralistic perspectivism in that there is no 
invariant “True World” with which our perspectives must align. Yet, while many might 
agree with the seemingly harmless belief about our changing reality, perspectivism is not 
often received with open arms.  To many, perspectivism is synonymous with relativism – 
that oft demonized attitude which purportedly grants validity to any and all ways of life.  
But, as Nehamas puts it, “The fact that other points of view are possible does not by itself 
make them equally legitimate … Perspectivism, as we are in the process of construing it, 
is not equivalent to relativism” (Nehamas 1985, 49).  In its most basic sense, holding a 
relativist stance, if it does not preclude one from making evaluative judgments regarding 
the beliefs, attitudes, and overall worldviews of others, at least makes such evaluations 
incredibly difficult.  Nietzsche, though, certainly has no qualms about judging what he 
considers to be “better” and “worse” perspectives (e.g., perspectives relying on a 
supernatural justification are, for Nietzsche, not legitimate).  In other words, one can 
acknowledge the partiality of all perspectives while not abandoning the pursuit of 
normative claims regarding “better” and “worse.”  While the criteria for evaluating 
certain perspectives are, at least within democratic societies, fluid and themselves 
continually up for re-evaluation, perspectivism does seem to give rise to at least one 
important prescription; that is, one must be aware that his way of making sense of the 
world and his attendant hierarchy of values is not the only story.  Yet, while 
perspectivism is not relativism redescribed, there are seemingly inherent features of 
human experience which, when situated within the context of a pluralistic society, present 
problems for the pursuit of social cooperation and amelioration.   
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The difficulties posed by pluralism  
 Part of the reasoning behind putting my discussion of care of the self before this 
present chapter on concern for the other is the simple fact that we experience life from a 
first-person, agent point of view.  Margolis notes this in describing the way pragmatism 
approaches selfhood.  Whether or not there is a metaphysical entity we can call a “self” 
which lies at the base of all thought and action, we certainly, from a phenomenological 
standpoint, experience life as a “self.”  Likewise, and with reference to Hilary Putnam, 
Rorty claims that Dewey’s pragmatism was “an insistence on the supremacy of the agent 
point of view” (Rorty 1999, 88).  Whether it is a cultural artifact or a natural proclivity 
built into human behavior, the reality is that we experience life in the first person.  
Although this point might seem trivial, James is keen to observe that this 
phenomenological reality leads us to treat our own experiences as somehow truer than 
others’.  “[W]herever there is conflict of opinion and difference of vision,” writes James, 
“we are bound to believe that the truer side is the side that feels the more, and not the side 
that feels the less” (James 1977, 630).  Because I, as an individual self, feel my own 
experience more than anyone else ever could, I am inevitably going to grant epistemic 
privilege to my perspective and experience – thus believing that my account of a situation 
somehow corresponds to the supposed “Reality” of it.  At its worst this phenomenon can 
lapse into a sort of fundamentalist way of thinking whereby we only grant validity to or, 
at least, strongly privilege our own perspective.  It is as if our way of life, our own 
description of the world and prescriptions for how things ought to be, is the Right way, 
the only way.    
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 This is indeed the very point of James’s poignant anecdote from his essay, “On a 
Certain Blindness in Human Beings.”  Although I introduced this story in Chapter I, it is 
worth revisiting, as it illuminates what is probably the most pernicious aspect of 
pluralistic perspectivism.  James describes a journey he took through the mountains of 
North Carolina where he passed by a number of forest coves in which the settlers there 
had forged a life for themselves by clearing the forest, building cabins, raising livestock, 
and growing corn.  James notes that the “impression in (his) mind was one of unmitigated 
squalor” and “was a mere ugly picture on the retina” (James 1977, 630-31).  Upon 
hearing from the mountaineer who was leading him on this journey that the cultivation of 
these coves is what provided their inhabitants with a sense of purpose, meaning, and 
fulfillment, James becomes aware that he “had been as blind to the peculiar ideality of 
their conditions as they certainly would also have been to the ideality of (his), had they 
had a peek at (his) strange indoor academic ways of life at Cambridge” (James 1977, 
631).   
 The point of this story is to illustrate that when judging another’s perspective or 
way of life, “The spectator’s judgment is sure to miss the root of the matter.”  This is 
because the “subject judged knows a part of the world of reality which the judging 
spectator fails to see, knows more while the spectator knows less” (James 1977, 630).  
This pronouncement goes back to the central pragmatist commitment that the traditional 
dichotomy between thought and feeling, reason and passion, is ill-conceived.  All 
thought, according to Nietzsche, James, and Dewey, is pervaded by feeling and affect.  
This affective dimension is clearly shaped in some degree by the same factors that have 
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forged one’s own perspective of the world.  These factors, however, vary widely between 
people on account of different familial, cultural, and idiosyncratic circumstances.   
 Thus, the issue is one of dogmatism.  What pragmatists hope to highlight through 
emphasizing the pluralism of perspectives extant in society is that one must remain 
cognizant that their own preferred way of describing themselves, others, and the world is 
but one possible way.  While I noted that the criteria we might use for weighing 
perspectives against one another are always going to be fluid and relative to a particular 
historical situation, there does seem to be one overarching guideline that serves as 
prescriptive within this pragmatist worldview.  That is, treating one’s perspective as 
though it is either the convergence of all possible perspectives, or is no perspective at all 
and is an accurate representation of the facts and values written into the fabric of the 
universe, is perhaps the cardinal sin within a pragmatist approach to ethics.   
 Such myopic obstinacy is the germ of the authoritarianism which so worried 
Rorty.  This is the attitude that stops inquiry, once and for all.  It is also the attitude that 
prompts one to speak rather than listen.
7
  As such, one is much more ready to hold that 
their way of seeing things is the only possible way of seeing things.  This manifests itself 
in the belief that there is only one way to be a “man,” a “woman,” a “father,” a 
“professor,” a “reader of Dewey,” etc.  This is a comportment that runs completely 
counter to the cardinal virtue of openness discussed in previous chapters.  To be 
hospitable to the new and willing to let experience change you, you must also be willing 
                                                 
7
 Dewey’s aesthetic ideal of doing and undergoing once again appears to be useful in thinking about 
navigating our world in an ethically-responsible fashion.  Dogmatists are all-too-ready to speak, or at least, 
not willing to listen to views contrary to their own.  We obviously need perspectives, comprised of our 
beliefs, desires, valuings, etc., but we also need to treat those perspectives with less self-certainty.  
Genuinely listening to another and reaching out to understand them is one powerful way of helping curb 
dogmatism. 
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to “listen” to others’ perspectives and to accept the possibility that there might be more 
than one way to live a life or act in any given situation.    
 All of this is to say that one of the more painful realities James lays bare in “The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” seems not only unavoidable, but more 
complicated than we might imagine.  As pointed out in the last chapter, individuals often 
have competing ideals within their very makeup.  As James notes, “Every end of desire 
that presents itself appears exclusive of some other end of desire.  Shall a man drink and 
smoke, or keep his nerves in condition?” (James 1977, 622).  Despite the rather simplistic 
binary posed here by James, his point remains.  That is, experience forces us into choices 
whereby certain habits of thought, action, and desire exclude the actualization of other 
habits of thought, action, and desire.  Moreover, in our dealings with others, it is often the 
case that our end of desire and/or the means to achieve it are somehow at odds with 
theirs.  James, though, also defines the essence of the good to be demand-satisfaction, or 
the satisfaction of one’s ideals with respect to any given situation. Hence we are faced 
with the “tragic situation” that “[s]ome part of the ideal must be butchered” (James 1977, 
622).   
 The benign example of deciding whether or not to donate money to charity 
highlights this clash of ideals.  The charity obviously has its interests in mind in soliciting 
donations – fighting poverty, feeding the hungry, helping disaster victims, etc.  Now, one 
may very well share these ideals, but suppose she is also deeply committed to providing 
for her family, including her two young children.  To make this example a bit more 
complex, assume that the family is feeling the effects of the weakened economy and 
disposable income is virtually non-existent.  The issue then becomes one of alleviating 
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the conflict.  In this case, one could simply bracket one of the sets of ideals by either 
exclusively deciding to donate money or not.  But, one could also attempt to forge a way 
forward that allows for both ideals to be pursued.  For instance, maybe in lieu of a 
donation, this individual decides to donate time towards the charity’s cause.   
 There are also more profound examples that capture the moral tragedy of 
competing ideals.  Suppose a fundamentalist Christian’s son announces to his family that 
he and his same-sex partner are getting married and asks for his father’s blessing.  The 
ideals this father holds with respect to his religion no doubt give his life meaning and 
purpose.  Yet, the love he should have for his son is also an extremely significant factor.  
What will this man do?   Will he disown his son, or, at the least, turn his back on the 
marriage?  Will he embrace his son and abandon his Christian faith full-stop?  Perhaps, 
though, he might take a more nuanced approach.  Maybe he will find the psychic energy 
needed to bracket his faith and the intuitional disdain he has for homosexuality in the 
name of maintaining a relationship with his son.  He might also, after serious and 
strenuous reflection, even be able to draw out the Christian ideals that did indeed give his 
life meaning and meld them with the love he has for his son.  I will explore how openness 
factors into this example later, but for now it is enough to simply notice just how difficult 
the conflict of ideals can become. 
 Ideals guide our decisions, on the micro and macro scale, both in regards to what 
we should do in any given moral dilemma and in regards to the larger question of how we 
ought to live.  Sometimes our own ideals come into conflict with one another, and 
sometimes the ideals of others come into conflict with our own.  In such conundrums, 
James advises us to target the more inclusive side, but is quick to point out that this side 
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is one that lacks any sort of finality.  Moreover, it is one that cannot be established a 
priori, but only through healthy experimentation. So while there might not be a calculus 
for determining which act will satisfy as many demands as possible, there are certain 
dispositional considerations that might help one achieve this balancing act.  Our own 
demands are pretty easy to consider and take stock of, but what about those of others?  It 
is here where we see why some pragmatists contend that tolerance is simply not enough 
to help us navigate our social environment in a more ethically-responsible fashion.  The 
thought here is that tolerance simply amounts to a passive “letting be,” whereas the more 
active disposition of inclusivity is one that strives for something more.  This is perhaps 
one reason why James’s suggestions for forging a more cooperative society are preferable 
to what sometimes seems like Rorty’s call for mere tolerance.  As Koopman notes, 
“Inclusiveness does not merely aim to let another be but furthermore aims to reach out 
into another to understand them” (Koopman forthcoming, 17).  Once we come to 
understand another’s way of seeing things, to whatever small degree, we will be in a 
better position to conduct ourselves in a manner that is more sensitive to their hopes, 
dreams, and ideals, and on a path towards that more inclusive side. 
 
Alleviating a Certain Blindness 
 One might rightly say that such a pluralism of individual ideals has existed 
throughout human history, so this is not a novel problem elicited by our contemporary 
situation.  Indeed, there has always been recognition of the differences in beliefs and 
desires held by people even within the same society.  Moreover, it is hard to imagine that 
one’s own experience and perspective has not always been privileged to some degree 
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over and against those of others.  Thus, the question of social cooperation has long been 
central to ethical philosophy.  That is, how might we encourage moral progress and social 
solidarity among individuals who often hold competing perspectives on the basic 
questions of what is and what matters? 
 It is in the approach to this pluralism, however, that the differences between much 
of the western philosophical tradition and pragmatism come to light.  “The traditional 
way of spelling out what we mean by ‘human solidarity’,” writes Rorty, “is to say that 
there is something within each of us – our essential humanity – which resonates to the 
presence of this same thing in other human beings” (Rorty 1989, 189).  In other words, 
the traditional approach to prescriptions against cruelty and for a sense of solidarity 
involved an appeal to a common human essence that would be binding and give rise to 
obligation; for example, an obligation to respect others.  Kant is certainly one of the most 
important figures in this tradition, as he attempted to entirely strip “empirical” 
considerations from moral reasoning.  Respect for Reason, which is, according to Kant, 
the essence of human being, is all that is needed to give rise to moral duty.  
 But notice that thinking about overcoming the pluralism of society in such a way 
attempts to dissolve, or at least gloss over, that very pluralism through replacing it with a 
common human essence.  That pluralism of ideals and desires is wrought by the 
idiosyncratic and contingent factors of each individual’s being – that is, aspects of what 
Kant would consider to be our “empirical self.”  So, on this view, the pursuit of moral 
progress in the form of increased solidarity and decreased cruelty is a matter of helping 
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people discover their essence as a human being and be able to recognize that same 
essence in their fellows.
8
   
 Within a pragmatist ethics, though, no such appeal to a universal humanity can be 
made.  Therefore, Dewey and Rorty actually appeal to just those “empirical” 
considerations (i.e., the desires, beliefs, values, and concrete demands of other people) in 
trying to encourage people to at least consider how their demands may affect the 
possibility of others’ demands being met.  This is why James claims that “the best act … 
makes for the best whole, in the sense of awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions” 
(James 1977, 623).  In making decisions about how to live or what we should do, it is not 
a common humanity that we should necessarily take stock of if we want to be ethically-
responsible, but rather it is the concrete demands of others that should factor into our 
moral inquiry.  
 This is why Rorty’s ideal moral self, the liberal ironist, is someone whose sense of 
human solidarity is “a matter of imaginative identification with the details of others’ 
lives” (Rorty 1989, 190).  For pragmatists, one’s “empirical self” is all we have, so, to go 
back to a common theme running throughout this articulation of a pragmatist ethics, 
human solidarity and social melioration (i.e., finding the more inclusive way to act, live, 
and think) is not about knowledge-acquisition, but is about finding creative ways to 
identify with others and experimenting with ways to achieve James’s “best act.”  The 
former involves interacting with others in a way that draws out and brings into relief the 
details of the perspectives of all involved, as with James’s epiphany on his journey 
                                                 
8
 Social contract theory does seem to offer an account of social cooperation that does not necessarily hinge 
upon there being a universal human essence.  Hobbes, however, speaks in terms of “laws of nature” and 
essential “human nature” in making his case, while Rousseau acknowledges that his version of the ideal 
societal set-up is one that is really only applicable to small city-states where the general will is virtually 
uniform.   
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through the mountains of North Carolina.  The latter way of achieving more inclusivity is 
about fostering an experimental mindset that can be of use in trying to solve conflicts 
between ideals; for, as James contends, “The course of history is nothing but the story of 
men’s struggles from generation to generation to find the more and more inclusive order.  
Invent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien 
demands, – that and that only is the path of peace!” (James 1977, 623).   
 It is worth noting, however, that these alien demands should not be considered 
that foreign.  They are alien in that they are demands not originating from one’s own self, 
but in even thinking about other’s demands we should be reminded of certain 
commonalities that bind humans to one another.  The pragmatist’s anti-essentialism does 
not prevent her from talking about such commonality.  As we saw in Chapter I, Dewey 
simply seeks to redescribe essences as gists, or socially-agreed upon patterns related to 
facets of experience, not as metaphysical things-in-themselves.  If we are going to 
actually respect the concrete demands of others and pursue the more inclusive path 
through life, we do have to find an entry point into our imaginative identification with 
them.   
 One generic way we can go about doing this is to remain aware that, at a certain 
point once basic survival needs are met, we are animals who strive to find/create meaning 
in our lives.  Nietzsche was keen to observe that even when those basic needs are met, we 
continue to will, desire, and strive – all in the name of giving meaning to our lives.  After 
realizing the sense of fulfillment achieved by the mountaineers in cultivating a plot of 
land, James is quick to analogize their strivings with his own that differ only in that they 
exist in his “strange indoor academic ways of life at Cambridge.”  The simple fact that 
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we humans derive meaning and fulfillment from things not directly tied to our most 
rudimentary biological and physical necessities is thus one tie that pragmatists will point 
out binds humanity and can be used to engender solidarity.   
 To sharpen this point of commonality more, Rorty is adamant that the ability to 
respect and empathize with others comes not from the recognition of some grand and 
shared essence of human being, but from being able to identify with them on a more 
parochial level, as “a fellow Jutlander, or a fellow member of the same union or 
profession, or a fellow bocce player, or a fellow parent of small children” (Rorty 1989, 
190-91).  People take up these identities in fashioning a self-narrative that will help guide 
them through existence, gain a foothold in their society, and find a sense of purpose and 
sometimes simply joy.   
 
Aesthetic experience, openness, and the pursuit of inclusivity 
  To return once again to the central claim of this dissertation, in eschewing the 
quest for moral certainty, pragmatists also reject the idea that moral development is a 
matter of learning absolute principles, inviolable rules, or coming to discover the essence 
of human being.  While these forms of ethical erudition are appealing in their easy 
transmission and for the simplifying filter they provide for what is oftentimes actually a 
rather complicated social environment, pragmatists worry about their purported ability to 
codify actions and ways of life, as well as their seeming inability to do justice to the 
richness of human experience.  As discussed in the previous three chapters, within a 
pragmatist approach to ethics, a host of potential sources of ethical enrichment are 
granted legitimacy.  For instance, we saw in the previous chapter how aesthetic 
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experience can provide not only a model of organic unity which one can draw from in 
organizing the various contingencies of her life into a cohesive whole, but also how, in 
cultivating the cardinal pragmatist virtue of openness, it spurs the pursuit of authenticity 
and fosters an experimentalism that embraces the ever-expanding possibilities for human 
thought and action.  We can now turn to, as I have laid it out, the second main concern of 
ethical philosophy – concern for the other – and explore how aesthetic experience as 
elicited by the visual arts can be of service in the pursuit of social cooperation and 
inclusivity.   
 By my lights, there are two interrelated ways in which this service occurs: (1) by 
reminding us of the wealth of possibilities for meaning and value available to us in 
experience (thus subtly gesturing at the idea that there is more to experience than our 
individual perspectives can capture), and (2) catalyzing conversation, through its inherent 
ambiguity, that brings to the surface the interpretative work in which we are always 
already engaged, as well as the plurality of ways such work can occur.   
 Regarding this first way aesthetic experience can be of service to us with respect 
to our interactions with others, much of what I will say was discussed in detail in Chapter 
II.  Recall that, for Dewey, one of hallmarks of aesthetic experience is that, when so 
immersed, the pervasive quality underlying any particular experience is felt in a profound 
way.  The undefined whole that binds together all of the elements of the dynamic work of 
art points to a “world beyond this world” (LW 10:200).  Yet this is not some 
transcendent, supernatural heaven, but is simply that which transcends our own little 
world of concepts and values that we use to navigate our day-to-day lives.  Dewey insists 
that this world is a “more inclusive one” in which the intimate relations between us and 
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our environment, in both its physical and social dimensions, powerfully reveal 
themselves.   
 What the work of art also brings into relief is the wealth of possibilities for 
making sense of experience contained within the present.  In normal experience, habits of 
thought and action often occlude these potentialities for meaning and value.  Through 
taking us out of our neat, tidy, and ready-made conceptual world, art thus puts us in touch 
with the transitory and uncertain nature of our existence.  In Chapter II, this characteristic 
of art was described in the context of Dewey’s discussion of “negative capability,” which 
allows one to embrace the inherent uncertainty in experience and utilize it to enrich 
meaning through imagination and art.  As I argued, this capability goes hand-in-hand 
with the virtue of openness, in that the latter necessarily presupposes a lack of self-
certainty in regards to one’s perspective.  This allows for a respect for a different type of 
pluralism than we have been discussing thus far – that is, the plurality of values, qualities, 
relations, and possibilities for being that reside in any given situation.  But, this pluralism 
is indeed very much tied to the pluralism of individuals’ perspectives present in society, 
in that it can have the humbling effect of reminding one that their way of describing and 
valuing the world is not the only way.   
 Such a reminder primes one for genuine engagements with others, where there is 
a willingness to learn from their beliefs and values.  And this notion actually ties into the 
second way aesthetic experience can be of service towards social melioration: 
engendering discourse that can make us starkly aware of the certain blindness of which 
James warned us.   
 166 
 
 In the epigraph to this chapter from William Stafford’s, “A Ritual to Read to Each 
Other,” one might very well be reminded of Nietzsche’s polemics against the herd 
mentality, or Dewey and Rorty’s disparagement of thoughtless conformity.  A pattern 
that others made is simply the status quo, and blindly following it might have less than 
desirable consequences.  To avoid this, Stafford seems to suggest that we get to know one 
another, dialogue and discourse, hear what gives another’s life weight, and find out more 
about one’s private attempts to cope with experience.  
 Imagine for a moment those experiences you have had when at a gallery, in front 
of a public sculpture, or walking by a mural, accompanied by another.  It is hard to deny 
the uncanny ability art has as a conversation starter.  But why is it that art sparks such 
intense and oftentimes thoughtful interactions between people?  One possible answer was 
hinted at in Chapter II in unpacking the aesthetic theory underlying this dissertation.  
That is, aesthetic experience brings to the fore the interpretative praxis in which we are 
always already engaged when making sense of the world.  In what might be crudely 
considered our normal, everyday experience, pervaded by routine and literality, we often 
forget the ways in which we are simplifying, arranging, filtering, emphasizing, in short, 
interpreting, reality.  There is a practicality to this, in that it undeniably helps us navigate 
our environment, both physical and social, in a more stable and efficient manner.  As I 
have emphasized, however, it is important to be reminded from time to time that there are 
a variety of possibilities available to us regarding the ways we make sense of ourselves, 
others, the world, and the relations between them all.   
 It is my contention that even the visual arts can be exemplary in serving as such 
reminders.  For one, as has been widely noted, art trades in the non-propositional.  Even 
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Kant himself recognized this feature of art in describing artistic genius.  One of the 
hallmarks of genius, according to Kant, is the ability to convey “aesthetic ideas,” or those 
facets of our experience which cannot be represented through concepts.
9
  Furthermore, as 
Heidegger argues, art is not merely about presence, but somehow “represents” the strife 
between what he calls the “world” and the “earth.”  This amounts to saying that art not 
only affords us a world of presence, be it through the colors, shapes, and lines of a 
painting, or the forms and texture of a sculpture, but also illuminates for us a sort of 
“absence” – the inchoate ground out of which all presence emerges.   
 Recall from Chapter II that for both Nietzsche and Dewey, the work of art 
possesses an inherent ambiguity and reminder of the inextricable uncertainty and 
unfathomable nature of experience.  Yet, it also enacts for us possibilities for meaning 
and value.  As for how this translates into our own lives, habitual and routine ways of 
thinking and acting often dull the richness of experience and, consequently, the various 
ways any situation can be described and evaluated.  One of the crowning features of art, 
then, is its ability to present us with something that “makes sense,” to some degree, while 
remaining ambiguous enough to keep alive the various possibilities for what exactly the 
work “means.”   
 This is not to say, though, that the work of art is inherently meaningless, and only 
gains meaning through the subjective projection of a perceiver.  For the artist’s, or in 
Rorty’s parlance, the “strong poet’s,” creations to gain traction, they cannot be complete 
                                                 
9
 “In a word,” writes Kant, “an aesthetic idea is a presentation of the imagination which is conjoined with a 
given concept and is connected, when we use imagination in its freedom, with such a multiplicity of partial 
presentations that no expression that stands for a determinate concept can be found for it.  Hence it is a 
presentation that makes us add to a concept the thoughts of much that is ineffable, but the feeling of which 
quickens our cognitive powers and connects language, which otherwise would be mere letters, with spirit” 
(Kant 1987, 185).  
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nonsense, but must “speak” in some way.   In discussing a work of art, whether it is 
something as bizarre as Tilda Swinton sleeping in a glass box at the Museum of Modern 
Art or as simple as a Japanese woodblock print, conversation is only going to be possible 
within the context of at least some shared network of meanings and values.  In looking at 
Van Gogh’s A Wheatfield with Cypresses (Figure 4), it is hard not to have thoughts of 
organic movement or wind rustling through leaves and long grass.  Moreover, the dance 
of the clouds is something I imagine we have all encountered, where we actually notice 
that they are not static features plastered upon the sky but are moving and changing. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Vincent van Gogh, A Wheatfield with Cypresses (1889). 
 
 This is clearly an affordance that is made possible by a shared experience that 
transcends even cultural variation.  Some works, on the other hand, reflect a common 
ground that might be more specific.  Without even knowing the title of Mondrian’s 
Broadway Boogie Woogie (Figure 5), it is difficult for those even slightly familiar with 
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urban life not to have images of city street maps conjured up when they lay eyes on the 
grid of yellow lines interspersed with various sizes of blue, red, and yellow rectangles.  
And, lest one think that this rectilinear description of the painting lends itself to a static 
interpretation, it is difficult to deny that the vibrant colors and non-uniform composition 
engender feelings of a bustling, pulsating, and alive downtown urban center such as 
Broadway, New York City – all of which happens to be so neatly captured in the 
musically-inspired title.  So, while we might not even be conscious of it, dialoguing about 
works of art, with their characteristic ambiguity, reveals in various degrees the shared 
background of meaning that makes communication possible. 
 
 
Figure 5. Piet Mondrian, Broadway Boogie-Woogie (1943). 
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 It is perhaps this aspect of aesthetic experience that Dewey has in mind when he 
describes how art helps establish continuity within our human environments: 
 All friendship is a solution of the problem (of discontinuity).  Friendship and 
 intimate affection are not the result of information about another person even 
 though knowledge may further their formation.  But it does so only as it becomes 
 an integral part of sympathy through the imagination.  It is when the desires and 
 aims, the interests and modes of response of  another become an expansion of our 
 own being that we understand him.  We learn to see with his eyes, hear with his 
 ears, and their results give true instruction, for they are built into our own 
 structure … Instruction in the arts of life is something other than conveying 
 information about them.  It is a matter of communication and participation in 
 values of life by means of the imagination, and works of art are the most intimate 
 and energetic means of aiding individuals to share in the arts of living. 
 (LW 10:340) 
 
Works of art can connect people at such a deep level because their raw material is taken 
from nothing more nor less than human experience – the structure of which, at a very 
basic level, is something we all share.  We are all organisms with certain biological 
similarities transacting with an environment that is both physical and social.  Aesthetic 
experience, for Dewey, is thus ecstatic in the sense that it engenders an imaginative 
identification with meanings, values, and beliefs that transcend what we consider to be 
our own. 
 Yet, as Dewey himself notes: 
 [I]t is also true that (the poem) exists in unnumberable qualities or kinds, no two 
 readers having the same experience, according to the “forms,” or manners of 
 response brought to it.  A new poem is created by everyone who reads poetically 
 – not that its raw material is original for, after all, we live in the same old world, 
 but that every individual brings with him, when he exercises his individuality, a 
 way of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old material creates 
 something new, something previously not existing in experience. (LW 10:114)  
 
In other words, although collective engagements with works of art can highlight the 
commonalities that bind us together, the disagreements that can, and almost certainly do, 
arise when thoughtfully discussing a work of art with another are perhaps even more 
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instructive in regards to the pursuit of social cooperation and inclusivity.  That different 
elements of a painting might give rise to different points of inception with respect to the 
temporal movement of an aesthetic experience, and thus entirely different aesthetic 
journeys, brings into relief the fact that unique and latent values and emphases shape the 
very way we make sense of the world.  In Van Gogh’s A Wheatfield with Cypresses, one 
may very well be drawn to the shorter tree in the foreground or the tall and slender tree 
that is in the background; both leading to different journeys through the work.  There can 
also be expressions of different comportments through discussions catalyzed by the work 
of art.  Looking at Ansel Adam’s Moonrise over Hernandez (Figure 6), for instance, one 
might take the black and white photograph capturing a barren desert town’s cemetery to 
be a reflection on human mortality.  One might, though, have a somewhat lighter 
response and be drawn to the scenic beauty of the photo, and the moon as an almost God-
like presence watching over the earth.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Ansel Adams, Moonrise over Hernandez (1941). 
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 The point here is that aesthetic experiences, when shared and discussed, awaken 
us to the blindness we so often have to the inward significance of others’ lives, and thus 
we are made aware of in a powerful and felt way the pluralism of values and perspectives 
existent in our society.  Indeed, James himself, in “On a Certain Blindness in Human 
Beings,” uses first-person poetry from Wordsworth and Walt Whitman to highlight the 
fact that we are often so caught up in our own personal pursuits and routine that we 
simply cannot recognize certain aspects of existence which might give meaning and joy 
to another.  To return to a point made earlier, if we take into account James’s 
commitment to the “more inclusive side” in regards to this plurality of ideals we should 
be careful not to misconstrue the attempt to overcome this blindness as simply being a 
matter of tolerance.  Again, as Koopman points out regarding James’s moral philosophy, 
it is fruitful to differentiate between mere tolerance and inclusiveness.  Tolerance, that is, 
can be satisfied by just being aware that others’ might hold different perspectives and 
then letting them be.  Striving for melioristic inclusivity, on the other hand, involves 
something more.  Koopman states: 
 The “more inclusive” path is not that of merely putting up with ideals which one 
 is blind to the value of, but is that of working to form new ideals as yet 
 nonexistent which can bridge across otherwise contradictory claims.  I take this to 
 be James’s key contribution to moral philosophy.  The potential tragedy of moral 
 pluralism is best avoided by way of an energetic moral inclusiveness that works to 
 innovate more capacious moral ideals than what we had previously dreamt of in 
 our philosophies and practices. (Koopman forthcoming,18) 
 
 It is appropriate here to finally expand upon what is meant by “ideals” in this 
discussion of James’s moral philosophy.  Unfortunately, I think the term is often 
conceived of in a restrictive sense.  Ideals do not have to be grandiose projections of 
perfection, but can also be rather banal.  A fruitful way of thinking about “ideals,” then, is 
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that they are simply that which guides our conduct.  They are ideas we have about what 
we ought to do in order to attain a certain better state of affairs in the world.  To refer 
back to the examples given earlier regarding the possible reconciliation of competing 
ideals, we can see what it might mean to “innovate more capacious moral ideals.”  The 
father who, after exhibiting the virtue of openness and becoming aware that the love his 
son shares with his partner is no different from the love he feels for his wife, and found 
(created?) a way to reconcile his Christian ideals with those of his son, has thus crafted a 
more capacious moral ideal that will help him navigate future experience in a more 
inclusive manner.  It should be clear that this is not necessarily an easy process, and the 
more dogmatic he is to begin with, the more difficult it is going to be.  Again, there is a 
certain vulnerability that goes along with being hospitable towards the new and willing to 
change with experience.  Adapting one’s religious beliefs can be a very painful process.  
In the end, if he cannot make such an extreme adaptation, perhaps he may still possess at 
least some degree of openness and at least slightly embody Dewey’s regulative ideal of 
growth.  That is, if he is only able to tamp down his intuitional disdain for his son’s gay 
relationship, and somehow hold together his traditional Christian views with the love he 
has for his son, he has at least showed a willingness to allow the movement of life to 
affect him.  This seems to me to be more than mere tolerance, though, assuming that he 
will not simply let his son and his husband just be, but will continue to struggle to make 
them a part of his own life story.  
 While this example trades on a father’s paternal interests, it could be extended to 
cover our interactions with non-family members or even strangers.  The point is that one 
is not committing the sin of incuriosity Rorty mentioned in discussing Lolita’s moral 
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import.  The motivation to be curious about the ideals of others might be stronger with 
regards to one’s closest kin, but this does not invalidate it as a significant factor in 
building a more inclusive society.  For, curiosity into the inner significance of others’ 
lives is, as Koopman states, done not “for egoistic reasons of psychic health so much as 
for heteronomous reasons involving being a better citizen, a kinder friend, a more 
generous lover, a more capacious human being in the midst of our socialities” (Koopman 
forthcoming, 17).  
 In other words, the pursuit of a kinder and gentler society demands more than 
mere tolerance.  This is not to diminish the importance of tolerance, for it is hard not to 
agree with Rorty’s sentiment that “communities which encourage tolerance of harmless 
deviance should be preferred to those communities whose social cohesion depends on 
conformity” (Rorty 1999, 86).  Granted, those opposed to gay marriage, for instance, 
often insist that the “deviance” of gay marriage is actually harmful to the institution of 
marriage.  While the tide seems to be shifting regarding the actual validity of this 
argument, there are certainly other controversial issues, such as abortion, which 
complicate Rorty’s claim here.  It thus might be more fruitful to simply glean from 
Rorty’s point that a society which encourages an experimental mindset is preferable to 
one that discourages it.   
 Indeed it is this liberal orientation which leads him to aver that the “best single 
mark of our progress toward a fully fledged human rights culture may be the extent to 
which we stop interfering with our children’s marriage plans because of the national 
origin, religion, race, or wealth of the intended partner, or because the marriage will be 
homosexual rather than heterosexual” (Rorty 1999, 86).  On this view, the father who 
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even begrudgingly attends his son’s same-sex wedding and supports him regardless of his 
sexual orientation is clearly preferable to the one who disowns his son because he is in 
love with a man.   
 Yet, the cardinal pragmatist virtue of openness that I contend is cultivated through 
engagements with works of visual art involves something more.  As defined as a 
hospitality towards the new, openness can easily be understood as a hospitality towards 
the different.  But it also means a willingness to be affected by experience, so we can say 
that openness, as it relates to our relations to others and how we deal with the pluralism 
of perspectives in our human environment, is about a willingness to listen to the beliefs, 
values, and ideals of others and allow those to expand our horizons of possibility for how 
one might live a human life.  As Pappas writes in discussing the aesthetic dimension of 
the democratic idea, “The role of openness in democratic communication should be 
obvious.  A community of people who are merely tolerant but not open-minded has built 
up internal barriers to the fullness of discussion.  They may be able to compromise and 
bargain, but will not learn from each other” (Pappas 2008, 235).  In short, this virtue of 
openness is about having a welcoming imagination with respect to the various ideals and 
values that shape a human life.  So, in the hierarchy of this syncretic ideal of liberal 
inclusiveness, the father who listens to and seeks to learn from the worldviews of his son 
and son-in-law is himself preferable to the merely tolerant father mentioned above.
10
 
 In closing, I think an important caveat is in order.  While I have attempted to be 
careful with the language I have used in discussing openness, I want to make it clear that 
openness does not equate to the radical acceptance of all ideals and ways of life.  The 
                                                 
10
 This is not to say that just because they are the worldviews of a same-sex couple they are inherently 
different than a heterosexual couple’s.  The point is that there is something more happening than just a 
simple “letting-be,” but a reaching out in the name of growth.   
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mother who is open does not have to, nor should, accept the views of her son who comes 
to her with plans for a suicide bombing.  In being open, she is merely willing to 
genuinely listen to the rationale of her son.  In so doing, she might very well be able to 
dissuade her son from going through his plans, or at least spark a moment of reflection 
that might shake him out of his entrenched ways of thinking about things.  Openness is 
merely a condition for the possibility of learning from others through a genuine attempt 
to understand the rationale behind their hopes, dreams, and beliefs.  Furthermore, it is 
important to keep in mind that the line which an individual will not cross with respect to 
possibly adapting their own perspective after dialoguing with another is going to vary.  
Openness is always going to be a matter of degree.  But, as the cardinal pragmatist virtue, 
openness is a trait on which the bearer’s life turns and, as such, even a hesitant hospitality 
towards the new will have a significant effect on inquiry into how one ought to live or 
what one should do in any given situation. 
 
An Artistic-aesthetic culture 
 It should be clear, then, how developing this sense of openness is critical to 
establishing a more understanding and inclusive society.  In concluding this chapter, I am 
going to take a brief excursion into the sort of utopian politics which Rorty himself is so 
keen on advancing.  In the spirit of this dissertation promoting the ethically-
transformative potential of, specifically, the visual arts, as opposed to the literary arts, I 
will be redescribing Rorty’s “literary culture” as an “artistic-aesthetic” culture.  Before 
articulating Dewey’s rich meaning of the “artistic-aesthetic” mode of experience, it will 
first be worthwhile to give a short sketch of Rorty’s literary culture.   
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 I agree with Rorty that within a pragmatist framework, a utopian approach to 
socio-political philosophy is the most appropriate tack.  It is not that pragmatists are 
completely against theory, but similar to James’s belief about the impossibility of an a 
priori ethics, pragmatists, especially Rorty, are skeptical of attempts to articulate detailed 
conditions for the possibility of a more just society.  Yes, we can offer hypotheses for 
how to attain such a utopia, but formulating an end-in-view that will stimulate 
imaginative descriptions of what such a society would look like is thought by Rorty to be 
a more effective strategy than spelling out a comprehensive theory for how we can attain 
it.  Pragmatists can thus “praise movements of liberation not for the accuracy of their 
diagnoses but for the imagination and courage of their proposals” (Rorty 1998, 214).  In 
terms of moral and social progress, then, pragmatists “abandon the contrast between 
superficial appearance and deep reality in favor of the contrast between a painful present 
and a possibly less painful, dimly seen future” (Rorty 1998, 214).   
Rorty’s own utopian exercise comes in the form of his portrayal of what he calls a 
“literary culture.”  One way of understanding what this means is captured in his claim, 
one that touches directly on the Nietzschean account of “objectivity” as the ability to 
entertain a number of possibly divergent perspectives, that what “novelists substitute for 
the appearance-reality distinction is a display of diversity of viewpoints, a plurality of 
descriptions of the same events … [w]hat (the novelist) finds most heroic is not the 
ability sternly to reject all descriptions save one, but rather the ability to move back and 
forth between them” (Rorty 1991, 74).  This utopian vision is gleaned from Milan 
Kundera’s claim that “it is precisely in losing the certainty of truth and the unanimous 
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agreement of others that man becomes an individual … (The novel11) is the territory 
where no one possesses the truth … but where everyone has the right to be understood” 
(Kundera 1986, 159).  Thus Rorty’s democratic utopia “would be a community in which 
tolerance and curiosity, rather than truth-seeking, are the chief intellectual virtues” (Rorty 
1991, 75). 
 Moreover, members of this culture do not seek what Rorty calls “redemptive 
truth” in some certainty-guaranteeing relation to Absolute Reality (in the form of God or 
The Way Things Really Are), but in “non-cognitive relations to other human beings, 
relations mediated by human artifacts such as books and buildings, paintings and songs.”  
“These artifacts,” Rorty avers,” provide a sense of the alternative ways of being human” 
(Rorty 2010, 478).  This is because, in this culture, “redemption is to be achieved by 
getting in touch with the present limits of the imagination (Rorty 2010, 479).  As I have 
been arguing, engagements with works of art not only expand our horizons of possibility, 
but can also reveal in a poignant way the very fact that people describe and value the 
world in different ways; and both of these phenomena can provide us with such limit-
experiences.  Indeed, as Rorty points out with his varying examples of human artifacts 
that serve as catalysts for imaginative growth, I would propose a more fitting name for 
his utopia is an artistic-aesthetic culture. 
 This hyphenated term comes out of Dewey’s theory of art, but also gestures at his 
ideal mode of experience.  In our common sense usage, when we talk about being 
artistic, we are usually referring to the doing or making of art.  On the other hand, when 
we talk about having an aesthetic experience, we mean undergoing or perceiving a work 
of art.  But, as discussed in Chapter II, for Dewey, the creation of a work of art, as well as 
                                                 
11
 Or, Rorty’s utopia. 
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the perception of it, involves a delicate balance between doing and undergoing.  The 
artist takes the role of the perceiver in creating her work, and the perceiver actively 
engages the work in a process similar to what the artist went through in organizing the 
elements of it.   
 If we translate this reciprocity to how members of this utopia might navigate their 
social environment, then we might say that individuals in this culture are artistic in that 
they are using their imaginations to weave together the various contingencies making up 
their existence, and thus creating new ways of being.  They are also artistic in that, to 
refer back to James’s conception of accommodating sometimes competing ideals, they 
creatively craft modes of interacting that are more inclusive.  Yet, they are aesthetic in 
that their interactions with others are not governed by shallow and stereotyped responses.  
This goes back to Dewey’s distinction between reception and perception.  As opposed to 
simply letting others be and foisting one’s preconceptions upon them, members of this 
culture will seek to actually listen to and understand others.  This is essentially the 
pragmatist redescription of intersubjectivity, whereby we acknowledge the creative 
agency of others who are engaged in their own struggle to fashion a self.  
 To extend this analogy, as discussed earlier in this chapter, in artistically creating 
our self through our private projects of self-fashioning, we must keep our “audience” in 
mind.  This is Rorty’s point in his discussion of Lolita.  But, maintaining an awareness of 
one’s “audience” will also help curb self-deception.  Because of the emphasis on 
autonomy in the process of aesthetic self-creation, it seems that the coherence of the self 
could be achieved through nothing more than wishing oneself to be a work of art.  But, as 
Nehamas points out, such wishing would only give the feeling of unity, not unity itself.  
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We must remember, then, that “the notions of style and character are essentially public” 
and that because we lack “any special access to knowledge of ourselves, such questions 
(involving one’s self-cohesion) are finally decided from the outside” (Nehamas 1985, 
186).  In other words, the work of art that is my “self” is at the mercy of its audience, just 
as others’ self-creations are at the mercy of theirs.  
 So, to reiterate, as perceivers in this Deweyan sense, we need to be aware that 
others are creating their own works of art through the process of self-creation.  While 
different people might be doing this in varying degrees, the point is that we must remain 
cognizant of the fact that others are selecting, simplifying, emphasizing, valuing, and 
organizing experience in their own unique ways, similar to how we are selecting, 
simplifying, emphasizing, valuing, and organizing experience in our own unique way.  In 
so doing, we just might have found a prescription for how to at least somewhat mitigate 
the certain blindness James warned us of.   
 This prescription involves practicing and cultivating the virtue of openness; for 
the blindness James observes often manifests itself in myopic and closed-minded ways of 
going through life.  This myopia, in turn, shows itself in negative, unfair, and rigidly 
preconceived judgments of others.  It also shows itself in the pernicious form of 
incuriosity – that incuriosity which Rorty, with reference to Nabokov, highlights as an 
all-too-common cause of suffering.  It is negligence with respect to the values, beliefs, 
and purposes of other people.  As I argued, aesthetic experience healthfully reminds us of 
the limits of our own perspective and thus the wealth of possibilities available for 
meaning and value.  At the very least, such a reminder primes us to genuinely engage 
with and listen to others.  At best, it can serve to spark curiosity into the various ways 
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individuals make sense and meaning in their lives.  While these are not necessary and 
sufficient conditions for building a more inclusive society, they certainly seem at least 
necessary to such a melioristic pursuit.
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CHAPTER V 
 
ART IN EDUCATION – AND EDUCATION IN ART: 
 
THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN  
 
ARTISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD 
 
I won’t stop painting ‘til the world looks the way it should 
I’m on a mission to make heaven look like my neighborhood 
- Qwel, “Manhattan Project” 
 
“Artistic” Utopias 
 
 Throughout this discussion of a pragmatist ethics and the role that aesthetic 
experience can play with regards to our moral development, I have suggested that in 
focusing on “last things, fruits, consequences,” the political philosophy coming out of 
pragmatism can be considered utopian in kind.
1
  Although it is difficult to accept Rorty’s 
conclusion that socio-political progress is something that happens more by chance than 
by anything else, especially an a priori moral theory, pragmatists are typically reluctant 
to give detailed prescriptive theories about exactly how to make the world a better place.  
In lieu of such theorizing, pragmatists are more concerned with fostering a spirit of 
experimentation that will give rise to a variety of hypotheses about how to get along with 
each other and thrive as a collective.  As I have claimed, a key aspect of this project 
involves articulating the traits of character most appropriate to this experimentalism.  In 
this way, pragmatists align themselves, in some degree, with the tradition of virtue ethics 
which stretches all the way back to Plato and beyond.  Indeed, for Plato, these virtues 
                                                 
1
 In the following discussion, we can take politics in the very general sense of relating to our lives as 
members of a public.  By “utopian politics,” I mean a certain approach to political theorizing that focuses 
more on hoped-for results (i.e., what an ideal polity would look like) than on arguing from assumed first 
principles.   
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were thought not only to lead individuals to eudaimonia, but would also give rise to an 
ideal society, one captured so famously in the Republic.   
 Plato, however, attempted to give detailed justifications for his utopia.  As hinted 
at in Chapter I, he wanted to provide theoretical proof that his way was the only logical 
way to structure an ideal society.  Pragmatists eschew such attempts to ground political 
stances in a priori foundations.  For, as Rorty claims, “[S]uch (political) stances can be 
justified only by pointing to results of actual or imagined social experiments” (Rorty 
2004, 274).  Thus they are more concerned with offering up suggestions for how we 
might become a better society, and evaluating those hypotheses with regards to the actual 
consequences they afford.  This is why utopian politics is the form most suited to their 
aims.  Social and ethical progress, for the pragmatist, runs on imaginative fuel.  
Hypotheses about how a certain prescription might help an individual flourish and/or 
society grow push the limits of imagination and occasionally bring into relief new 
possibilities that had been latent in experience.  Such forward-looking does not, though, 
preclude pragmatists from drawing on former successes and gleaning from those possible 
resources with respect to ethical inquiry.
2
  As Dewey argues, we cannot reduce such 
inquiry to any one consideration, be it past principles, intended or real consequences, or 
even specific virtues, and, so to exclude a potentially relevant consideration is a form of 
dogmatism.    
 Rorty often describes the pragmatist attitude as one devoted to the question “what 
difference will this belief make to our conduct?” (Rorty 1991, 2).  In terms of socio-
political policy initiatives, then, pragmatist proposals often come in a hypothetical form.  
                                                 
2
 Rorty’s argument for privileging liberal democracy as the best societal set-up currently around is based on 
nothing more than the simple fact that it seems to work in establishing more peaceful societies. 
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In other words, they ask us to imagine what experience might be like if we held a certain 
set of beliefs.  Indeed, my project in this dissertation has attempted to embody this spirit.  
For, it asks us to imagine what might change if the ethically-transformative potential of 
art, specifically the visual arts, was taken seriously.  For one, asking this very question 
already presupposes an understanding of ethical development that breaks in many ways 
from traditional conceptions.  Furthermore, we can also explore how art education might 
be transformed in light of this view of aesthetic experience and we will see an example of 
such transformation shortly in looking at how arts appreciation is being integrated into 
the training of future doctors.  Yet, before that discussion, I would like to say a bit more 
regarding the utopian endeavors of Nietzsche and Dewey in order to highlight the 
centrality of art within their ethical projects, as well as to give some substance to what it 
might mean if we were to achieve Nietzsche’s “artistic conception of the world.” 
 What is important to keep in mind regarding pragmatism’s approach to utopian 
politics is that, contra Plato, the ideals used to guide the construction of such a utopia are 
not given in advance of actual experience.  This approach therefore also stands opposed 
to Kant, who attempted to make the case that nature is amenable to our ideals, and that 
these ideals are not the stuff of empirical reality.  On quite the contrary, pragmatists 
actually stress that our ideals need to be amenable to the facticity of our lived experience.  
There is a sense in which the epigraph to this chapter expresses this pragmatist approach 
to ideals.  It is a strange claim – that painting, and specifically, in the context of the song 
from which the quotation is taken, graffiti, can make heaven look like one’s 
neighborhood.  At first glance, one wants to rearrange the syntax, so that what one is 
really trying to achieve through art is making one’s neighborhood look like heaven.  But, 
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that would take our ideals to be removed from the scene of our everyday lives.  What the 
artist is suggesting, on the other hand, is that through art we can build a heaven out of 
what we have at our disposal, in our neighborhoods.   
 This aligns with Dewey’s own view of ideals.  As is sometimes mistakenly 
thought, Dewey is not averse to ideals per se, but simply demands that our ideals emerge 
from inquiry as it transpires in our lived experience.  This can be expressed by thinking 
of traditional idealist theories as working “top-down,” in that ideals are thought to exist in 
some extranatural “heaven” to which we need to be responsible so that they will manifest 
on earth.  Pragmatism’s approach, however, is “bottom-up.”  Our ideals emerge within 
our lived experience, as real possibilities for how our world might possibly be. This 
means, though, that our ideals will forever be vulnerable and malleable.  But as we saw in 
discussing James’s moral philosophy in the previous chapter, that is the point.  We have 
the artistic license to forge new ideals, which again are just those ideas that guide our 
ways of thinking and acting, along with our ways of interacting with others and the world 
around us.   
 The renowned street artist, Banksy, in concluding his recent residency in New 
York City, accompanied photographs of his last piece, which were posted on his website, 
with an audio clip that, besides espousing a Deweyan-like disdain for the 
institutionalization of art, asks the audience to consider what it might mean to “live in a 
world made by art, not just decorated by it” (Banksy 2013).3  Although rather romantic, 
there is a sense in which this gets at one of the central themes underlying this dissertation.  
That is, what would things look like if we did indeed live in a world “made by art?”  In 
                                                 
3
 See banksy.co.uk for more detail regarding this project, this specific piece, and the accompanying audio 
guide. 
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other words, how might our experience be different if an “artistic conception of the 
world” was more prominent in our collective mindset?   
 Again, part of the reason why I am putting Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty together 
under the same intellectual tent is the fact that for all three art plays an absolutely crucial 
role in their thought.  In discussing Richard Bernstein’s criticisms against him, Rorty 
acknowledges that the former is right in pointing out the dominance of the aesthetic in 
Rorty’s later thought (Rorty 2010, 473).  Although Rorty attempts to distance himself 
from the term “aesthetic” and replace it with the “literary,” he does so by referring to the 
“aesthetic” as a “Kantian notion for which (he has) little use” (Rorty 2010, 474).  I think 
that Rorty, however, is too easily dismissive of the term “aesthetic,” even as it used by 
Kant.
4
  Rorty is obviously keen on literature and what it can do in terms of expanding the 
horizons of human possibility.  But, as noted in the previous chapter, he explicitly 
mentions a host of human artifacts that can “provide a sense of alternative ways of being 
human” – including even paintings (Rorty 2010, 478).5    
 A large part of what Rorty is getting at with respect to his utopian “literary 
culture” is that it is one in which art and aesthetic experience will play as important a role 
in our moral development, in our figuring out what to do with ourselves, as learning 
about other cultures, about environmental degradation, about Kantian deontology, about 
Jesus’ teachings, etc.  In fact, in this culture, art will slowly start to eclipse these other 
                                                 
4
 For Kant, an aesthetic judgment is by definition subjective, which means that it is based solely on 
pleasure and displeasure.  Rorty’s dismissive quip is probably just a function of his wider disregard for 
Kant’s taxonomy of judgments in general. 
 
5
 Here is a good place to note the usefulness of holding Nietzsche, Dewey, and Rorty together in dialogue 
regarding their views on art.  Nietzsche focuses almost solely on music, Dewey on painting, and Rorty on 
literature.  What they have to say about the relationship between art and life, though, overlaps nicely.  What 
Rorty has to say about the transformative effects of literature and Nietzsche about music seem just as valid 
with respect to the visual arts.  Likewise, what Dewey has to say about painting translates, I believe, across 
aesthetic experience in general. 
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sources (especially the last two) of ethical edification just because art does not clothe 
itself in absolutism.
6
 
 I would like to now touch on some aspects of Nietzsche’s own utopian 
aspirations, along with providing a bit more explication of Dewey’s reconstructed 
society, and, in particular, his conception of education within it.  My hope is that both 
brief discussions will illuminate the central role that art plays with respect to both 
thinkers’ normative projects and how their views can carry us further than Rorty’s 
attention only to the literary arts. 
 
  
An “artistic conception of the world” 
  
 Regarding Nietzsche’s positive ethics, it is true that what he puts forth is primarily 
concerned with the care of the self discussed in Chapter III.  In fact, within the discourse 
of political philosophy, Nietzsche is sometimes viewed as apolitical.  It certainly is the 
case that when he does talk about politics it generally takes the form of a polemic against 
the political programs of his time.  It is worth noting, though, that these critiques usually 
have to do with public policy’s stifling of the individual and fostering of a herd mentality 
that hinders genius.  Overarching political systems, Nietzsche believes, provide a sense of 
comfort by means of encouraging conformity and convention, and they trade on the 
trepidation we often exhibit with respect to the precarious side of existence.  This 
trepidation, again, is the result of what Nietzsche thinks is an engrained dissatisfaction 
with the inherent flux of experience.  As noted in Chapter I, Nietzsche sees the western 
                                                 
6
 For art to be able to fulfill this function, a certain amount of arts education/arts literacy is required.  This 
is part of Dewey’s point – art now either does not educate, or does so in ways that are completely 
misguided (e.g., the thought that art carries with it ahistorical and absolute values). 
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intellectual tradition as, for the most part, engaging in theoretical gymnastics for the sake 
of relegating that flux to some sort of apparent or less “real” facet of existence.   
 Nietzsche believes that this obsession with discovering the Absolutely Real 
through theoretical knowledge began with Socrates, or more correctly, what he terms 
“Socratism.”7  The Presocratic Greeks, on the other hand, were more than willing to let 
art and myth help them feel at home in the world.  Within this context, it is understood 
that tragedy “represents existence more truthfully … and completely” than theoretical 
knowledge” (Nietzsche 1967, 61).  Moreover, for these Hellenes, art was a “saving 
sorceress;” for she “alone knows how to turn (the) nauseous thoughts about the horror or 
absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live” (Nietzsche 1967, 60).  This 
culture, Nietzsche contends, embraced the idea that whatever it is that underlies our 
human reality is a dynamic and unpredictable process that is indifferent to our human 
pursuits of meaning and fulfillment – and this embracing is evinced in their tragic art. 
 Nietzsche’s nostalgia for this culture rests in his desire for us to recognize that the 
ideals that give our lives meaning and purpose are illusions.  For Nietzsche, “[W]e live 
only by means of illusions – our consciousness only scratches the surface.  Much is 
hidden from our gaze” (Nietzsche 1995, 19).  This is somewhat misleading, however, as 
it makes it seem like these “illusions” are somehow warped representations of reality.  
Nietzsche’s point is that our reality is all “apparent” in that we will never be able to 
construct a language that will map onto whatever noumenal realm might exist apart from 
our human reality. In other words, we dwell in the world of our experience, as natural 
beings in a natural environment. This is why Nietzsche balks at those philosophers who 
                                                 
7
 This rather hubristic conception of the human intellect vis-à-vis the world consists in “the unshakeable 
faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought 
is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it” (Nietzsche 1967, 95).      
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think that they are uniquely poised to found a culture that is somehow in touch with the 
absolute.  Rather, Nietzsche often claims that it is the artist who creates culture by 
imagining new ways of being human and a new world for these new humans to inhabit. 
 Thus, Nietzsche charges us to develop an “artistic conception of the world” 
(Nietzsche 1995, 21).  That is, we need to be aware that all of our tools for getting around 
in the world are “illusions,” in that they are human creations and not somehow 
manifestations of the True Nature of Reality.  Yet, a caveat is always in order here, as this 
is not to say that all illusions are equal – there is still room for evaluating better and 
worse illusions.
8
  What Nietzsche hopes to convey, though, is that we must become 
comfortable with the fact that no one has purchase on the Real, and thus must proceed as 
such. 
 These so-called “illusions” clearly help us navigate our moral lives, and in his 
1886 Preface to The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche claims that he seeks to “move, to 
demote, morality into the realm of appearance.”  But, he continues, “not merely among 
‘appearances’ or phenomena … but among ‘deceptions’, as semblance, delusion, error, 
interpretation, contrivance, art” (Nietzsche 1967, 22-3).  An artistic conception of the 
world, therefore, calls for the development of a certain comportment towards the 
concepts that make up and inform our ethical bearing, and, for Nietzsche, art is crucial for 
this development.  Bruce Ellis Benson captures this idea nicely in discussing what he 
terms Nietzsche’s “musical askesis” (Benson 2007, 28).  By askesis, Benson simply 
means the type of care of the self discussed in Chapter III, and he is careful to draw a 
distinction between this care and the asceticism, or denial of bodily passions, that 
                                                 
8
 As discussed in Chapter I, the main standard that Nietzsche uses to evaluate these “illusions” is their self-
awareness that they are indeed mere “perspectives” and not somehow in touch with The Way Things 
Really Are.   
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Nietzsche finds abhorrent.  This care, according to Benson, will help one move from a 
decadent disdain for the uncertain and contingent nature of existence to something closer 
to Nietzsche’s “yes-saying” ideal of amor fati.  Benson contends that Nietzsche’s musical 
askesis involves one learning to listen, to be swayed by life’s music, to sing, and to 
dance.  Without getting into the details of what each of these components means 
metaphorically, Benson’s main claim is that engaging with music and dance cultivates 
something strikingly similar to the virtue of openness I have been championing.  By 
listening, for instance, Benson takes Nietzsche to mean that the appreciation of music can 
“remove the wax from one’s ears.”  “Taking the wax out of one’s ears,” writes Benson, 
“symbolizes that one is no longer attempting to silence the music and thus deny aspects 
of life that one might rather not acknowledge” (Benson 2007, 37).  One of the foremost 
of those aspects is the dynamic flow of experience and the uncertainty that it inextricably 
brings.   
 Furthermore, Benson believes that this musical askesis helps us “learn to sing new 
songs” (Benson 2007, 39).  By this, he means that music can help push us towards self-
overcoming, a concept of Nietzsche’s that is essentially a willingness to be affected by 
experience and to grow with and adapt to novel circumstances.  I contend, however, that 
this askesis should not be limited to the appreciation of music, but includes the 
appreciation of art in general.  As we saw in Chapter II (note 8), both Nietzsche and 
Dewey refer to Schiller’s contention that all art begins with a musical mood.  Nietzsche 
and Dewey interpret this to mean that all artistic creation (and I would argue aesthetic 
appreciation) begins with and is pervaded by an inchoate feeling as opposed to a rigidly 
preconceived blueprint.  Thus, aesthetic experience, as elicited by even the visual arts, 
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can aid us in becoming better listeners (in Benson’s sense) and to be comfortable, and 
even eager, to “sing new songs.”  The appreciation of art is therefore central to 
Nietzsche’s understanding of how we might develop into individuals less concerned with 
absolute knowledge and certainty, and more willing to approach the values and beliefs 
that guide our lives with a greater sense of humility.  This perhaps gives substance to 
Nietzsche’s esoteric pronouncement that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justified” (Nietzsche 1967, 52).   
      
 
Education and art in Dewey’s reconstructed society 
 
 Like Nietzsche, aesthetics is central to Dewey’s entire philosophical enterprise.  
Indeed Thomas Alexander asserts that the “aesthetic dimension of experience” is “the 
central, guiding thought in (Dewey’s) philosophy” (Alexander 1987, xiii).  Yet, equally 
crucial to Dewey’s thought is his attempt to redescribe “experience.”  These guiding 
ideas, however, are intimately interrelated.  Dewey believes that we get the richest, 
“purest” sense of his conception of “experience” in the experience of art.  These aesthetic 
experiences present us with a model for how our own, everyday experiences might be art.  
“The art of life,” avers Alexander, “is the goal behind Dewey’s ethics, his philosophy of 
democracy, and his theory of education.  To treat life artistically is to exercise both 
imagination and reflection toward the exploration of the possibilities of the present” 
(Alexander 1987, 269). 
 I do not have the space here to do justice to Dewey’s rich account of education 
and his views for how we might reform it for the better.  But, as his work attempted to 
grapple with concrete problems and work on transforming society for the better, it should 
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not be a surprise that he was deeply invested in issues pertaining to education.  Indeed, he 
actually sees philosophy as being intimately entwined with education.  He even claims 
that, “If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental 
dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may 
even be defined as the general theory of education” (MW 9:338).   
 If education, then, is about forming traits of character, and, as I have argued, a 
pragmatist ethics is best thought of as a type of virtue ethics – in that the main point of 
emphasis is on suggesting just those dispositions that might helps us orient ourselves 
“towards nature and fellow men” in a way that is more ethically-responsible – then it 
would seem that Dewey is explicitly endorsing an approach to education that takes 
seriously its ethically-transformative potential.   Furthermore, since Dewey also believes 
that art and aesthetic appreciation should be at the forefront of our pedagogy, it follows 
that aesthetics becomes integral to our ethical comportment.  Indeed, in a diagram of the 
ideal school in his book The School and Society (1899), Dewey locates the museum in the 
very center (MW 1:53). 
 In Dewey’s utopia, or at least in his hope for a reconstructed (and better) society, 
art would not be removed from our everyday lives.  It would not be mere decoration, 
distraction, or entertainment.  It would, in fact, be central to education, conceived not 
simply a matter of the transmission of knowledge, but rather as the forming of habits of 
thought and action that are conducive towards his regulative ideal of growth.  I would 
say, then, that education, by Dewey’s lights, is paramount to developing more authentic 
individuals (in the sense discussed in Chapter III), as well as to fostering a healthier 
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democracy (as gestured at in Chapter IV).  Let us now look at how Dewey thinks arts 
appreciation might be crucial to this cause.   
 
 
Art in Education – and Education in Art 
 
 As we saw in Chapter II, Dewey is concerned about how the intimate relationship 
between art and our everyday lives is now, at the least, opaque, or, at the worst, 
completely ignored. Although written seven years before Art as Experience, “Art in 
Education – and Education in Art” (1927) presages the concerns he will raise in his later 
treatise on aesthetics.  For, in this essay, Dewey laments the fact that art, and specifically 
painting, is not taken seriously within education.
9
  According to Dewey, this devaluation 
arises from both our conception of education, as well as our conception of art.  
Foreshadowing a theme from Art as Experience, Dewey notes that we have unfortunately 
set “art on a pedestal, making of it something apart from the constant needs of everyday 
man” (LW 2:114).  The institutionalization of art, though, is also a result of what Dewey 
thinks is an increasingly compartmentalized worldview, wherein the desire for stability 
has led to an impoverished system that divides human experience into neat and tidy 
domains. 
 Indeed Dewey goes even further in his critique of contemporary society in citing 
how “modern preoccupation with science and with industry based on science has been 
disastrous” because “it strengthens the tendency to professionalism, or the setting of 
minds in grooves” in regards to education.  It is also highly problematic because “it leads 
men to take abstractions as if they were realities” (LW 2:113).  It might be unclear how 
                                                 
9
 Again, by “education” here, we do not mean any specific age or grade range.  Education, when conceived 
of in the way that Dewey does, is something that truly never ends.  As we will see later, this can mean 
education for K-12 students, the training of medical students, and perhaps even the public at large. 
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Dewey is connecting these various concerns, but he offers a hint, one that also happens to 
highlight a central theme of not only Dewey’s thought, but of pragmatism in general.  
Dewey states that this overly scientistic approach to experience is disastrous “because it 
has fixed attention upon competition for control, and possession of, a fixed environment 
rather than upon what art can do to create an environment” (LW 2:113). 
 This misguided conception of education as the inculcation of knowledge is thus 
bound up with the quest for certainty that Dewey and other pragmatist thinkers are 
challenging, and this is why art plays such a crucial role in Dewey’s reconstruction of 
education.  Remember that, for Dewey, art helps us cope with the inherent uncertainty of 
existence and empowers us to use that uncertainty to expand our horizons of possibility 
for meaning and action, and this is precisely what education is all about.  In Chapter II, I 
claimed that this expansion resulted from aesthetic experience’s heightened ability to put 
us in touch with the pervasive qualitative background of all experience.  But, Dewey 
thinks that this ability is not something we can just assume everyone will embody.  Such 
a capacity for understanding the fullness of our lived experience needs to be cultivated 
through education.  We are now coming to see what exactly Dewey might have meant 
when he says that “paintings do not educate at present till we are educated to … realize 
their educative potentialities” (LW 2:114).  The educative potentiality of aesthetic 
experience, as I am presenting it here, is the cultivation of openness, that virtue that  
loosens us from the rigidity and fixity that routine and custom engender, and that allows 
us to grow with experience.  However, we need to be educated in advance to be sensitive 
to the pervasive qualitative background.
10
  Again, this pervasive quality is the glue that 
                                                 
10
 I should mention that this education is not about getting a perceiver to have the “right” mood vis-à-vis a 
certain work.  There is not a “right” or “wrong” reaction to a work.  I think what Dewey has in mind here is 
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binds all of the elements of an aesthetic experience together, eliciting a sort of mood that 
transcends our conceptual systems of interpretation.  “To be educated for the educative 
function of paintings,” writes Dewey, “is thus to learn to see this integration in the whole 
and in its every part” (LW 2:115).  So, in order to unlock the educative and ethically-
transformative potential of aesthetic experience, Dewey thinks that we need to be primed 
for our encounter with the qualitative unity the work of art affords.  This priming would 
involve a heightened degree of care, which is conveyed in Dewey’s conception of 
perception (as an active and creative process) as opposed to mere recognition.  As we will 
see later, curricula employing what are known as Visual Thinking Strategies (VTS) do in 
fact call for students to carefully engage with paintings in just the way that Dewey was 
proposing, specifically by encouraging students to bracket their preconceptions and 
expectations and just attend to a particular work (as a singularity). 
 Dewey also thinks that we need to be educated to recognize how a work of art 
sometimes captures an ideal balance between the stable and the precarious. For the 
growth and enrichment of experience, we need both a measure of stability in and 
continuity with prior situations, practices, and values, but we also need creative 
transformation of experience in light of changing conditions. In regards to the stable, 
Dewey calls for educating individuals to recognize “a continuing tradition which works 
in the individual artists” (LW 2:115).  That is, we should be able to make connections 
between different works of art.  What, for instance, ties together the impressionist 
painters, the New York graffiti scene (as opposed to the Chicago scene), or Native 
American sculpture?  Yet beyond being educated to make these connections, Dewey is 
                                                                                                                                                 
a heightened sensitivity to the relationality of all of the various elements of a particular piece, and to the 
“sense” that art makes – even without being propositional. 
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quick to remind us that “[e]very significant painter in respecting and using the tradition 
adds something to it from his own personal vision and emotion, and his addition is 
qualitative, transforming” (LW 2:115).  Thus, in carefully attending to a work, we should 
also be educated to note what makes the piece unique.  How is the painting not simply an 
exercise in what Dewey disdainfully refers to as “academic art?”  How does the work 
bring into existence something new?  How does it transform the stabilities of the tradition 
out of which it emerges?   
 Coming to understand how a work of art captures this balance between the 
precarious and the stable is ethically-significant because, as discussed earlier, this balance 
that is exemplified in art also parallels Dewey’s ideal mode of moral inquiry.  Experience 
cannot be simply the blind adherence to the stabilities of custom, routine, and tradition – 
for that is the definition of a narrowed and closed approach to experience.  Yet, 
experience cannot be pure novelty and precariousness.  We are social creatures, and in 
order to thrive together as a collective, there needs to exist a shared network of meanings 
and values.  Art thus provides a model for how we might navigate our social environment 
in a way that draws on tradition and previous experience, but is not hindered by dogmatic 
preconceptions.  Art provides a model for how we might intelligently transform and 
reconfigure experience in ways that retain some continuity with past traditions and 
practices, but is not rigidly bound by them.   
 Sensitivity to the pervasive and unifying quality of a work, along with this 
recognition of how art brings together the stable and precarious facets of experience, are 
two things Dewey explicitly states we should emphasize in arts education.  Doing so, 
Dewey believes, will help unlock the educative, and ethically-transformative, potential of 
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art.  When this happens, art’s intimate connection with our everyday lives and 
experiences will hopefully start to come into relief.  Art will no longer be treated as a 
superfluous luxury within education, but as central to the development of dispositions 
that will help us navigate experience in a more rich, meaningful, and ethically-
responsible fashion.  This returns us to the underlying premise of my dissertation: that 
aesthetic experience can help cultivate what I consider to be the cardinal virtue of a 
pragmatist ethics – openness.  This premise is captured eloquently by Dewey when he 
writes: “Such refreshments (aesthetic experiences), themselves transient, yet discipline 
the inmost being of man … since they shape the soul to a permanent appreciation of 
values beyond its former self” (LW 2:113).  That is, art can help us grow. 
 
 
 Illustrations 
 
Art and medicine 
  
 Admittedly, this belief in the power of art to transform individuals for the better 
might sound rather idealistic and out of touch with how people actually develop their 
moral comportments.  Yet, current movements within medical school curricula seem to 
support my central claim and show the applicability of this artistic approach to ethical 
development.  Moreover, these movements are themselves responses to problems within 
the field of medicine that bear a resemblance to some of the deeper societal issues that 
Dewey thinks have played no small role in the depreciation of art, as well as the 
problematic state of the educational system.  In reviewing various articles discussing this 
growing trend in medical schools, wherein students are encouraged or even required to 
take arts appreciation courses, a recurring theme can be found regarding the current state 
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of medical care and the almost algorithmic approach doctors are forced to take.
11
  The 
belief is that the pressures doctors face in the name of efficiency has actually been to the 
detriment of their care, as they rely on assumptions, preconceptions, and seemingly 
mechanistic methods in diagnosing and communicating with their patients.
12
 
 So, as noted, there is a growing push in medical school programs to get medical 
students to take arts appreciation courses.  The rationale behind this is in part to combat 
the detrimental effects just mentioned and improve doctors’ overall care.  Medical 
schools at Yale, the University of New Mexico, Harvard, Northwestern, the University of 
Alabama in Birmingham, and McMaster University, for example, are all introducing arts 
appreciation into their curricula.  At Yale’s School of Medicine, first-year students are 
required to take such a course, and it was faculty there that pioneered this conjunction 
between art and medicine.  In a study published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, Yale professor Irwin Braverman and colleagues researched the experiences 
of the first groups of students to have gone through this course and found a nearly 10% 
improvement in observational tests.
13
  As noted in the study’s commentary, “The use of 
representational paintings capitalizes on students’ lack of familiarity with the artworks.  
The viewers search for and select all of the details in the paintings because they do not 
                                                 
11
 I think it is interesting that one can easily find a number of news articles discussing this trend.  In a 
Deweyan utopia, it would certainly not be newsworthy that art was being used to train practitioners in what 
we consider to be a quintessentially “objective” field such as medicine.    
 
12
 H. G. Wright’s book, Means, Ends and Medical Care (2007), provides a much more detailed analysis of 
these ills plaguing our overall approach to healthcare, and proposes a more Deweyan approach to medical 
inquiry where the ends of such inquiry are not presupposed. 
 
13
 Braverman, Irwin M., Jacqueline C. Dolev, and Linda Krohner Friedlaender. 2001. “Use of Fine Art to 
Enhance Visual Diagnostic Skills.” The Journal of the American Medical Association 286, No. 9: 1020-21. 
This study and a more general discussion of Yale’s implementation of this arts-based training are the 
subject of the Yale Times article by Daniel P. Jones and Karen Peart on April 10, 2009, “Class Helping 
Future Doctors Learn the Art of Observation.” http://news.yale.edu/2009/04/10/class-helping-future-
doctore-learn -art-observation.   
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have a bias as to which visual attribute is more important than another,” and this 
“lowered threshold of observation has direct application to the examination of the 
patient” (Braverman, Doley, and Friedlaender 2001, 1020). 
 The methodology utilized by many of these medical school arts appreciation 
courses is heavily influenced by a program known as Visual Thinking Strategies (VTS).  
The VTS program was designed by Abigail Housen, a Harvard-trained psychologist 
interested in the cognitive processes underlying aesthetic experience, and Philip 
Yenawine, a former Director of Education at The Museum of Modern Art.  The pedagogy 
behind VTS is rather straightforward.  While engaging a work of art, most usually a 
painting or photograph, students are asked three open-ended questions:  (1) What is going 
on in the picture?  (2) What do you see that makes you say that?  (3) What more can we 
find?  During this discussion, facilitators are encouraged to paraphrase their own 
comments neutrally, keep the focus on the actual work by pointing at the area being 
discussed, and attempt to frame and link student comments so as to establish somewhat 
of a coherent narrative.  The students themselves are encouraged to look carefully at the 
works, talk about what they observe, back up their ideas with evidence, listen to and 
consider the views of others, and discuss multiple possible interpretations.
14
   
 Now, one of the central claims made by advocates of these medical school arts 
courses is that such courses hone doctors’ diagnostic skills and improve their ability to 
detect important details.  In looking at the techniques employed in VTS, this sharpened 
diagnostic acumen certainly seems like it would be a primary benefit.  Yet, in noting the 
open-ended, interpretive questions used in VTS, as well as considering some of the 
                                                 
14
 For more information regarding VTS, please see the website at http://vtshome.org. 
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anecdotal evidence found in the articles discussing these arts appreciation courses, it is 
hard not to see an even broader transformation occurring in the medical students.   
 For instance, in an article titled “Learning Medicine by Looking at Art,” Sharon 
Levine, a professor of medicine at Boston University, praises the inclusion of arts 
appreciation courses in medical school on the basis that such training encourages a 
fluidity of thought and an increased ability to deal comfortably with ambiguity.  She 
notes, “If you don’t deal with ambiguity, you will make mistakes.  If you become fixated 
on one thing and don’t think about other possibilities … then you do yourself and your 
patients a disservice.”15  This resonates with an account given by a medical student 
participating in one of these classes who notes, “In this case, the patient’s health and 
personal story become the painting, and like analyzing the patients, there is no right or 
wrong answer, just the patient perspective, which allow you to understand their concerns 
and better treat the illness.”16  These views also align with the inherent uncertainty that 
both Nietzsche and Dewey claim is characteristic of a work of art, and recall that it is this 
engagement with art’s ambiguity that is crucial to cultivating openness.  It is perhaps also 
worth mentioning that Levine makes a rather Deweyan (and Heideggerian) point in 
contending that this need to carefully consider a horizon of possibilities is becoming 
more pressing, as doctors are now too often overly reliant on technological tools in 
diagnosing patients.   
 As gestured at by Levine, and emphasized by the Yale study on these arts 
appreciation courses in medical school, the central rationale behind this trend is that 
                                                 
15
 Pekow, Suzanne. 2012. “Learning Medicine by Looking at Art.” WGBH News, August 22. 
http://wgbhnews.org/post/learning-medicine-looking-art.   
 
16
 Steinberg, David. 2010. “Art Helping Open Eyes of Medical Students.” Albuquerque Journal, January 3. 
(emphasis added).   
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taking such courses will sharpen doctors’ diagnostic skills and make them better able to 
properly diagnose a patient.  Yet, as mentioned, I contend that there might be something 
more going on with the arts-based education these medical students are receiving, and it 
ties into my claim that openness is the cardinal pragmatist virtue.  That is, a more 
sharpened and careful approach to diagnosing patients is not separate from the 
development of openness, and may in fact be an ancillary effect of becoming more open.  
In being open, one will consider a wider range of possibilities for thought and action, and 
in so doing, they will not let preconceptions and assumptions dictate their practice.   
 In other words, I believe that these arts appreciation courses are cultivating the 
virtue of openness in medical students, and in looking at some of the testimonials given 
with respect to these programs, we can see more concretely just how this virtue manifests 
itself in the everyday lives of individuals.  Another one of the claims made by advocates 
of this trend in medical schools is that taking these arts appreciation courses helps doctors 
in their interactions with patients.  In the examples discussed in the last chapter, those 
who are open are more willing to listen and even attempt to understand the reasoning 
behind the opinions and perspectives of others.  Even if one is not going to necessarily 
accept another’s views, openness can be measured by the degree to which one tries to at 
least understand the rationale behind those views.
17
   
 Such an attempt to understand another begins with a simple recognition of the 
other as a person, as a subject, not simply an object within one’s own experiential 
narrative.  Yet, the quest for efficiency discussed above with respect to medical care 
seems to even encourage such objectification, for when the “object” of inquiry is treated 
as such and not as a human agent involved in a complex of relationships, it is much easier 
                                                 
17
 Again, openness does not amount to radical acceptance of the novel or different.   
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to fit that “object” into a preconceived diagnostic and treatment schema.  It is this 
privileging of efficiency over actual ethical and comprehensive care that this push to 
integrate art into the training of medical students is meant to combat.  In a New York 
Times article, “At Some Medical Schools, Humanities Join the Curriculum,” which 
explores this arts-based training at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Dr. David 
Muller, in praising these programs for training “better” doctors, states, “To make a better 
doctor means to me … one who sees the person and not just the patient, not just an organ 
system that is screwed up.”18    
 The idea that arts appreciation can help bolster intersubjective awareness is 
further supported by Dr. Joyce Zazulak who observes that as a family physician who is 
responsible for treating a multitude of people, “[I]t can be easy to make assumptions 
about a patient.”19  But through art appreciation courses for family medicine residents at 
McMaster University, she explains that the aim is to try “to train our residents to look 
deeper, to really understand the patient’s experience of illness and to improve their 
understanding of the complex nature of human beings.”  In the article in which Zazulak is 
quoted, it is also noted that the Harvard Medical School implemented an arts appreciation 
course into their curriculum in order to “hone (students’) observational, analytical and 
communication skills.”20  The idea here is that bringing less preconceived assumptions to 
bear on interpersonal interactions will aid in communication, and that arts appreciation 
helps one become less reliant on such assumptions.    
                                                 
18
 Kennedy, Randy. 2006. “At Some Medical Schools, Humanities Join the Curriculum.” The New York 
Times, April 17. http://nytimes.com/2006/04/17/arts/design/17sina.html.  
 
19
 “Using Fine Art Appreciation to Help Family Doctors Practice Better Medicine.” 2010. McMaster 
University News, September 22. http://fhs.mcmaster.ca/main/news_2010/medicine _and_art.html. 
 
20
 Emphasis added. 
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 This open communication is no doubt an asset in medical care, as it is tied to the 
sense of compassion of which those seeking such care are usually in need.  “Most 
medical schools,” notes Dr. James Woodruff, the Associate Dean of Students at the 
University of Chicago’s Pritzker School of Medicine, “now recognize the responsibility 
to train compassionate doctors.”21  An integral part of such training, Woodruff contends, 
is engagement with the arts and humanities.  And, in supporting my claim that the 
movement to integrate arts appreciation into medical school curricula is not just about 
sharpening future doctors’ eyes, Woodruff goes on to state, “There’s a sense that society 
is not satisfied with doctors who just make good clinical decisions, but with those who 
put their patients first and treat them with empathy, clarity and sensitivity to cultural 
diversity.”  Dr. Ellen Cosgrove at the University of New Mexico School of Medicine, in 
discussing the art appreciation courses students there are encouraged to take, echoes this 
sentiment in pointing out that physicians who have taken such courses are perceived by 
their patients as being more empathetic.
22
 
 In sum, what I want to propose is that it is not just a keener eye that is being 
trained in these medical students participating in art appreciation courses, but that their 
engagements with works of art is helping develop openness.  They are becoming more 
hospitable towards the new, a hospitality that presupposes the comfort with ambiguity 
discussed above.  They are also being trained to allow the actual experience of a patient 
to direct their practice and not just use assumptions and preconceptions to direct their 
interaction.  This also involves not just passively observing the patient as an object for 
                                                 
21
 Pevtzow, Lisa. 2013. “Humanities Courses Help Aspiring Doctors Provide Better Care.” Chicago 
Tribune, March 20. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-20/health/ct-x-medical-school-arts-
20130320_1_doctors-students-humanties. 
   
22
 “Art Helping Open Eyes of Medical Students.” 2010.  
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diagnosis, but actively treating them as a human subject.  At this point, it is fair to ask if 
we just want doctors to inhabit the world in such a way, or if these are qualities that we 
might want to try to foster in society in general.  And, if art can help such development, 
why is it seen as merely “the beauty parlor of civilization,” and not something more? 
 
 
Art and medicine: An account 
 
 Before articulating what exactly I am proposing in regards to our orientation 
towards art, and addressing possible counter-arguments or objections to my view, it 
might be worthwhile to reinforce the story told above regarding the ways in which the 
appreciation of art could have bearing on the development of more ethically-responsible 
doctors.  In what follows, I will be giving an account of an interview I conducted with Dr. 
Gabriel Monthan, M.D., a psychiatrist who is also an aspiring artist in various visual 
media.  This conjunction between the oft-thought divergent worlds of medicine and art is 
one of the foremost reasons I inquired with Monthan regarding these art appreciation 
courses in medical school, as well as the issues that such courses are meant to address.
23
   
 First off, Monthan admits that the “modern stereotypes (regarding doctors) 
involve knowing all the answers, which are frequently obtained via extensive diagnostic 
work-ups” and that “[t]his might be described as ‘cookie-cutter’ diagnostics.”  Monthan 
acknowledges that much of his medical education emphasized such systematic and 
technologically-dependent diagnostics, and that as a result “algorithms surface which are 
geared toward streamlining a medical work-up” which he willingly notes “provide an 
excellent framework for medical decision making.” 
                                                 
23
 The following responses were to an open-ended email query I sent Dr. Monthan asking for his thoughts 
about the articles referenced above regarding medical students taking arts appreciation courses.  Monthan 
Gabriel, email message to author, August 9, 2013. 
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 Yet, Monthan is quick to point out that these diagnostic algorithms “can also 
become barriers to critical thinking as they merely require you to follow a forking path to 
the answer.”  This testimony seems to align quite well with the cultural criticisms Dewey 
levies against the over-enthusiasm surrounding technology-dependent efficiency and how 
this has transformed education for the worse.  In Monthan’s field, psychiatry, he observes 
that “the diagnostic answers tend not to be absolute but exist on a spectrum instead.”  
Monthan implicitly endorses one of the fruits of pragmatism when he explains that there 
“are many more paths to consider when absolutes are removed.  It can be a disservice to 
the patient to simply follow a forking path to the answer, because often, there are no 
definitive answers.”  This can clearly be expanded to cover all of moral inquiry.  Often, 
there is not a definitive answer as to what the right thing to do is.  In such cases, 
absolutism seems to be more of a hindrance than a help with respect to a thoughtful and 
responsible consideration of the situation.   
 Monthan’s account of how he avoids falling into algorithmic engagements with 
his patients also seems to support the rationale behind the medical schools’ art 
appreciation courses described above.  In his response, Monthan, more than once, extols 
the virtue of creative critical thinking.  This involves him “imagining (himself) in the 
patient’s circumstance,” so that he “can attempt to feel some of the stresses that fracture 
them,” and that this makes him more equipped to treat them.  In concluding, Monthan 
expresses his belief that art appreciation can indeed help develop this imaginative 
approach to the doctor-patient relationship and the anti-absolutism he sees as being 
salutary for his medical practice. 
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 To return to this idea of an artistic conception of the world, within such a 
worldview how we think about even what might be considered one of the archetypes of 
“objective” inquiry, medicine, can be rethought.  In order to train more discerning, 
compassionate, and open doctors, these art appreciation courses for medical students 
work under the premise that encounters with works of art can help cultivate certain traits 
of character.  I suggest, however, that the value of these traits transcends the field of 
medicine.  Within certain discourse concerning law school curricula, there has been a 
recent push towards integrating more of the humanities, including arts appreciation, 
under the assumption that this would help foster a greater sense of compassion among 
future lawyers.
24
  And, even more generally, looking at the objectives and outcomes 
related to arts appreciation in K-12 education, one can see that there is a subtle awareness 
of the ethically-transformative dimension to experiencing various works of art.
25
  
 The ideas underlying this advocacy of arts appreciation perhaps speak to what 
Dewey had in mind when he says that we need to be educated to art’s educative 
potentialities.  Works of art not only teach students about the various techniques and 
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 See Lauren Marble’s article, “Do What’s Right: The Secrets of Success,” in the Oregon Bar 
Association’s newsletter at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/10jun/professionalism.html.  Indeed 
there are numerous pushes for integrating a humanistic approach to education, at all its levels and domains.  
Martha Nussbaum’s book Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010) is but one 
impressive example.  Also, the strategies discussed above regarding training medical students are also 
being employed to help train police officers.  Fitting the themes raised in looking at the value of arts 
appreciation courses, the instructor of this course presents the following ground rules: “First, there are two 
words that are not allowed – ‘obviously’ and ‘clearly’ – since what’s obvious to you may not be obvious to 
someone else.”  She also makes sure that the students know that “there are now judgments and no wrong 
answers.”  Hirschfeld, Neal. 2009. “Teaching Cops to See.” Smithsonian Magazine, October. 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/teaching-cops-to-see-138500635/?no-ist. 
 
25
 The National Standards for Visual Art education for K-4 grade go beyond just making sure students are 
learning about different artistic techniques, but stress the need for students to understand how different 
students can have different responses to the same work.  The highlighting of this interpretative work seems 
to me to be a good entry point into a discussion about the pluralism of beliefs and values that exist in every 
classroom. 
http://www.nacdnet.org/education/contests/poster/2009/National_Standards_for_Visual_Art_Link_To_Stat
e_Dept_of_Ed.pdf. 
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practices used in their creation, nor simply about the traditions and cultures out of which 
they arose, but they also teach us about ourselves, about how we inhabit, or might 
possibly inhabit, the world.  On the level of a private encounter with the work of art, art 
so often challenges our preconceived ways of describing and valuating the world in 
which we live.  Such unsettling has the ethically-significant consequence of expanding 
our horizons of possibility for human meaning and action.  On the level of collective 
engagements with works of art, the strategies being employed by those teaching arts 
appreciation are often geared towards bringing into relief the pre-reflective level of 
experience that binds individuals together. At the same time, these strategies also 
underscore the diverse range of perspectives extant among us, and they reveal the certain 
blindness we often have in regards to these differences.  All of these effects, I believe, 
can be of service in our own individual pursuits of well-being and flourishing, as well as 
in our communal hope for a more understanding and inclusive society. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Possible concerns  
 
 I would like to think that the picture I have tried to paint of a positive pragmatist 
ethics, as well as my argument for the ethical significance of aesthetic experience within 
this framework, both evince the general spirit of pragmatism guiding this dissertation.  
By that, I mean that I am in no way claiming that this is the definitive way to articulate a 
pragmatist ethics, nor that the account of aesthetic experience underlying my argument is 
the one and only way to explain our encounters with art.  My aim has been to offer up 
suggestions regarding these topics, and to highlight their advantages vis-à-vis our current 
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situation.  I have been suggesting that focusing on this intersection between art and ethics 
might provide us with a useful vocabulary and grammar for thinking about pragmatism, 
ethics, moral development, and the relationship between art and our everyday lives. 
 I want to now address three possible objections that one might anticipate in response to 
my thesis:  (1) a concern with the presumed elitism of the artworld and what this might 
mean for equal access, (2) the contention that I am committing what William James 
himself refers to as the “sentimentalist fallacy,” whereby an overemphasis on the domain 
of the imaginary puts us out of touch with the concrete demands of our lived experience, 
and (3) a more general worry about the virtue of openness and the threat of relativism that 
many think inevitably accompanies it.   
 Before addressing the first concern, I want to briefly synopsize one of the most 
crucial assumptions contained in my argument.  Throughout my discussion, I have 
attempted to show how art is especially powerful in the development of openness.  This is 
not to say that other experiences cannot cultivate this cardinal pragmatist virtue.  Our 
lives, if we are fortunate, afford us numerous moments when the familiar strikes us as 
fascinating, and we are opened up to the wonder of experience.  The beauty and sublimity 
of the natural world can obviously have this effect, as well as just those everyday 
surprises when the routine monotony of our day-to-day experience is unsettled in a 
delightfully refreshing, not disconcerting, way. 
 Engaging works of art is, for one, intentional.  The element of surprise is not a 
prerequisite for aesthetic experience.  Furthermore, and I have tried to highlight this 
throughout, the ambiguous and non-propositional nature of art lends itself to a certain 
type of approach.  We typically do not approach a work of art looking to somehow 
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discover the truth of it.  We are already in a state of uncertainty when perceiving a work, 
and thus primed to engage with the new.  This cannot be said for our attitude towards 
many other facets of experience, moral decision-making included, where we seem to 
want to get at the truth of the matter.   
 Returning, then, to possible objections to my central claims, regarding the elitism 
challenge, I acknowledge that there are certainly aspects of the artworld that can be 
pretentious and exclusive.  Artists seem to only get mainstream recognition when they are 
eccentric, and the stereotype of snobbery is all too much a part of the popular perception 
of art.  Moreover, specific to the medical school arts appreciation courses previously 
discussed, we are looking at a select group of exceptional students who have gotten into 
medical school, and these medical schools have easy access to their universities’ 
museums and the other fruits of culture which others might not be so fortunate to explore.  
With many public schools dealing with incredibly tight budgets, arts programs (along 
with other supposedly expendable classes such as physical education and music) are 
constantly under threat.  Thus the aim of making art appreciation a central part of all 
students’ ethical education seems to be hindered by a lack of access.   
 This is undoubtedly a complicated problem that would need to be approached 
from various perspectives.  The work being done by advocates of these medical school 
arts appreciation courses, as well as by those educators already employing techniques 
such as Visual Thinking Strategies, is a small but important step in the right direction.  As 
Dewey noted, art does not currently educate to its fullest because we are not educated to 
recognize its transformative potential.  If more educators are taught the benefits of art 
appreciation for the development of well-rounded and ethically-responsible students, 
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perhaps there will be a more vigorous defense of such programs when budgetary 
questions arise.   
 Yet, we also need to have our conception of art and the aesthetic expanded.  Art 
should not be restricted to what can be found in museums, galleries, and art history texts.  
One of the implicit themes of this dissertation has been the “artistic” dimension of our 
human attempts to feel at home in the world.  Within the pragmatist worldview I laid out 
in Chapter I, how we make sense of ourselves, of our environment, and of the relations 
between, is akin to the creation of a work of art.  As James notes, the world is not ready-
made and we have a hand in shaping the future.  This is perhaps what Banksy meant by 
his yearning to live in a world “made by art.”  Such a shift in how we treat the 
relationship between art and our everyday lives would, hopefully, aid in Dewey’s crusade 
against the institutionalization of art.  Art outside of the museum or gallery might acquire 
a heightened status, and the artistic-aesthetic dimension of human experience in general 
could be drawn upon to help us in our pursuits of individual flourishing and social 
melioration.  What this all amounts to is that if art is seen as something more than a 
frivolous luxury, we can perhaps move beyond elitism and exclusionary access to a more 
comprehensive engagement with the full range of art works and art processes.      
 This emphasis on the relationship between art and our lives gets at my response to 
the second concern noted above – that turning to art to help us become better people 
would be to potentially commit what James calls “the sentimentalist fallacy.”  This 
fallacy consists in the tendency “to shed tears over abstract justice and generosity, beauty, 
etc., and never to know these qualities when you meet them in the street” (James 1981, 
103).  In other words, there might be a concern that such a focus on art will take one 
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away from the concrete demands of the real world.  Christopher Voparil has voiced such 
a concern with respect to thinkers such as Rorty and Martha Nussbaum, who advance a 
view of moral development which relies on sentimental education, and specifically, 
sentimental education through literature and narrative.  It is Voparil’s contention that 
James’s theory on habits can be used to bolster Rorty’s and Nussbaum’s arguments for 
sentimental education by grounding them in our concrete lived experience.   
 Voparil’s (and James’s) main suggestion for how to avoid the sentimentalist 
fallacy involves a conscious effort to translate the fellow-feeling that might be fostered 
through certain types of literature, for instance realist literature and detailed narrative 
journalism, into action.  Only by doing so will one cultivate the morally-responsible habit 
of imaginatively identifying with the needs and concerns of others.  For art, then, to 
genuinely have a transformative effect on our lives, we must bring what it has taught us 
into the course of our experience. 
 While the discussion of the sentimentalist fallacy takes place in the context of 
specific affective states, the cultivation of openness could fall victim to this worry as 
well.  Through engaging a variety of different paintings, for example, one could become 
open in regards to being able to appreciate a diverse range of styles and traditions – in 
other words, to be hospitable to the new.  For pragmatists, though, it always goes back to 
concrete experience.  To develop the pragmatist cardinal virtue of openness, this 
hospitality towards the new must be enacted in how one cares for oneself and how one 
relates to and interacts with others.   
 One can imagine an art critic, whose entire life is devoted to the appreciation of 
art, who is yet plagued by the certain blindness discussed in Chapter IV.  Perhaps she is 
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condescending to her religiously-oriented neighbors, working under the closed-minded 
assumption that believers are naive dullards.  Any openness she has with respect to her 
art criticism is not the same as the virtue that has been central to this discussion.  That 
openness, as the cardinal virtue of a pragmatist ethics, is going to have its value for life 
grounded in our concrete everyday lives.  Part of what seems to underlie James’s warning 
against the sentimentalist fallacy touches on what is often regarded as the central point of 
divergence between classical Pragmatists such as James and Dewey, and the 
neopragmatism espoused by the likes of Rorty; that is, whether experience or language 
should be the general field of inquiry.
26
  As I discussed earlier, Rorty certainly could say 
more about our embodied existence, and his wariness of falling into a materialist 
“metaphysics” pushed Rorty away from any sustained treatment of habit.   
 For Rorty, in order to alter character, one needs to adopt a new vocabulary, a new 
way of speaking.  This might sometimes sound like transformation is “all in the head,” 
but Rorty would acknowledge that this vocabulary must be cast into concrete experience 
so as to change who one is or how society thinks about a given phenomenon.  In other 
words, these vocabularies must be used.  It is the same for openness.  Openness must be 
enacted if it is to be fostered.  In James’s words, we must “never … suffer one’s self to 
have an emotion at a concert, without expressing it afterward in some active way.  Let the 
expression be the least thing in the world – speaking genially to one’s aunt, or giving up 
one’s seat in a horse-car, if nothing more heroic offers – but let in it not fail to take place” 
(James 1950, 126).  To be praised for being open, the art critic described above needs to 
                                                 
26
 As I noted in previous chapters, I do not think fussing over who is right in this debate is itself very 
pragmatic.  Rorty’s insights regarding our linguistic practices are a nice supplement to James’s and 
Dewey’s discussions of experience, which themselves help Rortian-inspired pragmatists such as myself 
give a more robust account various aspects of human experience.   
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open herself to the perspective of her neighbors and reach out to try and get a feel for the 
inner significance of their lives.  In so doing, she might even find that her preconceptions 
about believers was misguided and that her neighbors have more in common with her 
than she could have ever imagined.  
 This brings me to the last of what I consider to be the most common concerns 
regarding my argument for the benefit that engagements with art can have for our ethical 
lives with respect to the cultivation of openness.  Indeed this concern has to do with the 
virtuousness of openness itself.  As I would not want to restrict this proposal only to 
those who subscribe to some form of the pragmatist worldview articulated in Chapter I, it 
is worth addressing what is probably the most commonly rehearsed criticism against 
pragmatism.  In Chapter I, I mentioned pragmatism’s less than favorable reputation 
among other philosophical traditions, particularly those of an analytic bent, wherein it is 
seen as simply an “immature” or, as Rorty puts it, a “decadent” worldview that leads to a 
culture “that wishes not to get things right but to make things new,” and will thus “be a 
culture of languid and self-involved aesthetes” (Rorty 2010, 486).  This interpretation 
rests in the belief that pragmatism, in advocating for openness over certainty, amounts to 
a weak-willed relativism.   
 Hopefully, the preceding chapters have highlighted the various ways that 
pragmatists can eschew certainty without giving up the seemingly innate human desire 
for ethical guidance.  We need to have beliefs that can guide our lives.  A state of 
constant and radical skepticism is not what Nietzsche, Dewey, Rorty, or any of the other 
thinkers sympathetic to the central commitments of pragmatism are advocating.  
Remember, Rorty cites the fundamental premise of his Contingency, irony, and 
 214 
 
solidarity, as the idea that “a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought of as 
worth dying for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing 
deeper than contingent historical circumstance” (Rorty 2008, 189).  
 In championing this open orientation towards experience, pragmatists are not 
advising us to abandon those beliefs that give our lives order, meaning, and purpose.  
They are simply asking us to orient ourselves in a certain way towards those beliefs, so as 
to allow us to navigate the novel and changing aspects of experience in a way that helps 
maximize individual well-being, as well as how we interact with and respond to others.  
This orientation can, admittedly, come with a degree of existential despair regarding the 
seeming absurdity of condition once we give up any claims to the certainty.  Thomas 
Nagel, in discussing the notion of the absurd – the tenuous clash between our seemingly 
unavoidable drive to take our beliefs with the utmost seriousness and the problematic 
light cast on those beliefs by our ability to reflect on the contingent and ultimately 
insignificant nature of them – advises us to just embrace this “absurdity” as it comes, and 
to let that embrace infuse our lives with a sense of irony (Nagel 1971, 727).   
 Though, as Rorty alludes to, this is not a sort of detached irony where nothing is 
held to be worthy of guiding one’s conduct.  Possessing the cardinal virtue of openness is 
always a matter of degree.  How willing one is to be affected by experience, how 
hospitable towards the new one is, how much one will actively seek not just to tolerate, 
but also to attempt to understand and grant value to the beliefs of others – these are all 
abilities one may possess to greater and lesser degrees.  But, what remains is that even a 
little bit of openness is better than none.  Perhaps it is helpful to think about openness, 
then, in contrast to its antithesis, closed mindedness.  Openness is, admittedly, a very 
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difficult concept to articulate, and how exactly it works in one’s moral life can be hard to 
tease out.  I have suggested that what aesthetic experience and engagements with the 
work of art actually do is help loosen the crust of convention that limits our horizons of 
possibility.  It is my claim that art can help us think about ourselves and others in a way 
that is not so much dictated by rigid and preconceived ideas about what it means to be a 
“man,” a “woman,” a “father,” an “American,” a “professor,” a “doctor,” etc.  I also have 
contended that in doing such conceptual unsettling, art can help us overcome that certain 
blindness we have towards others in a way that not only unites us with them, but aids us 
in becoming more understanding of difference.   
 
   
Closing thoughts 
 
 Another way of approaching openness, then, is that possessing it injects a 
fallibilism, a willingness to revise one’s beliefs, into one’s overall comportment.  One can 
have beliefs that they are willing to die for, as long as they are also willing to revise those 
beliefs if experience shows them to be in some way harmful towards oneself or others.  
Holding these abilities – profound commitment to certain values combined with a 
willingness to revise values in light of new experience – together might seem to be a 
debilitating paradox, and perhaps it is a regulative ideal after which one always strives, 
but never fully achieves.      
 Openness also carries with it a spirit of experimentalism that is so crucial to our 
democratic way of life.  Just as artists experiment with the traditions out of which they 
are working in order to truly bring something new into existence, the ideal comportment 
within this pragmatist ethical framework I have laid out is one that is comfortable gazing 
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upon new vistas of human experience and seeing that landscape as one in which a better 
society might be forged.  While the past will no doubt have influence on our present 
practices, we must be willing to break from it in the name of progress.   
What has been left unsaid until this point is just how much hope this requires.  I 
actually consider this idea to be Rorty’s best – the idea that we need to substitute hope for 
knowledge.  As we can readily grasp from current news, our world is changing, and it is 
changing fast.  What hubris it takes to think that we can actually come up with some a 
priori theory about anything that will help us navigate the complexities of this changing 
world.  Therefore, we need to have hope.  We need to have hope that we can adapt to the 
fluctuating tides of history so as to constantly work towards the brightest future 
imaginable.  Openness demands this sort of hope.  If one is going to be hospitable 
towards the new, they must also possess a belief that such hospitality is a good thing.  
Granted, the novel is not good, per se.  This is why discourse surrounding the new must 
remain as open and reflective as possible.   
 This is the task Dewey saw philosophy having once it abandoned the quest for 
certainty, for a description of Reality-in-itself.  That is, “Philosophy,” Dewey insists 
should, “surrender all pretension to be peculiarly concerned with the ultimate reality, or 
with reality as complete (i.e., completed) whole; with the real object,” and he goes on to 
aver that philosophical inquiry is “[n]ot a contemplative survey of existence nor an 
analysis of what is past and done with, but an outlook upon future possibilities with 
reference to attaining the better and averting the worse” (MW 10:39).  In closing, then, I 
would like to briefly discuss how my project relates to the discipline of philosophy in 
general.  Although drawing on various philosophical concepts and jargon up to this point, 
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I would like to think that this discussion has not been solely directed at philosophers, but 
to educators (regarding arts education), to students (regarding the need to take the 
appreciation of art seriously), and to the general public (regarding the need to rehabilitate 
art as a central part of human experience).  But, with respect to academic philosophy, I 
would like to summarize my main points.   
 My central claim is that a normative ethics can indeed emerge out of the central 
commitments of pragmatism.  This prescriptive ethics, however, will admittedly look 
different than other, more traditional forms.  A pragmatist ethics is not going to claim 
certainty regarding ethical prescriptions via appeals to an essential human nature, a set of 
supposedly absolute and universal moral maxims, nor a calculus based on maximizing 
human satisfaction.  Humbly, all it can offer are suggestions for how we might become 
better people, where “better” is a notion simply rooted in where we stand as a democratic 
society.  As Dewey writes: 
 Powerful present enemies of democracy can be successfully met only by the 
 creation of personal attitudes in individual human beings; … we must get over our 
 tendency to think that its defense can be found in any external means whatever, 
 whether military or civil, if they are separated from individual attitudes so deep-
 seated as to constitute personal character.” (LW 14:224-30) 
  
 This aligns with Rorty’s contention that Dewey’s aim was to propose hypotheses 
about how to “create new ways of being human, and a new heaven and a new earth for 
these new humans to inhabit, over the desire for stability, security and order” (Rorty 
1999, 88).  With this in mind, I am wholeheartedly endorsing the virtue of openness as 
the cardinal virtue of a pragmatist ethics.  Openness is, of course, not the only virtue we 
ought to cultivate, but it is crucial to our moral deliberation. With this general attitude in 
tow, we can even grant that other character traits that might be salutary become apparent.  
 218 
 
To be open requires a certain view of the way things are, and in holding such a view, it 
has hopefully been brought into relief that other virtues might be worth developing.
27
 
 Having openness, and its attendant contextualism, as a cardinal virtue, however, 
allows one to realize that these other virtues might not always be the best tools to use in 
any given situation.  In this way, the pragmatist virtue ethics I have described resonates 
with Aristotle’s vague definition of virtue, specifically here the virtue of charity, as: 
“[T]o give (money) to the right person, to give the right amount of it, at the right time, for 
the right cause and in the right way” (Aristotle 2002, 34-5).  Extrapolating beyond 
Aristotle’s focus on donating money, we can see openness as a light which helps us see 
more of the possibilities of a situation and more of the tools for inquiry we have at our 
disposal.  For instance, we have multiple tools for ethical inquiry which relate to past 
principles, hoped for consequences, and habits of thought and action.  In his essay “Three 
Independent Factors in Morals” (1930), Dewey argues that it does a disservice to inquiry 
to rely on or overemphasize one of these factors over the rest.  What openness does, then, 
is help us be comfortable with this complexity, and be able to better evaluate which tools 
will be most appropriate to a given situation. 
 Granted, a pragmatist ethics does not give us the instruction manual for handling 
our moral lives that many of us would like to have.  Again, the wager here is that the 
pursuit of such a manual actually does more harm than good as it relates to genuine 
ethical inquiry.
28
  When determining how one ought to live or what one should do in any 
given situation, blindly following directions can lead to devastating consequences.  Sure, 
                                                 
27
 See Chapter I (pp. 48-9) for a brief list of these virtues. 
 
28
 This is also one of the central ideas of Mark Johnson’s book, Morality for Humans: Ethical 
Understanding from the Perspective of Cognitive Science (2014).   
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sometimes such adherence might lead to the “good.”  Yet, an open comportment towards 
experience will not only allow for an appreciation of prior values and principles, but will 
also allow for ethical possibilities previously ignored.  This is what Rorty is getting at 
when he redescribes “redemption” within the context of his literary culture.  Instead of 
seeking what Rorty terms “redemptive truth” (i.e., the absolute solution to the question of 
what to do with ourselves), members of his utopia will understand that “the only source 
of redemption is the human imagination, and that this fact should occasion pride rather 
than despair” (Rorty 2010, 479).    
 I have been arguing that the appreciation of art can help us lessen the 
prescriptions on our conceptual lenses.  By this I mean that the fact that art makes sense, 
that it speaks to us, while being by its nature ambiguous and non-propositional, eases us 
into an awareness that our conceptual systems of interpretation do not exhaust the 
possibilities open to us in human experience.  Labels such as “good,” “bad,” “right,” and 
“wrong,” along with a whole host of other concepts that we employ in our ethical 
decision-making, simply do not do justice to the rich complexity of our existence as 
human organisms coping with our physical and, more importantly, social environment. 
Art can show us new ways of being a self.  Art can help us recognize some of the most 
basic ways in which we are bound together, as well help us become comfortable and even 
curious about individuals’ diverse perspectives on what is and what matters.  
 However, as Dewey astutely points out, we need to be educated to see how art can 
perform this transformative function.  As a final thrust of support for what I have been 
arguing, I feel it is fitting to invoke a very pragmatist tactic.  I have mentioned numerous 
times that the test of any idea for pragmatists ends up being the difference holding such a 
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belief will have in one’s lived experience.  I thus conclude by asking the following 
question:  if we think about ethics in the way I have described, if we think about art and 
aesthetic experience as I have articulated them, and if we think about the relationship 
between the two in the terms I have suggested, what constructive difference might this 
make in the well-being of ourselves and others?  For one, we have to give up any notion 
of certainty in regards to our ethical lives.  Within the framework I have proposed, we 
can no longer stake a claim to knowing that we are living the one right way, or doing the 
one right thing.  Furthermore, I have presented self-correction as something that is not as 
easy as discovering your essence, and, similarly, attempted to show that the pursuit of 
solidarity and inclusivity requires a bit more imaginative work than we might have 
previously thought.  Moreover, I have tried to show how art and aesthetic experience are 
intimately entwined with our everyday lives, and thus brought art off of its pedestal as the 
beauty parlor of civilization.   
 But what might be gained in thinking about the relationship between art and 
ethics in the way I have presented?  I believe that the pragmatist ethics I have presented 
provides us with the resources we need to reconcile the skepticism surrounding moral 
certainty and absolutism with the human desire to make evaluative ethical judgments and 
to make the world better.  We can still say that something is right or wrong, we can still 
praise and condemn ways of living.  Openness simply asks us to treat such judgments in a 
tentative fashion.  As Dewey notes, when engaged in moral inquiry, we would be wise to 
remember that the option(s) not chosen are not necessarily “bad” (MW 14:194).  Thus, 
this ethical framework opens up possibilities for living a life – for creating a self – that 
will, ideally, aid more and more individuals in the their pursuits of a meaningful, happy, 
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and fulfilled existence.  This approach to ethics also emphasizes the need to understand 
the perspectives of others, and appreciate the plurality of those perspectives, so as to 
work towards a more inclusive society that is not a melting pot, but a collective of 
differences bound together by the humble commonalities we share.  And, as I have 
argued, I believe that the appreciation of art needs to be taken seriously as a source of 
ethical development within this framework.  In so doing, I hope to have captured the 
spirit of Nietzsche’s, Dewey’s, and Rorty’s commitments to the intimate relationship 
between art and how we live our lives.  They, I believe, certainly heard God’s laugh
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